Part I

Islamism, Democracy, and the "Clash of Civilizations"

Islam and the West:
Some Cursory Remarks
on Recent Trends

Taufik Abdullah

"A Middle East largely without debates (except, at times within the administration)". Perhaps remembering his early days as the president of the US who was determined to promote human rights all over the world, Jimmy Carter continues his column in an editorial in the *Washington Post* of September 5, 2002, under the heading "The Troubling Face of America", by stating that "the US, which used to be admired 'almost universally' as 'the pre-eminent champion of human rights' now has become the target of respected international organizations concerned about this basic principle of democratic life. We have ignored or condoned abuses in nations that support our anti terrorism effort while detaining American citizens as 'enemy combatants,' incarcerating them secretly without being charged with any crime or having the right to legal counsel". Carter gives other examples about abuses of human rights against people suspected of being Taliban soldiers. He disputes the right of the US Secretary of Defense who declared that the soldiers would not be released, even if some day they were exhausted

and even if they were found innocent. Carter also questions the wisdom of attacking Iraq, such as promoted by a host of conservative leaders in the present administration. Finally, in his short column, Carter also laments the fact that "the US government has abandoned the idea of sponsoring any substantive negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis". He says, "Our apparent policy is to support almost every Israeli action in the occupied territories and to condemn and isolate the Palestinians as blanket targets of our war on terrorism, while Israeli settlements expand and Palestinian enclaves shrink".

Reading this column from the perspective of American partisan politics, we may simply interpret it as nothing but a complaint of a former Democrat's President whose basic policies have been abandoned by the incumbent Republican President. This may well be the case; after all, a recent CNN poll still gives president George W. Bush 65 per cent approval rating.

But then is it not so that precisely the three examples cited by Carter — the nature and character of the so-called global war against terrorism, the eventual attack against Iraq, and certainly, perhaps the most important and sensitive one, the Palestinian conflict — have been the concerns of Muslims of late? Who are the terrorists? What is the definition of terrorism? Is it possible that acts of terror are conducted by the state? Or, should terrorists simply be understood as those who are not with us and therefore should be considered and treated as people who are against us? No one would argue that Saddam Hussein is far from an ideal ruler, say euphemistically, but why should the Iraqi people be punished so many times over? "The State of Iraq", writes Fouad Ajami, "has been at war with the society". A consequence of the US' policy, as an observer puts it, is that it has made it easier for Saddam's regime to stay in power. The sanctions have practically ruined the middle class and reduced it to silence. The irony is that the champion of freedom has made freedom an unattainable goal for the Iraqi people.

In his State of the Union Address President Bush is "kind

enough" to call Iraq and Iran—the countries that have been trying to reposition their places in the world community—and North Korea, as members of "the axis of evil". No one would question the right of the president to have a judgment on anything, but one can ask the question from what perspective the alleged evilness of a country should be viewed? Why should he constantly use the language of hate at times when a better understanding between nations and among the members of the world community is urgently needed, unless he speaks from the conviction that he has a monopoly on truth and justice? He has certainly an answer to this kind of criticism. "Does the world", he might say, "not actually consist of 'absolute good' and 'absolute evil'?" "America will lead by defending liberty and justice", he says, "because these are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere", and, as if to tone down this bold statement he adds, "we have no intention of imposing our culture—but America will always stand firm". History and God, as President Bush explicitly states, have dictated the US to play that role.

Suddenly we are introduced to Huntington's thesis. It is also a thesis that sees the future as being the arena of "the clash of civilizations" (notably between the Islamic and Western civilizations). It is also a thesis that rejects the idea of American multiculturalism. "Multi-culturalism at home", Huntington says in his world famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), "threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West". Even Fukuyama, who does not try to conceal his pride in being part of the Western liberal tradition, cannot match this claim, despite his prognosis that "history" has ended with the self-destruction of the Soviet Union, the state once called by Reagan the "Evil Empire". He is, after all, visualizing the world ruled by Western liberal democratic principles.

Who, in this intellectual sphere, would then be surprised to learn that a group of conservatives is suing the University of

North Carolina for allowing a book, entitled, *Approaching the Quran: The Early Revelation* (1999) to be required reading material for a summer course? Despite the fact that the book is written by Michael Sells, an American professor of comparative religion, the group objects to the fact that the book only touches upon the bright side of the Islamic Holy Book. "Behind the lawsuit", writes the author in his open letter to the *Washington Post* (August 8, 2002) "is an old missionary claim that Islam is a religion of violence in contrast to Christianity, which is a religion of peace. In effect the plaintiffs are suing the Quran on behalf of the Bible. They cite verses that demand the slaying of the infidels—case closed. But most Muslims interpret these in the context of the early war between Muhammad's followers and their opponents". In the letter he also states that a leader of the group criticized "the notion that we should be acquainted with the core theological ideas of the Quran. He demands we focus on Islam and terrorism, a topic that already dominates bookstores' shelves".

In this intellectual climate we do still need Edward Said, who in his seminal book, *Orientalism* (1978), exposes that this branch of knowledge about the religions, cultures, and languages of the people in the East, is actually an expression of Western domination? Or Said's more popular writing, *Covering Islam* (1981) in which he states "to speak about Islam in the West today is to mean a lot of unpleasant things". Do we still have to be convinced by Norman Daniel's remarkable *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (1993) about the continuing strength of the prejudice against Islam that had begun to take shape since the Middle Ages in the Western world? The eventful September 11 incident is tragic as it were "many of those same Muslims" writes Sells in the same above cited letter, "who held candles in solidarity with the Christians" which might have helped the approval rating of president Bush; it also strongly intensified the already negative attitude toward Islam. From a historical perspective, however, this strong anti-Islam sentiment

in the West—most notably in the US, the state that has been called by Huntington "the core states" of the West—is an apex in the long history of millennial adversity. But then Muslims cannot ignore the fact that despite the September 11 tragic event, not only the number of scholars, intellectuals, and even politicians in the West—including the US—who are really trying to understand Islam from the way the Muslims comprehend the nature of their belief, is on the increase, awareness about the importance of comprehending "the others" has increased as well. Indeed Muslims should never ignore this fact. The "West" is after all an analytical construct that can never be equated with social and political reality. The "West" is neither a monolithic cultural world nor an undifferentiated political and social reality.

"The world-wide exposure given to the views and actions of Osama bin Laden and his hosts the Taliban", Bernard Lewis writes in his widely acclaimed book, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (2002), "has provided a new and vivid insight into the eclipse of what once was the greatest, most advanced, and most open civilization in human history". "In short", according to Lewis whose earlier writings have become the targets of the serious criticisms of Edward Said's *Orientalism*, "Islamic civilization in the Middle East" —Lewis, it should be noted, has no pretense to talk about other Islamic countries— "has reached the nadir of its development". It is along this line of thought that in its "Special Report" *Newsweek* (October 15, 2001) comes up with a devastating judgment with the caption, "Bin Laden's fanatics are the offspring of failed societies". In other words, they are not the lunatic fringes in their respective societies; they are actually the representatives of certain social formations and historical circumstances. In this report, written by a naturalized American of Indian Muslim descent, the magazine points its fingers at three major causes: the autocratic rulers, the failed ideas, and the capture of religion by fanatics, as the culprits of the failed societies.

On the basis of a hypothesis that there must be something wrong with the Islamic world, Lewis' book is a serious attempt to trace the series of failures that have been besetting the world of Islam in the Middle East. Practically in all fields — most notably in politics, the military, science, and the economy — the attempts of the Islamic states to reform themselves have failed. The intellectual reformers could only manage to arouse awareness but without significant impacts. Before long they too had to admit defeat. "What have the Muslims done to Islam?" The Psalmists or the fundamentalists, according to Lewis, attributed these failures to a tendency of Muslims to adopt alien notions and practices. But the modernists would say, as Lewis puts it, "The loss is not in the abandonment but in the retention of old wars, and especially in the inflexibility and ubiquity of the Islamic clergy". In short, as Lewis tends to suggest, the failure does not only lie in the efforts to cope with the demands of the time, but also in the endeavor to explain the failure itself.

Lewis' well-known less-than-sympathetic appraisal of Islamic and Middle Eastern tradition aside, in the above mentioned observation he is trying to capture the intellectual mood that has been entertained by critical Arab intellectuals for some time. Laroui Abdallah, for example, in his *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals* (1977) launches a sharp criticism to the tradition of serious examination of inherited cultural mooring. "All too long", he says, "has the Arab intellectual hesitated to formulate a radical criticism of culture, language, and tradition". It is also exactly this hesitancy, one may add to this sentence, which has caused social and cultural discourses to be easily dominated by the so-called "inflexible" men of religion. The *fatwa* that has condemned Salman Rushdi to death is but one example of the growing radical tendencies in recent years in the Islamic world. The irony of the *fatwa* is that it was issued by the Iranian revolutionary leader who had crushed the military might of the Iranian Empire by the mere call to a simple, honest, just, and dignified way of life.

Laroui might be right in his theoretical observation when he says, "The more a society lags behind other societies, the more are the goals of revolution diversified and deepened; the more the intellectual is conscious of this retardation, the greater are his responsibilities and the more frequent are temptations to escape into illusion and myth; the more a revolution must be all-embracing, the more distant and improbable it seems". And, I may also add, the greater the danger is being felt, the higher the possibility for the revolutionary to resort to the all too familiar weapon of reactionary action. Consequently the greater is the possibility for the revolution to abandon its idealism. Any student of history would most likely agree with Laroui's admonition about the need for the intellectual to "objectively appraise what he has hitherto called political commitment". And Laroui is not alone. Whatever the weaknesses of the Middle Eastern states may be, the situation would have been much worse had it not been for the presence of critical and creative intellectuals and the largely moderate Islamic communities in the region. The huge majority of the Muslims need only justice, fair play, and a little understanding. The Islamic militants or terrorists if you like, may have been the products of the failed society, but are they not also the children of the Western failure of understanding and justice?

In spite of sharing similar experiences of colonialism, the psychological wound inflicted by a history of Western conquests in Southeast Asia has never been as grave as it has been felt in the Middle East. Archaeological findings suggest that in the eleventh century there were already Islamic settlements in the Indonesian archipelago and that in the thirteenth century the first known Islamic kingdom had been established; the process of Islamization, however, really began to intensify in the fifteenth century and reached its climax in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That was also the time when explorers, adventurers, traders, and missionaries from "the country above the wind", Europe, came to this part of the world. Therefore, he

may not have been too far from the truth when a scholar said that Islamization in Southeast Asia took place as a result of the "race with Christianity". Conversion to Islam however, also meant making oneself part of Islamic cosmopolitan culture. It is understandable that Muslims in the Southeast Asian region also have their share in anti-Western polemics and in expressing an apologetic attitude towards Islam's past glory.

The people in this region have also long and varied stories to tell about their struggles, bloody or otherwise, against Western political and economic domination and cultural hegemony. A tradition of resistance is very much part of the history of the Muslims in this region. Just take the recent events. The Abu Sayyaf group is still very much active in spite of so many truces and negotiations between the Philippines' central government and the Islamic *bangsa* Moro. The group is still active despite the presence of the US military to support the central government. But how many are these followers of this radical group in this overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country? How many percent of the Muslims in the Philippines support this tiny radical group? Whatever their apprehension towards Christian dominance, the majority of the Muslim community still prefers to find solutions for its grievances in the political process of the country. However strong the determination of the Islamic party in Malaysia to make Islam the sole foundation of the state may be, the party has to face the fact that Malaysia is a plural society, without a strong Malay majority. As a federal state Malaysia also consists of several states, which jealously guard their respective jurisdiction. Since the British colonial period, religion has been under the direct supervision of the separate states. In this situation the moderation of the demand and the sincere willingness to cope with social and cultural plurality would not simply be a matter of virtue, but an imperative if the Islamic party wants to remain relevant in the national community.

The fall of Soeharto in Indonesia did not only open up the process of democratization, it also gave the opportunity for a

long suppressed radicalized Islam to re-emerge. It is as if out of the blue the large Muslim majority in Indonesia was forced to observe how groups of people, wearing white clothes and white hats, burned down alleged "houses of *maksiat*". In the name of Allah and for the sake of society at large these groups have gladly transgressed the borderline between doing well and committing crime. Suddenly, Indonesia is accused of being a possible training ground for Al-Qaeda. Whoever is to be blamed and whatever the causes may be, some parts of Indonesia have become the battleground of bloody religious conflicts. Have Indonesian Muslims drastically changed their moderate posture and their attempt to cope with modernity without abandoning the basic foundation of their religion?

Many years ago the late Mohammad Hatta, the first vice-President of Indonesia—whose 100th birthday has just been celebrated by the nation who more than misses him—mildly criticized the majority of Indonesian '*ulama*', religious teachers and leaders. In one of his speeches Hatta—he himself a grandson of great '*ulama*'—says that one of the weaknesses of the Indonesian '*ulama*' is their lack of a deep understanding of social change and the dynamics of time. Several decades have passed since Hatta expressed his opinion and in the meantime Indonesia has not only passed through several political and social upheavals; social and educational backgrounds of the '*ulama*' group have become much more varied than they were in the past. More importantly, the '*ulama*' as a social category has practically lost its monopoly over religious discourses. Islamic classic texts have become easily accessible to novices lacking the proper background knowledge of Arabic. Translation and print–culture have revealed the secrets of the texts. Furthermore, Western educated religious leaders are no longer a strange phenomenon. The map of religious alignment has also shown significant changes. The intellectual and doctrinal gaps between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah—both most likely not only the two biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia but also

in the world — have become narrower than ever. These organizations, along with a new type of *'ulamaʾ*, are not only the intellectual and social backbones of Indonesia's relatively moderate stand in the worsening relationship between Islam and the West of recent years, but also the major sources of Islamic creative ideas in facing the modern world. The hardening of the position of the Islamic militancy would later be seen as a sad aberration in the history of nation building.

Conflict of values is a very common social and cultural phenomenon. One of the main normative functions of voluntary association — be it a political party, religious organization, or whatever — is to manage and canalize conflict impulses into constructive endeavor. Not a single society in the world is without its conflicting system of values. In the relation between nations and civilizations one cannot simply isolate one value or ideology and turn it into the authentic representative of the whole. Therefore one may wonder why the attitude of Western powers is determined by the voice of the disgruntled Islamic militants only. Why should they ignore the voices that concern the majority while at the same time take serious heed of any clue that may come out of the militant minority? Is it because the voice of the Islamic militants provides strong confirmation to the kind of perceptions they already entertained about Islam for so long? Or on the political and economic level, is it because these voices may pose a serious threat to their economic interests and power? The more the Western powers, notably the US, base their policies and attitudes on their understanding of these militant sections of the Islamic community, the greater the possibility for this minority to expand its influence. And, the logical consequence would be: the graver the Western apprehension towards Islam, the tougher the militants would cling to their ideas about the West, whose ways of life and attitudes have become increasingly repugnant to them. And what is the next stage? Would the world community let itself fall into the

trap of Huntington's scenario of the future: "the clash of civilizations"?

Frankly I don't believe that we are heading towards this bleak scenario for the future. Nor do I believe the more optimist prognosis about the future, when the whole world would adhere to Western liberal democracy. Multiculturalism will continue to characterize the world. Competition between nations, despite globalization and the decreasing importance of nation states may still continue or even intensify. But, as I have stated earlier, not only the voice of moderation is still strong, the attempts to understand and comprehend the "others" are also growing. The louder the voice of hatred the greater would be the effort to silence it. But no one should free himself from his responsibility to cultivate the spirit of understanding, justice, and friendship. Different types and scales of international gatherings—from meetings to small workshops, from scientific conferences to art festivals and sport games—not to speak of economic interdependencies and technological interconnections can certainly help, but no responsible citizen of the world community should remain aloof from the dangerous game that people driven by feelings of hate, revenge, and arrogance have been playing. Standing aloof and hoping that things would be resolved in the course of time may not be a criminal act but is certainly a sign of hopelessness.

Islamism, Democracy, and the "Clash of Civilizations"

Bassam Tibi

In my contribution, I shall take an analytical approach to Islam, democracy, and the issues of the value-loaded clash of civilizations. My first step then is to outline the approach I use for the study of Islam.

The first text, I ever saw in my life and which I used to learn for reading and writing was the Quran. At the age of five, I went to the Umayyad mosque in Damascus and started to learn how to read and write. This is more meaningful to me than the medal of the state that I received from the President of Germany. I originally come from an *ashraf* family in Damascus called Banu-al-Tibi, a family to which, according to the history of Damascus, leading *qadi*s and *mufti*s belonged to for centuries. It has been well documented that the Banu-al-Tibi family was for centuries among the notables (*ashraf*) of Damascus. I grew up in such a family. Islamic education and Islamic values were the educational framework of my socialization. And then in Germany as well as in the United States, where I have been doing my research for the past 20 years, I learned how to study Islam as a social scientist. With this background, it has been very impor-

tant from the very beginning to combine the study of the sources of Islamic history and Islamic faith with the social scientific methodology of studying Islam. The first text I studied during my undergraduate years in Frankfurt was Emile Durkheim's methodological rules for the sociology of religion. Religion is based on faith, but is also–in his understanding–a "social fact". I still follow this rule when I study Islam. Of course, we need to study the Quran and religious precepts, but for studying Islam as embedded in Islamic society, i.e. the social reality of Muslims' life, it is not enough to refer to Islamic teachings. There are many shortages in Muslim life and it is very important not to put the blame on others, but also on us. If we understand the Quran well, we then know God's revelation:

> And Allah doesn't change the people unless they change themselves (QS:13:11).

This Quranic verse also instructs us to consider ourselves not as individuals, but as social realities, in order to be able to understand what is wrong in our social spheres.

In addition, there is a need for addressing Islamism. This modern term was coined to describe a recent movement. In Arabic, people say *al-Islamiyya* for which the translation is "Islamism". This well-known term has become established in Arabic since Hasan Hanafi, a very famous Egyptian philosophy professor in Cairo, published his book *al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Fundamentalism) in 1986. The term fundamentalism is frequently used for "political Islam". In the Arab world, however, the preferred term is *al-Islam al-Siyasi*, i.e. political Islam.

At issue is not Islam as a faith or a system of ethics, but rather as a political ideology. Islam is not only my religion, but also my set of ethics being a Muslim living in the West. Yet there exists an interpretation of Islam as a political system underpinned by a political ideology. In short: "Islamism" describes a political Islam. This is not the faith or the ethic of Islam, nor is

Islamism a reflection of the idea of our civilization. Many Muslim people discuss these issues and agree to apply the term "civilization" to Islam. In this understanding the Islamic civilization is a notion embracing the whole *umma*. All civilizations have their own values; hence, the clash of civilizations is a conflict over values. If we go back to the history of Islamic ideas, we encounter the work of Ibn Khaldun, the great Islamic philosopher in the fourteenth century, who coined the term *al-'Imran* as the "Science of Civilization" in his book *Muqaddima*. His work was left disregarded in the world of Islam for a long time, but was rediscovered in the late eighteenth century in Europe and translated into French in the nineteenth century. In the Western science of history, we read the great British historian Arnold Toynbee who early discovered Ibn Khaldun and his study of history. According to Toynbee "Ibn Khaldun is the brightest mind in the history of mankind". This expresses a European view on a Muslim scholar. The idea of Ibn Khaldun is that human beings unite and establish a collectivity of their own, a so-called civilization. In Ibn Khaldun's opinion, the core of a civilization is not religion, but the *'asabiyya*. It seems quite difficult to translate *'asabiyya*. There is a great number of literary works dealing with this issue. But the best translation is the French term *esprit de corps* (spirit of collectivity).

It follows from what I have said that it is possible to explain Islam and Islamism and also to deal with democracy in this way. At the outset we need to ask: Why are we talking about democracy here and now? Before I address this issue, let me make one more point on "civilization". Long before Samuel Huntington came up with his ideas about civilizations, the great political scientist, sociologist, and philosopher Raymond Aron published his book *Peace and War between the Nations* in 1961, i.e. at the height of the Cold War. He addressed bipolarity as a cover veiling the real conflicts and concealing reality. Aron referred to the two blocs in world politics at that time: the Western and the Eastern bloc. The reality, however, was the heterogene-

ity of civilizations. Aron rightly referred to the fact that humanity consists of civilizations, not of Capitalist and Communist blocs.

The crucial question for our meeting is therefore: Does a feasibility of a new "world civilization" exist? I challenge this term and refer to Ibn Khaldun and his concept of *'asabiyya*. Humanity is a unity of very different peoples. Muslims form a common civilization, yet those in Morocco are distinguishable from those in Indonesia. I learned from Clifford Geertz, with whom I studied in Princeton, and his classic *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* that Indonesian Islam is different from Moroccan Islam. I was born in Syria, but I lived in Morocco and I visited Indonesia many times. My experience over the years corresponds in fact to what Geertz observed. But Moroccans and Indonesians do have something in common. They are Muslims and they have one *'asabiyya* in the understanding of Ibn Khaldun, having a civilizational self-awareness. It is this what distinguishes them from others.

Islam is not only a faith but also a common bond. Therefore, I believe that humanity is subdivided into a variety of civilizations. There is nothing wrong with that. The Quran states that:

> And we created you as tribes and peoples to get to know one another (QS:49:13).

This is an acknowledgement of the diversity in humanity. When it comes to Muslims themselves we find, a verified *hadith* by the Prophet stating:

> The diversity in my *umma* is a sign of well being.

Hence, the existence of diversity is acknowledged in Islam. In our present days, Islamism acknowledges this diversity and the fact that humanity is sub-divided into civilizations. However, islamists have a monolithic world-view. The debate on this heated up when Samuel Huntington published his article *The Clash of Civilizations* in 1993. In the same year, Princeton scholar Bruce Russett published a book under the title *Grasping*

the Democratic Peace. Starting from peace as a strategy for the twenty-first century Russett argued, if people organize themselves democratically they could deal with their conflicts by negotiations. Of course, there are conflicts among people of different civilizations having different values. These are conflicts over values, which can be resolved peacefully through talking with each other. Unlike Huntington, Russett revives the Kantian idea of "democratic peace". Similarly, the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium also published a book under the title *Democracy and Asia* in order to promote the idea of democratic peace. As co-author of this book, I advocated the abolition of war as a means of settling conflicts. I argue that existing conflicts about people's values can be resolved peacefully.

As a social scientist, I am committed in my analysis to the Weberian approach which involves addressing the issues at hand in an analytical fashion, instead of hoping for a solution by wishful thinking. Sometimes authors pursue their wishful thinking and thus the outcome is clearly not an analysis of the reality, but rather its distortion. Unlike Max Weber, I am not completely value-free in my analysis to the extent that I do acknowledge the grounds on which I am operating. These grounds too are triggered and formed by my personal interest. The German scholar Jürgen Habermas taught us students that any search for knowledge is driven by interest. Hence, one needs to ask what one's interest is. Everybody has an interest, and my interest is peace and how we can achieve it.

I am committed to a cross-cultural dialogue. What is this dialogue about? "Dialogues" does not solely mean, "talking to each other". Dialogues are efforts of "conflict resolution". To do this, we have to identify the causes of conflict. There are value-related conflicts as well as economic and many other conflicts. In short, the scope of conflicts is very broad. In order to be able to speak to one another, we first of all have to create a common language. For instance, if somebody from Europe speaks about peace, he may involve philosophical thoughts of Emmanuel

Kant, while the approach by an orthodox *Salafi*-Muslim to explain peace would differ considerably. There are still Muslims who want to expand the *Dar al-Islam* in the understanding of the Islamization of the world. This is their contribution to achieving peace. But we now live in the twenty-first century and—without pluralism—traditional Islamic approaches must not be considered as in any way fruitful for peace. As a reform-Muslim, I do accept Hindus, Jews, and Christians as equals and I am able to have peace with them. So, we need to base peace on new grounds.

After September 11, talking about the need for a common language obliges us to prevent "culture" being overlooked in world politics. Prior to September 11, it was very difficult to deal with culture. As a professor of International Relations, I found it hard to become established in this field. Some IR-colleagues even asked me to work on cultural anthropology or theology, because religion and culture do not belong to the field of International Relations in the first place. I am pleased to tell you that in February 2001, 7 months ahead of September 11, in its annual meeting, the International Studies Association accepted two panels on Religion and International Politics presented by Professor Fred Halliday from the London School of Economics and myself. Fred Halliday said to me in Arabic: "We do our pilgrimage here in Chicago". It was rather meant to be a scientific pilgrimage though and we were allowed to have two panels on religion, culture, and international relations respectively. This was quite exceptional in the field of International Relations at the time, but now it is allowed to consider this turn to culture a "strategy of research".

Islam, as many other faiths, is not solely a religion but, as mentioned above, also a civilization. The term itself appears to be frequently blurred, which is why so many people ask what civilization actually means. In International Relations, we primarily deal with states, like Indonesia, having dialogues with Australia, Malaysia, and the United States. But how can differ-

ent civilizations talk to one another in practice? First, we need to distinguish between culture and civilization. I have been trained in International Relations, but I have also studied cultural anthropology with Professor Clifford Geertz, who is considered to be the greatest authority in this field. I have learned from him to understand culture as a local production of meaning. Geertz is an expert on Indonesia, he spent years doing research there, and I am grateful to have learned about Indonesia from him even before coming to the country myself. Indonesia, although an Islamic country, is also the world's greatest cultural diversity with more than 300 different cultures living in one state.

Culture, as said above, is always local and means local production of meaning. There are in this country some cultures that resemble each other considerably. But is it possible to talk about a "cultural entity" of Indonesia? I am a Muslim living in the United States and in Europe. My background is the Middle East, i.e. Syria. When I meet Indonesians, I feel close to them and, to be honest, I feel more close to them than to Americans, because we have something in common. It is not only the faith of Islam; it is also a very specific civilizational awareness. And therefore, it seems possible to me to see Islam as a bond of civilizations. This statement also applies to other entities for there are civilizations that represent a certain world-view. The definition of civilization is not based on religion, but rather on a common world-view. I believe that there is an Islamic world-view, which I have described at length in my most recent book *Islam between Culture and Politics* (New York 2001). I see a great variety of different cultures stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. It is certainly true, that they are culturally different, but they also share a similar or even the same world-view. Along these lines, we can talk about a civilization. The same can be seen in Europe. I have been living in Europe for forty years and have seen many diverse parts of Europe. During the past twenty years, I established a new life in North America besides that in Lower

Saxony in Germany. In the United States, people from the East Coast are obviously distinguishable from people from the West Coast, but they, as is true of Europeans, equally share a Western world-view and the same civilization. The dialogue is between the two civilizations: those of Islam and the West, which covers Europe as well as the United States. It is a dialogue about values and not about the search for a new world civilization. There is no such thing as a civilization uniting all mankind. Civilizations differ from each other, but they can be related to one another by the term "cross-cultural morality". I coined this term in the book *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations,* which I co-authored with the former German President Roman Herzog. Samuel Huntington was also invited to join us as a co-author to write the concluding chapter. Unfortunately, he declined. In my contribution to this book, I argued that we could bridge the gap between civilizations in establishing certain common grounds. Surely, Muslims share a different morality than Christians, Hindus, and Jews, but we can search for commonalities in norms and values.

To do Huntington justice, he did not only talk about the "clash of civilizations". In his article, published in 1993, he dealt exclusively with it and the so-called "bloody borders in Islam". In his book published in 1996, however, he became more differentiated. We had a seminar at Harvard University on "culture and globalization" and I was part of the group of scholars gathered there. For hours, I discussed the pending issues with Huntington and expressed my deep concern about demonizing people and cultures. We as Muslims do not want the West to demonize us, but we should not do the same to others, nor to persons like Huntington, nor to the West as a different civilization. Those who have read Huntington thoroughly know what the last chapter ("The Commonalities of Civilization") in his book is about. Here Huntington himself deals not with the "clash of civilizations", but also calls for the search for commonalities. I go far beyond Huntington in arguing that it is possible to es-

tablish a consensus over values. We need a basic consensus over democracy, individual human rights, and civil society. Of course, we may not agree on all these issues, but there are basic issues we can come to terms with and both parties should be open-minded. Another point made in my argumentation is the question of what dialogue is? A dialogue is simply an effort aiming at conflict resolution, i.e. a peaceful conflict resolution is the alternative to war.

There are several requirements for a dialogue and I will single out some of them. At first, it is wrong to resort to accusations and self-victimization. When Western and Islamic people talk to one another they need to address genuinely the pending issues related to living together in peace.

Secondly, I would like to refer to a problem I have with Edward Said. To be sure, Edward Said does not know the Quran, he is a Christian and a scholar of English literature at the Columbia University. In 1979 Edward Said published his book *Orientalism,* although he is not an expert in Islamic Studies. Despite his great lack of knowledge in this very field, he is right in claiming that there are prejudices against the "Orient". Indeed, there is such a thing as Western orientalism. I live in Germany, I studied Oriental Studies and I am a victim of German orientalism. I did side with Edward Said for years until a friend of mine, Sadik al-Azm, a Syrian professor of philosophy opposed Said by making a crucial point; he published an article under the title "Orientalism, and Orientalism in Reverse". In that article, he states that Edward Said is reversing orientalism. To a European racist an African man might be considered ugly, because black is often associated with ugly. But Africans who defend themselves against this racist demonization by arguing: "No, black is beautiful!" do not go beyond racism in that their response is a kind of anti-racism. Therefore, we should not use the arguments of orientalists to reverse racism.

Thirdly, there is the problem of blame. Can we put the blame of our Islamic misery on orientalism? Should we not also look at

ourselves and refrain from accusation and self-victimization? We surely need to be knowledgeable about each other. Westerners should know more about Islam than that a Muslim has the right to be married to four wives. Islam is much more complicated than such kinds of simplifications and prejudices. However, it is equally true that we Muslims need to know more about the West. The West is not only Hollywood and Marilyn Monroe; it is more than that. It is also Emmanuel Kant and the French Revolution. Both parties need to be ready to compromise and to avert self-righteous argumentations.

Fourthly, we need to accept the existence of conflict between Islam and the West. I studied Islamic-Western history and compiled my research into my book *Crusades and Jihad*. I came across the fact that the first globalization project in history was not Western globalization; it is our globalization when Islam, in the seventh century, started to spread its project. The Islamic vision came also across to Indonesia, through trade however. But Islam came to other places of the world through *jihad* war. Here I am not talking about Islam as revealed in the Quran. Instead, I am knowingly talking about Islam in terms of history, i.e. about historical Islam. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western globalization began to emerge and ever since we have two clashing globalization projects. Yet both in the history of Islam and the history of the West, one has to concede positive elements between the ninth and twelfth centuries: The Hellenization of Islam revered Aristotle as the *al-mu'allim al-awwal* in its history. To clarify my point, *al-mu'allim* (the teacher) is the highest rank in Islam and is much higher regarded than the rank of the ruler. Indeed, the first *mu'allim* for Muslims between the ninth and twelfth centuries was Aristotle who was not a Muslim. This is an indication how open-minded Muslims were at that time, and this is why the Islamic civilization was doubtlessly the highest and most developed civilization in the world. Having the Hellenization of Islam as one part of mutual fertilization, we may detect the Islamic impact on European Renais-

sance as the other. Many Western historians acknowledge that without the impact of Islamic rationalism (Ibn Rushd [Averroes]) on the West, the Renaissance would not have taken place. I see this statement as a fact. Additionally, as I outlined in *Crusades and Jihad,* there is a long tradition of economic, military, and power relationships between both civilizations.

Let me now conclude by referring to the two levels of dialogue. A dialogue can be international, i.e. Indonesia is having talks with the United States or people from different states and parts of the world get together for general meetings—like this one—on a non-governmental level. Moreover, there is another area of dialogue probably not known in this country, because there are not that many Indonesian migrants in Western Europe. It is the integrational dialogue with Muslim migrants in the West. In 1950, there were only 800,000 Muslims living in Western Europe. In the year 2000 the number climbed up to approximately 15 million. It is expected that in the mid of the twenty-first century there will be about 40 to 50 million Muslims living as migrants in Western Europe.

Islam has become a part of the West through migration. Does this mean that Islam in Europe become European? When Islam came to Indonesia it became Indonesian; when Islam spread over to Africa it became African. So there are two levels of dialogue, and the content of the dialogues needs to be different according to the level. However, the dialogue in Europe between the Islamic Diaspora and the West on the one hand, and the dialogue on the global level on the other should both aim at a consensus consisting of values. This consensus is an element of bridging civilizational gaps; it is a cross-cultural approach and a cultural effort to establish an international morality.

Peace between civilizations is possible. Only a tolerant Islam and an open-minded West are able to establish a democratic peace. Islamism and a hegemonial West would lead to a clash between Islamic and Western civilizations. Each party has to do its own homework. Our homework as Muslims is to

look in the mirror and realize "what went wrong", in order to change ourselves instead of blaming others. I do not contradict myself when I ask the West for doing the same homework by not putting the blame on Islam.

Religious Resurgence
at the End of the Twentieth Century

Elizabeth F. Collins

Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the world has witnessed the emergence of new movements in every major world religion. This religious resurgence has two faces. It has been described as a "fundamentalist" revolt against modernity, but it has also produced "civic" movements that provide social services to marginalized populations, and press for ethical politics. What these diverse religious movements share is an emphasis on the moral authority of religious traditions and a demand that religion play a central role in political life.

For the most part, scholarly and media attention has been directed at new (so called) "fundamentalist" religious subcultures, as in Gilles Kepel's *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (1994) and Marty Martin's multi-volume study of *Fundamentalisms* (1994-99) in every major religious tradition. Media attention has been particularly directed at those religious movements that support the use of violence in the expression of their demand that a particular religious tradition be the basis of political authority. These include not only the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, small groups

throughout the Islamic world variously described as "Islamist", "Wahhabi", or "Salafi", Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam in Indonesia, and but also the Bharatiya Janata Party (or BJP) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, which militantly promote a Hindu India, the United Sangha Front, a militant Buddhist party in Sri Lanka which has opposed negotiations with Hindu Tamils, Gush Emunim in Israel, which has used violence to promote the biblical concept of the Land of Israel, and also Protestant fundamentalist groups that push for American support of Israel in its use of violence to repress Palestinian protests.

However, a few studies, such as Jose Casanova's study of *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994), have pointed to the emergence of new movements that play an important role in the expansion of civil society and the promotion of democracy, social justice, human rights, and tolerance. In Indonesia, the *Pembaruan* (Renewal) movement of Nurcholish Madjid and the Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) are examples of new civil Islamic movements promoting tolerance and democratic reform. In *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (2000), Robert W. Hefner also pointed to the profoundly moderating and democratic influence Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have had on Indonesian politics over the last decade. In addition to civic Islamic movements, we can point to the liberation theology movement in Latin America and the Philippines, Solidarity in Poland, and Palang Dharma in Thailand. While the militant (so-called) "fundamentalist" movements are exclusive and authoritarian, these civic religious movements support inter-faith dialogue, tolerance, freedom of worship, and civic activism in the areas of education, economic development, and conflict resolution.

I argue that the focus on a clash between Islamism and the West as the challenge of the twenty-first century is misplaced. Rather, we need to understand the changes that have affected contemporary societies in the last half of the twentieth century

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and brought forth this religious resurgence. And we need to examine the two faces of this global resurgence in religion — one militant and exclusive, one inclusive, civic, and tolerant — to see under what conditions militant fundamentalist subcultures are fostered. For it is these militant subcultures and those in any religious tradition who support the use of violence that present the real challenge of the new century.

The global religious resurgence of the late twentieth century is to be found in countries that differ in both their cultural origins and their level of development. This suggests there is a global crisis that has led people to turn to their religious traditions in search of a solution. A thorough analysis of this crisis is not possible in such a short space as this contribution, but we can provide an outline of the political, social, and economic context in which these new religious movements emerged.

1) First is the legacy of the Cold War, which led to support for dictatorships by Western powers of the "Free World", and authoritarian rule in Eastern Block nations. Western support for authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia allowed corrupt rulers to abuse their power. Movements for change were suppressed and dissidents were arrested and tortured. The frustration of efforts at reform through political channels led people to turn to their religious traditions as providing a way to mobilize collective resistance and to support demands for social justice. This was the context in which liberation theology movements emerged in Latin America and the Philippines and Engaged Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Thailand. In the Middle East, Islamic "fundamentalist" movements or "Islamism" emerged.

2) Population growth and economic pressures led to massive migration from the countryside to cities in the 1960s and 1970s. In the sprawling cities, rural immigrants formed marginal communities with limited economic opportunities. The spread of education in the independent nations of the third

world promised a better future, but those who graduated found that there were not enough jobs. The third aspect of the global crisis has been the failure of governments to provide economic opportunities for a new generation of educated young people and adequate services in the form of hospitals, health and community centers, and education for marginalized groups in urban environments. Both civic and militant religious groups have tried to fill this gap by programs of social welfare, community building, and economic development. The Islamist message has been particularly effective in providing these communities with hope for a different future.

3) Third are the effects of the globalization of capital and the domination of Free Market ideology. With the demise of socialist governments in newly independent nations, multinational corporations have played a growing role in the economies of countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. They have been able to purchase mineral and land rights, often through bribes or deals with corrupt governments. In many countries, as in Indonesia, corporations, such as Exxon-Mobil and Freeport Mining, have taken advantage of the security forces provided by authoritarian regimes to crush opposition to their claims on land and resources. Local corporations also benefited from favors conferred by corrupt regimes. Throughout the world the spread of global capitalism has led to a massive transfer of access to natural resources and land from local peoples to elites and corporations. The impoverishment of local peoples, the resentment of owners of small enterprises unable to compete with well-connected corporate elites, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor has fueled movements for reform.

4) Economic forces are now beyond the control of national governments. As multinational corporations expanded into international markets to take advantage of cheap labor, governments with less developed economies found themselves

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competing for investment by offering liberal conditions to corporations, keeping wages low, and suppressing political protest. This tended to destabilize governments. Furthermore, national governments found themselves unable to manage international economic crises, such as the Asian Crisis of 1997. The impact of international economic forces and resistance to change by authoritarian regimes has led to a growing sense of powerlessness. When people feel powerless, they are most likely to turn to violence.

5) The effects of powerlessness can best be seen in the emergence of Islamism in Egypt after the defeat of Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Muslims looked for new leadership. Drawing on the legacy of anti-colonial movements, resentment at the domination of Muslim nations by Western powers, and the failure of secular nationalist leaders to provide people with a better life, the Islamists claimed that only through the overthrow of corrupt secular governments and the establishment of an Islamic state could social justice be attained and Muslim peoples win the respect of Western leaders. Middle class professionals and impoverished rural immigrants alike turned to the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, Mawlana Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, and Ayatullah Rohullah Khomeini, which promised to create a more just society with moral leaders. In Egypt, the imprisonment and torture of Islamist protesters radicalized the Muslim Brotherhood and legitimated the use of violence in political struggle. The success of the Iranian revolution against the dictatorship of the Shah of Iran in 1979 suggested that violent revolution was the way forward. American support for Afghan resistance to Soviet aggression helped to globalize the Islamist movement and the ideology of armed struggle (*jihadism*) in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The failure of leaders of Israel and the international community to deal with the problem of displaced Palestinians played an important role in the spread of Islamism. The Palestinian

intifada that began in 1987 presented images of rock-throw-ing youths confronting a well-armed Israeli army of occupa-tion that resonated with the experience of Muslims who had protested against their own (Western-backed) governments in the hope of reform. Photos of Palestinian children killed by the Israeli army relayed throughout the Islamic world by new global media made Palestinian resistance to Israeli oc-cupation a metaphor for the relationship between Muslims and the West.

6) Finally, it is important to emphasize that although the glo-bal crisis derives from economic globalization and a failure of leadership by secular and supposedly "democratic" re-gimes to deal with the effects of economic and social change, this crisis is not viewed simply in terms of economic and political issues. It is perceived to be a moral crisis. In urban settings the impact of traditional moral sanctions is eroded. Corrupt elites pursuing their own self-interest block politi-cal reforms. As a result, many people throughout the world have come to regard secularism as the cause of the global crisis. Even in prosperous communities in the United States, there has been growing anxiety that the world is being en-gulfed by spreading immorality. As illustrated by the name taken by the new conservative Protestant movement that emerged in the 1980s, the "Moral Majority", the tendency to see "secularism" as the problem is to be found everywhere. The claim that religion is the solution to the world's prob-lems is particularly strong in fundamentalist subcultures.

However, religious mobilization has not been the only re-sponse to the global economic and political crisis. The last 25 years have also witnessed the emergence of the NGO movement and an international civil society. In the absence of effective leadership from national governments, thousands of local non-governmental organizations have been established to deal with environmental issues, women's issues, political reform, and a host of other problems. Organizations such as Amnesty Inter-

national and Human Rights Watch and the coalition of environmental organizations that organized the summit in South Africa on sustainable development have tried to provide international leadership in dealing with problems that threaten peoples of all nations, particularly in the areas of human rights, the environment, and poverty. Like the new religious movements, these NGOs represent efforts by ordinary people to do something about the issues that threaten their societies and the global human community.

As we look back over the last 25 years, then, we see there is room for hope as well as deep concern about our future. Everywhere people have been organizing to confront issues that impact their societies, and they have begun to build international coalitions to work for reform. The danger that we confront today lies not in a clash of civilizations but in failing to recognize that the political, economic, social, environmental, and moral crisis we face will require patient and persistent efforts at reform. Violent solutions will only provoke and legitimize further violence.

Defining the problem of the twenty-first century as a "clash of civilizations" or a "war against terrorism" leads to polarization. People are pushed to define themselves in patriotic or religious terms of a single dimension, as American or Western versus Islamic, and Christian versus Muslim. Those defined as the enemy-other are dehumanized. This kind of polarization sanctions violence and carries the risks of catastrophe.

Cross-cutting attachments that link people to others in different social groups are denied. In contrast, membership in professional organizations, in civic groups working on environmental issues, human rights or gender issues, and interfaith dialogue supports recognition of our common humanity.

The challenge that confronts us is to find a way to build upon a heritage of civic activism supporting non-violent movements for a more just global economic and political order. We cannot simply wait for political leaders to solve the crisis we

confront. Movements in support of greater economic justice and the common good have always come from below.

Reform must be global and local at the same time. We must work at building democratic institutions that hold political leaders accountable to all the people, not just influential elites or particular segments of society. We must demand that corporate leaders take responsibility for the impact of their policies on others. We must individually and collectively engage in dialogue with groups having different interests and perspectives. We must build networks across national boundaries if we are to provide hope for change. We must demand reforms in the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. The choice is not between Islam and the West or between religious and secular movements, but between non-violent reform and a descent into violence.

Islam, Democracy
and the "Clash of Civilizations"

Komaruddin Hidayat

Islam, democracy, and the "clash of civilizations" are currently three widely discussed themes, although the relation of each to each other is not always clear. While Islam is believed to be God-given values, democracy is a man-made product. The "clash of civilizations", on the other hand, is a nightmare, or to be more precise, Huntington's nightmare. As such, few like to talk about it, but especially after September 11 the nightmare seems to have become a reality.

The first thing to understand when we problematize Islam and democracy, is that, based on revelation, Islam puts human beings under control of something outside of them. Accordingly, we do not actually own our own lives. Life is lived under God's rules and regulations. It is true that there is discussion about free will among Muslims, but this discussion evolves around God, not around human beings. It is inconceivable for Islam, or for any other religion, to negate the existence of God let alone to break the relationship between human beings and God altogether.

It goes naturally then that if the center of the Islam-based community is God and His revelation, the distance between this community and God decides everybody's position. The closer one is to God, the more respected one is and the more knowledgeable one is about the revelation, the better one's access to power. It is only natural that religious men are dominant in the decision-making process in an Islam-based community, and it is equally natural that this group is potentially the strongest opponent to democratization.

In Islam nobody argues that one can choose a Prophet. Even though a Prophet is a human being like each of us (*qul innama> ana>basharun mithlukum*), he is given revelation (*yuh>ilayya* [QS:41:6]). Although the Prophet had done his best to encourage people's participation in community matters, his people were hardly courageous enough to challenge him. "God and his messenger know best (*Allahu wa Rasuluhu a'lam*)", was usually the answer when the Prophet asked someone a question.

A slight different situation emerged when the Prophet died. After him, there was nobody who was given revelation. In a sense everybody was now equal. But religious considerations remained strong in people's positioning. Each of the Four Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafa> al-Rashidun*) was an early convert. Later converts like the Banu Umayya—although they were economically powerful and more cosmopolitan because they played a significant role in international trading in Arabia—were politically and socially marginalized. However, in terms of "democracy" the era of the Four Guided Caliphs was better than that of the Prophet. There was an election process, as well as competition for the caliphate office and there were fierce debates in the councils set up by the caliphs.

The worse was the era after the Four Guided Caliphs. The Muslim community fell into anarchy. The values that are compatible with democracy such as consultation (*mushawara*) and egalitarianism (*musawat*), which were consciously developed

by the Prophet and by the Four Guided Caliphs, were suppressed. Since then the Muslim world lived under an oppressive system. And so far they have not yet experienced what the Western world has: the disappearance of the "ancient regime" and the emergence of new political and social structures.

Democracy, unlike systems based on religion, does not require proximity to God in order to fully participate in community matters. In a democratic society it is unnecessary to have an understanding about revelation in order to become a community leader. Of course not everybody can become leader even in a democratic country, nor can everybody get everything he wants. But through democracy people can participate to achieve what they need and the notion of status is more open.

A more intriguing question however, is whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Is it the rule that once democracy is accepted as the political system in a Muslim community then, Islam will loose its ground? If we ask this question to Indonesian Muslims, the answer is somewhat surprising. According to Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) research on Good Governance, 71 per cent out of 2017 respondents—taken proportionally from 16 provinces—see democracy as the best system for the country. But at the same time 58 per cent of them also agree that an Islamic government (i.e. governance based on the Quran and the Ḥadīth of the Prophet led by experts in Islam) is best for Indonesia. How could it be that the majority of them believe in a democratic system and in an Islamic government at the same time?

One possible answer is that for them democracy is indeed compatible with Islam. They can be democratic and have an Islamic government at the same time. This is potentially confusing. How can a reason and secular-based government system go hand in hand with a revelation-based system? Well, this is one of the unique features of Indonesian Muslims. When we look at it further we discover that, although they accept an Is-

lamic government, only 13 per cent of them are actually ready to fully acknowledge God's sovereignty. It means that while confirming the Quran and the Hadith as the foundations of the government of the state, they demand a greater participation in interpreting them. It is not surprising that Indonesia is not a good home for fundamentalism or for scripturalism.

But when we ask my colleague Bahtiar Effendy about the compatibility of Islam and democracy he gives a tricky answer. First, he quotes Huntington, "Islamic doctrines thus contain elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy", and then he says that "what makes Islam congenial and uncongenial to democracy is a matter of how someone interprets the doctrine of Islam". But, again quoting Huntington, he goes on to say that so far no Islamic country has been fully democratic. This is the reason why the Muslim world has been excluded from studies on democracy. If we accept the argument that whether Islam is pro or contra democracy is a matter of Muslim interpretation, the absence of democratic countries in the Muslim world means that Muslims have been unable so far to interpret Islam in the light of democracy — or that Muslims so far have only been able to interpret Islam against democracy.

When it comes to interpretations, many different variables are at work, and these include history, culture, and political and economic conditions. Interpretation is basically subjective; it is a product of the complexity of life. The failure of Muslims to be democratic is partly due to the absence of an atmosphere suitable for the rise of democracy. A challenging task emerges if one is to socialize democracy in the Muslim world: from understanding their history and re-inventing their culture, to solving their economic and political problems. Democracy cannot work in Indonesia unless it allows itself to be intervened by local history and tradition.

Before I end my remarks, let me remind us:

Being Muslim, we might be trapped in a dangerous busi-

ness. If, for some reasons, we are convinced that democracy is the best system for the world, and, as true believers, we also believe that Islam is the best way of life, and then we will potentially be led to see that everything in Islam is democratic. The Quran is democratic, so is the Ḥadīth, the Prophet, the Caliphs etc. Thus for us the argument runs as follows: to say that Islam is undemocratic equals to say that Islamic values are base, or even to negate the rightness of Islam.

Well this might not be the case. Islam believes in universal values, and this makes it ready to accept any truth beyond its boundaries. As far as democracy is concerned, even when it did not originally come from Islam, it can be justified within the framework of the Islamic tradition. It is the duty, for people from the East and the West, then to prove that democracy is universal.

The "clash of civilizations" is at least based on one of two assumptions. First, we all fail to make a common ground. The West is the only good home for democracy. Muslims will never manage to re-interpret their doctrine contextually and will always have the same version of history and the same understanding of their cultures. Second, we all believe that democracy is not only the end of the Western world but also the end of our world. There is nothing beyond democracy. The notion of "political system" seems to be frozen here. Are we sure about this?

Since it is absurd to assume that we all will have the same view of our history and culture, it is also absurd to believe that there is such a thing called the "clash of civilizations". But a stronger argument can be made against a permanent existence of the clash of civilizations: globalization. With globalization dialogue and communication are inevitable, and that makes every aspect of our lives open. What is more is that civilization is supposed to be mankind's best product, is it correct that our best product is a clash or a war?

It is more correct, in my view, to acknowledge the "clash of ideologies", instead of the "clash of civilizations". Ideology is characterized, among other things, by the existence of a common enemy, emotional attachment, political agenda, and simplification. Now, let's talk about Islam, about democracy and about the West, not as ideologies, but as sets of values.

Part 2

Media and the Politics of Image Making

Fighting Demons in the Kingdom of the Blind: Media and the Politics of Demonization in the Wake of September 11

Farish A. Noor

September 11 and After: Cold War and the Red Scare Revisited

The terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001[1] have served as the opening to a new round of scare-mongering and hate-campaigns across the world, opening the floodgates of hysteria and panic and lending weight and credibility to discursive strategies that would have been more at home during the peak of the "Red Scare" of the Cold War than the opening decade of the twenty-first century.

One year on, we live in a world where talk of a "War against Terrorism" has mutated and evolved into a myriad of forms, and where leaders of powerful Western nations can glibly preach the gospel of unilateral intervention, counsel for "regime changes" in recalcitrant states and justify the assassination of foreign leaders as part of the campaign against terrorism. We live in a world where the curtailing of fundamental

human rights and civil liberties is now being conducted with cavalier ease, where governments with appalling human rights records are free to justify their use of repressive laws and security arrangements (again, as part of the war against terror) and where the anti-terror bandwagon—already overcrowded as it is—has been garlanded with the trappings of benign civilization, rationality, freedom, liberty, and progress. Never have so many laudable human values been debased and instrumentalized so openly for the sake of clearly political goals. September 11 was not merely a blow to the United States, but a blow to humanity in general.

But by focusing on the singular event of September 11 we are in danger of particularizing a phenomenon that is far more universal that we might care to admit. The fact is that terror and terrorism has been with us before September 11, and it remains with us today. The question is how to understand it. While some Western countries like the United States remain bent on pursuing their agenda at whatever human cost, the rest of the world stands dumbfounded before the absurdities around us. Palestinian civilians are being killed on a daily basis; their homes, businesses, schools, and places of worship destroyed with impunity; yet the media continues to depict the Palestinians themselves as "terrorists".

Israel, on the other hand, has been given a blank cheque to do whatever it wills in the occupied territories and is portrayed as a state exercising its right to defend itself. Against what, one might ask. And who, indeed, are the so-called 'terrorists' that we are supposed to guard against? To top it all, the nation that placed itself at the vanguard of the new "global war against terrorism" —the United States of America—was itself the only country that has ever been accused of practicing state terrorism by the World Court.[2]

Terrorism today happens to be an extremely complex and confounding phenomenon. It is local and global, particular and universal. Its causes cannot—and should not—be traced back

to any essentialist understandings of cultural specificity or identity. Nor would anyone attempt a micro-specific pathological approach to the question of why a particular individual would be driven to such course of action.

To compound the situation even further, the media has played a direct and in many cases deleterious role in aggravating what was already a difficult situation. At a time when serious political and statistical analyses should have come to the fore, we have instead been fed a staple diet of grand conspiracy theories, tales of nefarious plots and subplots and a drama of truly global proportions whose cast included the most simplistic and caricatural two-dimensional characters, ranging from the "forces of good" to the "forces of evil". What should have been seen and understood as a serious structural and institutional crisis within the emerging global order has instead been cast as a battle between light and darkness.

The Necessity of Deconstructing the Fallacies and Fictions of the Times We Live In

One year after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, we are no closer to the solutions that we seek in order to remedy the ills of the world we live in. The structural imbalances and contradictions that exist within the present world order—divided as it is by very real divisions and cleavages of power and force—remain intact, if not further consolidated. The discourse of the "war against terrorism", elevated to the status of a meta-narrative that informs and shapes other discursive economies (political, economic, socio-cultural, and religious), has taken on a life of its own and operates according to its own perverse logic of binary oppositions. Everywhere we see newer and stronger boundaries and frontiers being drawn, as a prelude to what can only be a greater conflict that will engulf the globe as a whole and claim humanity *in toto* as its victims.

In the face of such stark and harrowing developments, one can only hope that common sense and goodness prevails. But

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to place our hopes on the nobler qualities of human beings at a time when the very notion of "humanity" itself is being undermined and degraded by the workings of the global war machine would be naïve at best and dangerous at worst.

What is required now, more than ever, is a sustained critique of the present global order and its internal workings. Here is where the media has to play its part with utmost responsibility. At a time when politics has been reduced to mere sabre-rattling and hate-campaigns, those who work in the media industry are duty bound to speak the truth to power, and to reports the facts in such a way that objectivity does not lend itself to political instrumentality instead.

There are at least three main conditions that need to be met if the media is to play a proper role in the present state of affairs:

The first condition is to be both consistent and objective in its work. Perhaps the saddest outcome of the past year is the way in which the mainstream global media has allowed itself to be utilized as part of a massive global war machine, led by the United States in its search for new enemies. In the course of the past twelve months, the mainstream media in the West have not only helped in the propaganda campaign against the alleged "perpetrators of terror" (a plastic and amorphous category so vague that it now includes practically everything, ranging from actual terror groups to countries and governments whose political and economic agendas are seen as contrary to the ideology of the Liberal-Capitalist powers of the West), but also played an instrumental role in obfuscating the facts of history and by doing so colluded in the erasure of the West's own role in the use and promotion of terror as a weapon of politics.

It is well and fine—even necessary—to condemn states, governments, and parties that promote the use of violence as a tool of politics. But any such critique needs to be consistent and objective, which is where much of the media has failed so far. By failing to mention and to highlight the abuse of human rights by powerful Western nations and their crony allied states, the

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mainstream media in the West has shown that it too can remain willfully blind to the excesses of those parties deemed "friendly" in this latest campaign for global hegemony. To condemn the human rights abuses of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, for instance, was a laudable thing to do but one can only wonder why the abuses of human rights on the part of other pro-Western states like Israel, Russia, and Saudi Arabia were conveniently swept under the carpet.

Likewise to condemn the use of terror tactics and hate-campaigns is both morally and politically necessary, but one can only ask why the appalling record of some Western states in exporting terrorism abroad (as was the case of America's tacit support given to the Taliban during the initial stages of its development) has not been mentioned. Nor should the media remain silent over the abuse of human rights and the erosion of fundamental liberties in the West today, or in those countries that are regarded as "allies" in the fight against terror. If and when the media remains silent over the ethnic and religious stereotyping and profiling of entire communities, we can no longer say that the media is here to serve the ends of truthful and objective reporting. This leads us to the second condition that needs to be met, which is to deconstruct stereotypes and the need for an ethics of recognition in the media itself.

As mentioned earlier, the present "war against terrorism" seems to be more a throwback to the past and the time of the Cold War than a reflection of the times we live in. The media has singularly played a key role in the construction of boundaries and frontiers of identity and difference. Thanks to the images that have been fed to us over the past twelve months, the world community now feels and sees itself as a divided entity, split along boundaries of race, ethnicity, and religion.

The main reason for this is that the media remains oblivious to the need for an ethics of recognition of the Other. Rather than interrogating the fundamental categories of self and alterity, we have been presented with neat chains of equivalences that con-

veniently divide the world into two camps: The forces of good, which have been equated with Western civilization, liberalism, democracy, and freedom; and the forces of evil, which have been equated with Oriental traditionalism, obscurantism, and religion. Caught between these two opposing dichotomies, there is simply no middle ground, no room for interpenetration and crossbreeding between the two.

Yet it remains a fact that the Other is always the constitutive Other to the Self. If images of a violent, angry, and irrational Islam at its doorstep have haunted the Western media, one of the main reasons for this is its own collusion in the creation of the entity whose monstrous potential it can no longer ignore or control. Racism and prejudice invariably confirm themselves and we are left with nothing but the instrumental fictions that we have created for ourselves. If the Western media today is battling demons, we need to ask: who was responsible for the creation of the image of an angry, irrational, and fundamentalist Islam in the first place? The living presence of the hate-driven fanatic is proof that prejudice often translates itself into reality, and reality into political reality.

The third condition that needs to be met is the responsibility of the non-Western media to live up to the same standards that it demands of others as well. Here too we have seen the evident failure of the global media at work. At a time, when the media in the Muslim world could (and should) have attempted to regain the moral high ground in the battle for hearts and minds, we see that the Arab-Muslim media fares hardly any better than its Western counterpart. Trapped within the vices of *realpolitik* and forced to contend with the vicissitudes of power, the Arab-Muslim media has proven to be its own worst enemy and a carbon copy of the Western media apparatus. Rather than present the truth and play its part in the deconstruction of stereotypes and prejudicial images, so much of the non-Western media has chosen to play to the gallery instead, feeding their respective audiences with soothing tales of the corruption and impending de-

struction of the West and the righteousness of the militants' cause. The net result is that the media both in the West and non-Western world have become mirror images of each other, reflecting each other's narrow solipsistic biases and fears, bringing the world no closer to a proper understanding of the world we live in.

The way out of this impasse is simply to adopt an ethics of recognition of the Other which sees the cultural/religious/ethnic/political Other as the constitutive Other to ourselves. If the media is to liberate itself from the clutches of *realpolitik,* it needs to educate itself as to its own motives and motivations. Living as we do in a globalized world where communities and nations are brought into such close proximity with one another and where the frontiers of race and religion are bound to overlap and interpenetrate, one can only hope that the media will evolve to a degree of sophistication where it can and will reflect the complexities of the hybrid and eclectic times we live in. Now, more than ever, deconstruction has become a necessity for media politics.

Notes

[1] The attacks on the United States of America on September 11 began during the early hours of the day and followed each other in rapid succession. At around 8:45 a.m. a hijacked American Airlines jet—Flight 11—out of Boston, Massachusetts, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Soon after, at around 9:03 a.m., a second hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center and exploded. It was only by 9:17 a.m. that the Federal Aviation Administration shut down all New York City area airports. One hour after the first attack President George Bush, while speaking in Sarasota, Florida, stated that the country had suffered an "apparent terrorist attack". Minutes after the statement (at around 9:45 a.m.), another American Airlines jetliner—Flight 77—crashed into the Pentagon. At 10:05 a.m. the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed. Soon after the

second tower followed suit. Finally at 10:10 a.m. the fourth United Airlines jetliner—Flight 93—crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh. The speed of the attacks made it extremely difficult for emergency measures to be taken effectively. What complicated matters further for the ground-level emergency staff was the fact that the two towers that were hit were extremely unstable. When the towers finally collapsed, scores of New York firemen and rescue workers were also trapped and killed by the falling debris.

[2] In his book, *9-11* the American academic Noam Chomsky began by questioning the terminology of the new "global war against terror" itself. As he puts it: "To call this a war against terrorism however, is simply propaganda, unless the 'war' really does target terrorism. But that is plainly not contemplated, because the Western powers could never abide by their own definition of the term, as in the US Code or army manuals. To do so would reveal at once that the US is a terrorist state, as are its clients' (p. 16). In other parts of the book he explains how and why the US itself should be considered a terrorist state along with its clients: "It is worth remembering—particularly since it has been uniformly suppressed—that the US is the only country that has been condemned for international terrorism by the World Court and that rejected a Security Council resolution calling on states to observe international law" (p. 44). Noam Chomsky, *9-11*, An Open Media book. Seven Stories Press, New York. 2001.

Media and the Politics of Image Making

Parni Hadi

Discussing the role or the involvement of the media in search of a new world civilization after the September 11, 2001 calamity, this paper limits its scope to the news media, which is my area of experience and concern. By news media, I refer to news agencies, newspapers, magazines, radio, and television news programs, and Internet news services without neglecting the importance of films and books. Also of no less importance than news is advertisement.

I would start by saying that the media are inseparable from politics. Even, some say that politics is what the media present or the media themselves are politics. Consequently, news organizations in some cases are often seen to be more powerful than political parties (organizations) and even governments. Bernard Hennessy (1981) observes the close relationship between politics and media. According to Hennessy, politics is the process of forming of and influencing the public opinion, which is one of the main functions of media. Still, there is a definition that corroborates the close relations between media and politics, namely: information is power. This matches with a definition of politics often quoted by Soekarno, the former first President of

the Republic of Indonesia, that politics, in Dutch, is "*machts-vorming en machstaanwending*," which means the formation and the utilization of power.

Referring to the above observations, notions, and definitions, information presented by the media is neither value-free nor interest-free, and, consequently information may be best defined as a product that is loaded with the ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural values and interests of the owners (publishers), management and editorial staff, and supporters (readers, listeners, and advertisers) of the media concerned. Thus, a news organization can simultaneously function as a political, economic, social, and cultural institution. The values and interests pursued by a news organization dictate its editorial policy. It determines what is news and what is not. In essence the values and interests serve as guidelines for the choice of sources, angles, titles, headlines, length, and placement of stories and pictures for print media and airing (prime-time or not) for radio and television stations.

Dominant Values and Interests

Relevant to the values and interests adopted by media, Bernard S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in *Manufacturing Consent* (1988) state that mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is the function of the media to amuse, entertain, and inform, and inculcate individuals with values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda.

This book sketches out a propaganda model relevant to the performance of the mass media of the United States. But, since the United States has been the model of democracy, of which freedom of the press is one of the important pillars, the model is

also applicable to journalistic practices throughout the world, including the Islamic (developing) countries. The study indicates that the media serves to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity through their choices of news, emphases, and omissions of facts. The media serves the ends of a dominant elite namely rich people and those holding political power and the combination or conspiracy of both, commanding huge resources, money, and power. This conspiracy can set news "filters" through the following:

First, the size, concentrated ownership, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms. Second, advertising as the primary income source of the mass media. Third, the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power. Fourth, "flak" as a means of disciplining the media and finally, "anti -communism" in the 1970s (and now "anti terrorism" after the September 11, 2001 attacks) as national religion and control mechanism.

What Chomsky has pointed out in the 1980s is still apparent today worldwide, including Indonesia, after the industrialization of the media. We can clearly see who own the big newspaper groups, radio and television groups, combined print and electronic media networks, the advertisers and where most advertisements go. It has been long noted that the media are tiered or rated, with the top tiers or ratings measured by prestige, resources, and outreach.

In Indonesia, the so-called Islamic media occupy lower ratings due to various factors. Therefore, it is understandable and logical that the Islamic media cannot function well as the mouthpiece of Muslims to influence public opinion. It is the top tier, along with the government and wire services, that defines the news agenda and supplies much of the national and international news to the lower tiers of the media and thus to the general public. Something will become news and national issues of public discussions only after having been carried or aired by

the top tier media.

The same thing happens on regional and global levels. And, at present, global information with unbalanced control of media ownership, networking, and information technology, the West (industrialized countries) led by the United States is much more superior in forming and influencing global public opinion than Islamic (read developing) countries. The result is clear: the Western media control or dictate the public opinion of the global population. Who owns the global media networks? Indonesian fundamentalist Muslims point out: the Zionists.

The September 11 attacks have wrongly damaged the image of Islam. It was revealed in a discussion forum on the impacts of the September 11 tragedy on Islam and Muslims organized in Malaysia last Wednesday (September 4, 2002) as reported by the Eramuslim web site, quoting AFP. However, the tragedy at same time has helped bridging Muslim and non-Muslims relations, the forum organized by the Malaysian Institute of Southeast Asian Studies concluded. Singapore Minister of Muslim Affairs, Yacob Ibrahim, was quoted as saying that emotionally the September 11 attacks have brought the Islamic world closer to the other world. It is no doubt that Islam has to suffer from a damaged image due to the irresponsible terrorists attacks.

The US government has accused Al-Qaeda to be behind the attack, though evidence to support the accusation is yet to be produced. The damaged image of Islam is clearly the direct result of massive global media reports on the irresponsible and inhumane act of terrorism, and campaigns launched by the Western media led by the US against the presumed Muslim terrorists. The US embassies are also very active in launching anti-terrorism war campaigns by producing information materials and sending experts on Islam to influence the public opinion. Unfortunately, the Islamic media, let alone embassies of most Islamic countries, do not react adequately by providing professionally prepared information materials for the Western public.

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Misperceptions

The image of Islam in the West, particularly for the average Americans, has been negative long before the September 11 attacks. This is the result of several unfortunate misperceptions about Islam. Marshall M. Bouton, former Director, Contemporary Affairs of the Asia Society, in a book entitled *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society* (edited by John L. Esposito, 1986) observes three causes for these misperceptions. First, Islam is frequently seen as necessarily violent, anti-Western, and politically and socially reactionary. Second, the sudden spotlight on isolated events distracts observers from an appreciation of the longer-term evolution of the relationship between Islam and society in Asia. Although Islam has provided an underlying unity in fundamental belief and practice, its interaction with diverse cultures and ethnic groups has resulted in Muslim societies with distinctive features and experiences. Third, a focus on dramatic events tends to blind Americans to the varied approaches that the people and governments of Asia are taking in determining the roles Islam plays in their societies today.

David D. Newsom, former US Ambassador to Indonesia, in the same book, writes that for a variety of reasons, the attitude of many Americans towards the Islamic world tends to be negative, supports those observations. In the minds of many Americans Islam is associated with the Arab world, although the vast majority of its adherents live in Asia, east of the Persian Gulf. Such a perception has resulted in unnecessary retaliatory actions against Arab-looking people in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy. If there is a broadly negative view of Islam in the United States, according to Newsom, it springs primarily from two perceptions.

One is that Islam—particularly fundamentalist Islam—represents a threat to the interests of the US. This is because in certain countries such as Libya and the Philippines, Islam is identified with direct attacks on strategic US interests. The other

is that Islam is basically perceived as an inhumane religion as a result of a distorted view of Islamic social customs. Islam as is described by popular media lends itself to sensationalism, for example, Islamic law penalties, such as flogging, as well as reported acts of fanaticism and terrorism. Americans associate Islam with the imposition of restrictive customs. Islam is identified with polygamy, the seclusion of women, greater restrictions on women's dress and participation of women in public life, and harsh forms of justice. I personally have a funny experience upon my first visit to Germany in the late 1970s. Following my introduction as a Muslim, my new German friend's first question was: "How many wives do you have?"

The Americans' negative attitude towards Islam has in turn resulted in a similar Muslims' negative attitude towards the United States. Many in the Muslim world look favorably on, and are favorably inclined towards, the United States, but they are inhibited in expressing their views by the strong belief in the Muslim world that the United States is anti-Islam. The image problem is further complicated in the eyes of friends of the US in Asian Muslim countries because the Western media seem to focus only on political activities of extremist Muslim movements, not on the more positive aspects of the Muslim community. To name one example, an Islamic alms raising to help the poor organized by Dompet Dhuafa Republika, which is known and appreciated nation-wide in Indonesia is never given any attention by Western correspondents stationed in that country.

Stereotypes

Cultural encroachment from the West is also seen as a threat to Muslim societies. Deep within the traditions of these societies are lingering feelings regarding the Crusades, which are compounded by humiliation that comes from a recollection of the European and American domination of once great Islamic societies. This is aggravated by American publications and films

whose attitudes toward Islam range from patronizing to insulting. Novels, television shows, and films that express stereotypes of sheiks as villains arouse particular ire. Islamic traditions are portrayed without adequate consideration of historic truths or Muslim sensibilities. The difficulty of empathizing with Muslims is compounded in the case of church groups in the United States who often see Islam as the primary obstacles to missionaries propagating the Christian faith abroad.

The former US Ambassador observed all these in the 1980s. We can imagine how deep the aggravating damage of Islam in the twenty-first century is in the uni-polar political and economic constellation led by Washington. The Islam Infonet of August 27, 2002 reported that the majority of US Muslims, amounting to some seven million people, suffered Post-September 11 bias. This is the direct impact of stereotyping, generalization, and oversimplification.

According to a survey conducted by the Washington-based CAIR (Council of American-Islamic Relations), 57 per cent of American Muslims say they experienced bias or discrimination since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and almost all respondents (87 per cent) said they knew of a fellow Muslim who experienced discrimination.

Meanwhile, AFP reported on August 28, 2002 that the September 11 anniversary stirs up bad memories for US Muslims. It quoted a Muslim as saying that the media has a responsibility to give news, but they should not keep on going about things that spread hate. On the same day the *Dallas Morning News* reported that Muslims look uneasily to September 11. The US Muslims have become the targets and the victims of "guilt by association".

But to be fair I have to admit that stereotyping, generalization, and oversimplification also still trap many Muslims, including journalists. For example, any Westerner or white man is identified as Christian or non-Muslim and therefore, anti-Islam. Such a notion has resulted in sweepings of foreign tour-

ists, particularly Americans and Europeans, launched by fundamentalist Muslim groups in several hotels in Indonesia recently.

Another thing that many Americans do not comprehend is that Islam is diverse, not only between Muslims living in different countries, but also within a country. John L. Esposito, professor of Religion and International Affairs, Georgetown University and editor of the book mentioned above, cites an example of Indonesian Muslims who are grossly divided into a minority of Islamically observants (*santri*) and a majority of nominal Muslims (*abangan*). Such a division is nowadays seen as no longer valid or even as an oversimplification, particularly with the re-awakening of Islam since the 1990s which was among others marked by the establishment of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association).

By way of observance, Indonesian Muslims are divided into two groups: Traditionalists (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Modernists (Muhammadiyah). Again, such a division is now no longer seen as significant. In political orientations, Indonesian Muslims are wide ranging, varying from staunch supporters of Islamic political parties fighting for the implementation of the *shari'a* (Islamic law) to supporters of nominal, even non-Islamic, nationalistic and secularist parties.

Despite the diverse ways of observance and political orientations, Muslims are united by strong feelings of solidarity as members of a worldwide Islamic community (*umma*). Many Americans do not understand this. Despite differences among Muslim states, the Islamic world (Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia, Arabs and non-Arabs) lends sympathetic attitudes towards Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli problem, which comes as a surprise to many Americans. It has been widely known since decades that the central obstacle of effective relations between the Islamic countries and the United States is the conflict between the Arab States and Israel.

Unfortunately, the Bush administration is not sensible enough. An Editorial in the *Washington Post* of September 5, 2002, criticized the US government. Written by Jimmy Carter under the heading of "The Troubling Face of America", the editorial says: "Tragically, our government is abandoning any sponsorship of substantive negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Our apparent policy is to support almost every Israeli action in the occupied territories and to condemn and isolate the Palestinians as blanket targets of our war on terrorism".

Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, research and development Director of Mindanao State University shows a sympathetic understanding of Islam. She writes in *The Media and Peace Reporting* (published by the Philippine government in 2000):

> The popular literature on Islam indicates that it is the most misunderstood religion or way of life in our predominantly Catholic country, but also in many parts of the world. Islamic zealots claim that this is the result of Western-oriented Zionist-influenced global media. The worldwide resurgence of Islam has been explained as a reaction to such influence.[1]

Obstacles: Inability to Respond

It has often been said earlier that media play a significant role in creating misperceptions about Islam for Americans and vice versa, Muslims towards Americans. It is unfair to blame only the Western media for the prevailing misperceptions. Despite the fact that most Islamic countries are equipped with news agencies, and radio and television stations at a national level to convey information on Islam for overseas audiences, the Islamic media have also contributed to these misperceptions in the two worlds, namely by not producing adequate, accurate, and professionally written reports on Islam to correct so-called biased reports by the Western media.

News institutions have made joint efforts to correct the imbalance flow of information from the Western (industrialized

countries) to the developing (Islamic) countries through various news exchange networks such as IINA (International Islamic News Agency), NANAP (Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool), OPECNA (OPEC News Agency), OANA (Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies), BONAC (Broadcasting Organization of Non-Aligned Countries), and ABU (Asian Broadcasting Union). But because of a lack of professionals and insufficient technological equipment to meet international standards their efforts are of no avail. They are unable to compete with transnational wire services, or global radio and television networks. The same is true for Muslim Internet services.

It must be admitted that for some countries, especially those with authoritarian democracy, the absence of press freedom poses a major hindrance to the supply of quality information for Western consumption. In non-English speaking countries, like Indonesia, news services in the most spoken international language for foreigners are a rarity. Since its establishment nine years ago until now the *Republika* daily, which is known as the mouthpiece of Indonesian Muslims, has not yet been able to provide information in English through its On Line service.

As a journalist of almost 30 years, I have to testify that biased reports by media (Western and Islam) are not solely attributed to the journalists' bad intentions and failures. Oftentimes the so-called biased reports are attributable to the absence of reliable sources. Of course, in some cases media act as an actor in the policy making process, playing a role in agenda setting. But, by and large and in principle the media do not invent the news. Focusing on dramatic events is not only practiced by Western journalists. It has been a common journalistic practice everywhere. Sean MacBride in his *Many Voices, One World* (1980) as quoted by *The Media and Peace Reporting* cites the criteria for news most commonly mentioned: "timeliness, wide interest, out of ordinary or out of the norm, and finally the element of conflict". News coverage is also cued by events and tied to specific and isolated occurrences, rather than long-term processes.

But I have to admit that media reports are not governed by one framework or certain journalistic theories. News is the result of combined factors and considerations. At times, media are very critical to their own governments and societies, while at another times they are pursuing a bi-partisan policy for the sake of so-called national interests. The latter took place in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks when the American television stations subdued to the call of the US government for not airing a video-taped speech of Osama bin Laden, the number one suspect of the WTC bombings. The media in Australia, Canada, England, Japan, and France followed their American friends. This act of media censorship by the US government was criticized by the International Media Forum sponsored by the UN at its meeting in commemoration of the International Freedom of the Press Day on May 3, 2002.[2]

For the sake of national interests, media may obey appeals of the government. Hopefully it is also for the sake of national interests that the *New York Times* of July 29, 2002, criticized the US government. It says that the US is doing a poor job in countering growing anti-American sentiments overseas and must revamp the way it promotes its foreign policy abroad. Quoting the Council on Foreign Relations, the paper reports that the council asserts that many countries, in particular predominantly Islamic ones, see the US as "arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive, and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue". Such a rising tide of resentment may undermine the Bush administration's efforts to fight terrorism and become an obstacle if the US decides to invade Iraq, the report says.

These examples give vivid evidence that media have their own character and principles that are not always easily intervened by outsiders, including the government. This takes place not only in Western countries, but also in Indonesia in the present Reform Era.

The prevailing misperceptions must also be attributed to

Muslim scholars. Newsom says that Muslims, including Muslim scholars, seem to have difficulty in explaining their religion and way of life in ways that will be read and understood by outsiders. Muslim writers have a tendency to be theological in their approach and to use extensive Arabic terms and Islamic concepts that bewilder American readers. It is ironic and unfortunate that there are not many current popular books on Islam written by Muslims. I purposely quote many statements by Newsom, because the topic of this discussion focuses primarily on the relations between Islam and the United States on the occasion of commemorating the first anniversary of the September 11 tragedy, since most of his observations remain valid until today.

New World Civilization

Everybody dreams of a new civilization which guarantees respect for human dignity without any discrimination due to religious, racial, cultural, social, and national background or economic status. But the dream, I am afraid, will never come true for developing (Islamic) countries, which are not adequately equipped with the ability to convey information carrying their values and interests to contribute to the long-awaited new civilization. Mostly the values and interests of Western countries controlling the flow of global information will determine the new global civilization, if we wish to call it so, which emerges. Thus, an ideal new civilization with proportional, if not equal, contributions from all nations, religious beliefs, and cultural values remains a dream for Islamic (developing) countries.

Of course, we may hope that the dream will come true if all followers of religion faithfully and whole-heartedly observe the essence of all religions, which is to advocate "love". Among noble sayings to be observed in the context of the relations between the West and Islam are the following: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you" for Christians, and what

Prophet Muhammad said: "None of you truly believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself" for Muslims. Could we?

Solutions

Acknowledging the important role of media as the conveyor of values and interests, solutions to eradicate misperceptions among different peoples with different religious and cultural values must be sought for through the following steps:

First, dialogues between Western and Islamic specialists and opinion makers to foster mutual understanding. Second, exchange of visits of scholars, journalists, writers, film makers, and artists for a certain period of time that gives them enough opportunities to get a feeling being of at home in each visited country. Third, training of journalists, writers, and filmmakers from Islamic (developing) countries in Western societies to increase their professionalism. Fourth, improving the professional and technological capacities of news organizations in Islamic countries. Fifth, joint publication of books and journals fostering mutual understanding. Sixth, joint film making with actors/actresses representing both Western and Islamic societies. Seventh, establishing professional global Islamic radio and television networks. Finally, activating diplomacy by Islamic diplomats.

Notes

[1] Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, "Telling the Truth of the Other: Images of Islam and Muslims in the Philippines," in *The Media and Peace Reporting: Perspectives on the Reportage of the Peace Process,* Melinda Quintos de Jesus, ed. Pasig: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), 2000.

[2] Editorial of *KOMPAS* daily, May 4, 2002.

Part 3

The Palestine-Israel Issue:
In Search of Peaceful Relations

The Palestine-Israel Issue:
In Search of Peaceful Relations

Azyumardi Azra

September 11 and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The tragedy of September 11 brought Americans together as a nation, united in grief and resolve. At the same time, Americans from every walk of life began asking some tough questions about America, global terrorism, and the Muslim world. Even though so far it is only Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda who have been held responsible for the September 11 tragedy, the US has also been launching its global "war against terrorism" and against Muslim radical groups wherever they are, which are considered primarily to target America and the West in an unholy war of terrorism. With regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict, the US and Israel condemned Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups as terrorist organizations. Although their targets were not as spectacular as the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon buildings, Hamas activists and other Muslim radical groups have conducted a series of suicide bombings in Israel and Palestine. In response to these accusations, Hamas' leaders maintained that the use of violence is a form of legitimate resistance and retaliation against Israel's occupation and

its use of unrestrained violence and terror against Palestinians.

The circle of violence between Palestinians and Israelis became completed with the rise of terrorism among Jewish individuals and groups. For instance, Baruch Goldstein, a medical doctor, killed over 30 Muslims as they were praying on February 25, 1994. When the peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis gained a new momentum, Yigal Amir, an activist who yearned for a truly Jewish society in Israel, killed Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin on November 4, 1995, on his way to a great peace rally held in the plaza of the city hall in Tel Aviv. Perpetrators of these acts of terrorism justified their deeds by using Jewish theology, historical precedents, and biblical examples.

Different Historical Narratives

Conflict and violence between the Palestinians and Israelis have a long history. Many outsiders now often assume that the main source of the latest series of violence is the status of the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, the conflict runs far deeper. Palestinians and Israelis have radically different historical narratives. This predates the occupation that began in 1967; they go back to each side's self-conception as a historical victim, and they have engendered much mutual hatred. The Palestinians, other Arabs, and many Muslims outside the Middle East believe that Israel was created and defended by the US and other Western countries to keep them weak and divided. The continued loss of territory and the routine humiliation of the Palestinians create only a greater sense of disillusionment that in turn leads to even worse violence as represented by Palestinian suicide bombers, including young females.

The Principles of the Oslo Accord

The Oslo Accord between Israel and the PLO of 1995 promised to resolve the Israel-Palestinian issue. The Accord foresaw

both separation and cooperation for the two states: Israel and Palestine. Partition of the disputed areas would occur in stages and would be facilitated by confidence-building measures and a gradual easing of Israel-Palestinian enmity. The two sides are expected to cooperate in such areas as security, trade, and labor, and to defer resolving the most divisive issues, including Jerusalem and the refugees. A key premise of the Oslo talks was that formal peace agreements would produce greater trust and security for both sides. Although several interim accords have been negotiated, however, such trust has shown few signs of developing. Now, after many months of bloodshed, it seems that the Oslo Accord is virtually dead.

Derailment of the Oslo Accord

Policies and actions between both sides have threatened to derail the Accord. Many Israeli leaders resented the election of Arafat as "President" of the Executive Council of the Palestinian Legislative Assembly in 1996. The Hamas suicide bombings in 1996 as reprisals for the killings of Hamas leaders by Israel again threatened to derail the Oslo Accord altogether. On the other hand, since Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister the peace process was in effect put into cold storage. Under both Labor and Likud governments, Jewish settlements continued to be built in the Occupied Territories of Palestine violating the Accord and infuriating the Palestinians. The policies of the hawkish Prime Minister Ariel Sharon have only led to further violence. Witnessing the political wrangling and intensified violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Muslims and many others around the world, including Jews, were amazed at the audacity with which Israelis appeared to be the pursuing an ethnic cleansing policy. In their attempts to maintain their political position, all three latest Israeli Prime Ministers (Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and especially Ariel Sharon) pander the zealots among Zionists and ultra-con-

servative religious groups, for whom anything Muslim or non-Jewish is anathema.

Land for Peace

The search for peace between Israel and Palestine should pursue a middle course toward disengagement and subsequently waiting for matters to stabilize. This of course should not obscure the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation remains a vital long-term goal. Just as the current inflaming passions necessitate disengagement in the short-term, the stubborn constraints of Middle Eastern geography necessitate cooperation in the long run. Israel's military solution would not put an end to Palestinian nationalism and struggle; and the Palestinians will never be able to eliminate Israel through force. Therefore, the two sides must learn to live together in a peaceful manner. In this respect, the Oslo Accord's underlying two-state vision remains sound; sooner or later, they will have to come back to the idea of partition. Thus, the concept of "land for peace" is the cornerstone of all efforts to negotiate an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is still the only option. Israel will part with Gaza and the West Bank. On that land, the Palestinians will establish their own independent state. In return, the Palestinians and other Arabs will formally end their claims on the Jewish state and normalize ties. This concept is of course also supported by the latest peace proposal put forward recently by Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

The Status of Jerusalem

No doubt, one of the most crucial issues is the status of the Holy City, Jerusalem. It is interesting to reconsider (former) President Clinton's suggestion; he proposed that in the end, Jerusalem must also be divided, but shared, and serve as a capital of two states. Clinton maintains that, "What is Arab should be Palestinian and what is Jewish should be Israeli". Following

the Clinton formula, the Old City of Jerusalem would be divided between Palestine and Israel. Palestinians would be in control in the Muslim and Christian quarters, while the Jewish quarter would remain under Israel's control. The Armenian quarter would also go to Palestinian sovereignty. While the most sensitive area is the *Haram al-Sharif*, revered by Muslims as the place where the Prophet Muhammad ascended to Heaven, for the Jews the site is known as Temple Mount, and Jews believe that it is the place where the ancient Jewish Temple once stood. According to the Clinton formula, Palestinians and Israelis must accept split-level sovereignty. The Islamic sites on the Temple Mount Plaza, the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Dome of the Rock would fall under Palestinian sovereignty while the Western Wall and the subterranean space below the plaza, where Jews believe their temple lies in ruins, would be controlled by Israel. But, neither side would be permitted to excavate the Temple Mount platform. The painful principle behind this plan is that Jews and Palestinians (as well as Muslims at large) would have to set aside their competing claims over whose God is the True God and whose history is legitimate.

Reconciliation

The Oslo Accord contains an important principle for peace between the two sides, that is, reconciliation. While the Israelis have accused Arafat of failing to publicly chart a course for reconciliation, the Palestinians see no sign of reconciliation from the Israelis either. The two sides to this end have implemented no program. Top leaders of Israel and Palestine never gave a single speech—let alone program—to their respective people calling for reconciliation. With regard to reconciliation both sides should attempt to ease misperceptions and prejudices against one another. In the contemporary relationship between Palestinians (Muslims) and Israelis (Jews)—as a consequence of the creation of Israel and continued conflict between the two sides—

Muslims are often accused of being inherently anti-Judaic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Zionist. By definition Muslims cannot be anti-Judaic. Whatever internal differences with Judaism, it is part and parcel of the Islamic cultural and ideological tradition. Jews are very much "People of the Book" (*Ahl al-Kitab*). Similarly Muslims cannot be anti-Semitic because the original Muslims, the Arabs, were themselves Semites. Anti-Zionism among Muslims is understandable, since for Muslims this ideology is the basis of the creation of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. However, since the clock cannot be turned back for the Palestinians to reacquire their lands nor to eliminate Israel, or for the Israelis to eliminate the Palestinians, the only option is to establish peaceful existence; here, reconciliation between the two sides is one of the most important and proper things to do.

Role of International Powers

The future of peace between Israel and Palestine is also much dependent on international powers, particularly the US and other Western countries. To lay the groundwork for disengagement the US and other Western countries should help the Israelis and Palestinians contain the chaos and halt the violence. They should be less tolerant of violations of the agreements by either side; and should be fair to both sides in order to ease the impression of a double-standard attitude on the part of the US to the Palestinians. Peace will not work if treaties and accords are not implemented fully and fairly. At the same time, the US should do what it can to make the Palestinian Administration more viable, encouraging and helping Palestinian economic development in order to dilute the PA's dependence on Israel. Washington should press the oil-rich Arab and the Persian Gulf states to use a fraction of their oil profits to help the economic development of Palestine. The US should also start promoting Palestinian democracy in a bid for more accountable and credible government. Finally, the US must remind the leaders of the

two sides that merely creating a border or even a stonewall will not automatically result in lasting peace. Therefore, Palestinians and Israelis must learn to speak the language of reconciliation, or else peace and cooperation will remain elusive.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Hostility to the West in Arab and Islamic Countries

Osama Ghazali al-Harb

This contribution tackles the role played by the Arab-Israeli conflict in creating and nurturing hostile attitudes towards the West in general and the United States in particular. Hostility in the Arab and Islamic worlds against the United States and the West was roused in an unprecedented way in the wake of the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, and the discovery that all its perpetrators were Arabs and Muslims. Two hypotheses have arisen in this regard to explain these attitudes.

The first is that these hostile feelings are an expression and extension of the difference in culture and civilization between Islam and the West, a difference that marks the long history between the Muslims and the Christian Western world. With the growing dichotomy in terms of culture and civilization between the two sides in the modern age, these feelings, especially towards the United States, have increased and culminated in the events of September 11.

The second hypothesis does not deny the impact of the dif-

ferences in culture and civilization between the two sides, yet it sees this as minimal when compared to the impact of US policy, and Western policy in general, towards the Arab and Islamic worlds, and especially the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. These policies trigger sentiments of hostility in the Arab and Islamic worlds and aggravate the feelings of the differences in culture and civilization.

Unfortunately, many Israelis and their friends in the United States and Europe are endeavoring to exclude the second explanation and focus instead on the cultural and civilization dimension, lest public opinion in the West hold Israel responsible for the harm caused to them by the Arabs and Muslims and thus apply pressure to change the US and general Western policy towards Israel.

However, this paper adopts the second explanation, which charges US and Western policy with the responsibility for such sentiments of hatred, not for the sake of shifting this policy against Israel, but only for the sake of achieving more balanced stances towards both parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, where efforts exerted for the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian and Arab peoples should match those devoted to the maintenance of Israeli security and prosperity.

The incompatibility of the cultures and civilizations of Islam and the West is rooted in the long history of competition and conflict between them. From the first third of the seventh century up till midway through the eighth century, and in almost only 100 years, the Arabs and Muslims managed to establish an empire that extended across North Africa, Iberia, the Middle East, Persia, and northern India. Yet at the end of the eleventh century, after about two centuries of stability, tension between Islam and the Christian West began with the Crusades—in 1095—through which the European rulers tried to establish a Christian kingdom in Jerusalem and its surroundings though this ended in total failure by the end of the thirteenth century.

At around the same time, the Ottoman Turks emerged, invading most of the Balkans and North Africa, taking Constantinople in 1453 and besieging Vienna in 1529. For almost 1,000 years, quoting Bernard Lewis, "from the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam".[1]

Western Christian counterattacks started in the fifteenth century, with Europe regaining Iberia by conquering Granada in 1492. At the same time, thanks to their maritime excellence, the Europeans were able to surround the Islamic territories and break through to the Indian Ocean and beyond. The failure of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 was the beginning of a long retreat. The Balkan peoples struggled to free themselves from Ottoman rule and the Ottoman Empire became the "sick man of Europe".[2]

However, one cannot but agree with Samuel Huntington when he says—contrary to the opinions of others—that:

> The relations between Islam and Christianity, both orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other's other. The twentieth century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity. At times, peaceful coexistence has prevailed; more often the relation has been one of intense rivalry and of varying degrees of hot war … Across the centuries the fortunes of the two religions have risen and fallen in a sequence of momentous surges, pauses and counter surges.[3]

Nevertheless, the idea of acute confrontation of civilizations between Islam and the Christian West under Ottoman rule reflects many reservations. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser argued that:

> The Ottoman Empire was, in final analysis, part of the system of European countries, and it was joined by France in a certain period against the Habsburg dynasty. Other European countries, such as England, against Russian aggressions, supported the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, moreover, relied on the

> Christians in the Balkans and appointed them to various posts. The Muslims and Christians knew each other well and lived in most cases side by side in a number of societies, each of which abided by its religious rituals and local laws and applied them independently. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-faith state … where each local religious society had its own rights and structure of authority.[4]

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (which was the last political embodiment of the Islamic "state", which encompasses all Islamic countries and territories under the "rule" of the caliph), the confrontation between Islam and the West turned from a confrontation between a Christian Europe and a "united Islamic empire" to one between a number of colonizing European countries and colonized Islamic ones. Almost the entire Islamic world, from Indonesia to Morocco, and from Central Asia to sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of the Arab peninsula and Afghanistan, fell into the hands of European powers: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Russia. This, in turn, led to the decline of the "comprehensive" or "religious" aspect of the confrontation, which had to vie with a "nationalist" dimension related to the struggle of these peoples to obtain their independence. Furthermore, the centre of the former empire, Turkey, gave up the idea of the Islamic caliphate altogether and turned to secularism.

Focusing on the Arab world, one can detect more than one combination of the religious-cultural dimension with the nationalist dimension in the face of foreign control. In the Arab *Mashriq*, the crystallization of the nationalist sentiment was associated with the rejection of Ottoman control, despite its Islamic identity, before European colonization. Although the nationalist movement, in its beginnings, was related to the efforts of the Christians in the region, it gained considerable momentum and achieved enormous popularity with the Muslim majority through the nationalist organizations and parties that emerged at the beginning of the century. The same holds true of the "Arab Revolution", under the leadership of al-Sharif

Hussein of Mecca, which got its main support from Britain in its confrontation against (Muslim) Ottoman control. Yet on the contrary, in the Arab Maghrib the confrontation with French colonialism, along with its cultural aspects, was associated with the crystallization of an Islamic identity that almost united with the national one. In this regard, the Algerian people were described as Muslims before being Algerians. In the heart of the Arab world, however, in Egypt, there was a unique balance at some points between the "national" and "religious" tendencies among the Egyptian elite.

This means then that Arab attitudes towards the West, starting from the twenties and thirties of the last century, were the outcome of colonial control by the European countries over the Arab ones, and not only the result of cultural and religious differences. This colonial control in fact contributed to nurturing Arab Islamic feelings against Western hegemony.

Hostile Arab sentiments towards the West can be interpreted historically in terms of the empirical control over the Arab and Islamic peoples more than in terms of mere cultural and religious contradictions. The implication of this fact becomes all the more clear when examining Islamic reform movements in the modern Arab world. With the end of the Ottoman Empire, reform movements started to emerge in various parts of the Arab world as a reaction to the acute deterioration that befell the region under Ottoman control in comparison to Europe's renaissance, the Arab world had heard of. These movements are often categorized as either *Salafi* movements, which seek a return to the pure primary origins of the religion and refuse to submit to Western culture, or modern movements that seek to merge Islam and superior European civilization. The first, which is represented in the Wahhabi movement in the Arab peninsula, the Mahdi movement in Sudan and the *Sanusi* movement in North Africa, sought to return to the origins of Islam, make do with their heritage and shun Western civilization, warning of its dangerous effects on the purity of Islam. In other words, these

movements tended, albeit to different degrees, to separate themselves from the West rather than attack it or render it a foe.

More important though is that modern renewal movements emerging in the Arab world at the beginning of the nineteenth century sought mainly to make a compromise between Islam and European modernization and not to reject or rival it. The core of the message communicated by the pioneers of modern Arab thought, spearheaded by Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, Khair al-Din al-Tunisi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Abdul-Rahman al-Kawakibi, was to harmonize Islamic and modern enlightened European thought. They all sought — each according to his own vision and methodology — to purify Islamic thought from all aspects of weakness and deterioration and to inject it with the intellectual and enlightened tendencies that prospered at the time in Europe in social and political fields. Al-Tahtawi and Khair al-Din, in particular, sought to set a new cultural composite to unite Arab-Islamic and European cultures in one whole, being inspired by the previous achievements of the Arabs in their renaissance in the area of interaction with more advanced cultures.

This trend continued in the Arab world, and especially in Egypt, in the first half of the twentieth century. A long line of intellectuals and thinkers, including Qasim Amin, Ali Abdul-Raziq, Taha Hussein, and Muhammad Hussein Haikal, all looked towards Europe and European culture, seeking to learn from it and merge it with Arab culture. Thanks to these thinkers the Arab region, with Egypt at its heart, witnessed an intellectual boom that cannot be denied, as well as a promising openness to European culture and values in a number of economic and social spheres.

The questions that raise themselves here, however, are: why have these efforts not reached their conclusion, and why has there not been a radical comprehensive modernization of Islamic thought and culture capable of reaching the roots of Arab Islamic societies and renewing their concepts? These questions

have many answers, such as the nature of the prevalent under-developed social and economic conditions, the state of cultural and educational weakness of the lower classes, and the strength of backward and conservative religious ideas. Yet topping this list is the effects of European colonialism, which controlled most Arab countries from the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

For the powers of Arab modernization, colonialism raised a problem that was hard to solve: how to combine the legitimate political rejection of European colonization (whether British, French, or other) with the advocacy of the great and enlightening values of European culture and civilization.

Just as the confrontation with European colonialism helped to differentiate between revolutionary or fundamentalist politicians unwilling to make compromises or reach a common understanding with foreign powers, and other, moderate politicians, so, in intellectual and cultural circles, did the confrontation distinguish between intellectuals and pioneers of religious thought who were willing to represent Western values and cultures (such as Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ali Abdul-Razak, and Salama Moussa) and others more cautious.

In the 1930s, in this general context, the Arab region witnessed the emergence of a new element that carried its political and cultural implications on to the course of Arab life as a whole; namely Zionist Jewish immigration to Palestine and the initiation of the project to establish the state of Israel.

Despite what we have just covered, it is still possible to hypothesize that the cultural and religious conflict between Islam and the West is not enough in itself to produce strong feelings of hostility between Muslims (and the Arabs in particular) and the Western world. But this is linked with other political influences and factors, such as Muslim unity under one empire that seeks invasion and expansion (such as the Ottoman Empire), and the Western powers' colonization of Islamic countries and the accompanying economic and technological gap (as at the

end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries).
And the Zionist project in Palestine, crystallized in the emer-
gence of the Israeli state in the middle of the century, played an
important role, the influence of which surpassed those of other
factors.

To start with, one should note the special religious and his-
toric significance for the Muslims and Arabs of Jerusalem, a city
that lies in the heart of their region. According to Islamic doc-
trine, Jerusalem was the first *qibla* for Muslims, the point to-
wards which they face during prayer, before it became the Ka'ba
in Mecca, their eternal *qibla*. The al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem
is the third most sacred of Islam's holy places following the
Ka'ba in Mecca and the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. More-
over, according to Islamic doctrine, Jerusalem is the place of the
Prophet's nocturnal journey from Mecca, from which he as-
cended to the seven heavens. Jerusalem is also home to the Sa-
cred Rock, which is associated in the minds of Muslims with
the nocturnal journey.

After the Islamic conquest of Jerusalem in 638 CE, the caliph
Umar Ibn al-Khattab went personally to take over the city in
honor of its holy status. He assured the city's Christian citizens
that their lives, possessions, and churches were safe, and guar-
anteed them freedom of worship. Omar's pledge as it became
known, laid the basis for the relations between the Muslim and
non-Muslim residents of Jerusalem, as adhered to by Salahuddin
al-Ayyubi (1187 CE) and Ottoman sultan Salim I (1516 CE).

The Muslim caliphs constructed Jerusalem and the Umayyad
caliph Abdul-Malik bin Marwan and then his son al-Walid
built the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosques. In several
successive ages, Jerusalem was ruled from Damascus, Baghdad,
Cairo, and Constantinople, and it witnessed the establishment
of mosques, schools, and houses for the study of the Quran and
Hadith (traditions of the Prophet) as well as markets, hotels,
bathhouses, etc. The maintenance of these buildings was funded
by the *waqf*, or endowment, systems financed by the caliphs,

sultans, military leaders, scholars, and the men and women of the state.

From the political historic perspective, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the crystallization of the Arab nationalist movement in the Middle East and the start of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, while, at the same time, the Zionist movement began to consider migration to Palestine as an expression of "Jewish nationalism". On this point Maxim Rodenson says:

> It was bad luck for this kind of Jewish nationalism, which has been named Zionism, that the original residents of Palestine started to become influenced by a similar intellectual movement, namely Arab nationalism, at the same time that the trend grew towards the call for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine … The First World War (1914-18) allowed both Arab and Jewish nationalism to make remarkable leaps forwards.[5]

This meant an inevitable clash between emerging Arab nationalism and arriving Jewish nationalism. This was acknowledged by the Zionist pioneers and was nurtured by the deep nationalist sentiments on both sides.

But more important than this, the Arabs were in no doubt about the role played by the European colonialist nations—which had dominated their countries since the beginning of the twentieth century—in the foundation of the Israeli state. For while these nations desired the establishment of separate entities in the region, which later became the states of the Arab Mashriq, they perceived that the state most worthy of support in Palestine was a Jewish and not an Arab one.

Apart from Zionist pressure and internal policy considerations in Britain, British decision makers believed that a Jewish Palestine would secure the position of Britain in the Middle East after the First World War and would protect vital roads to India, not to mention securing financial and political support from Jews worldwide. The British foreign minister Lord Balfour's declaration to Baron Rothschild in November 1917, in which

he stated that the British government viewed favorably the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, was the real beginning of the establishment of Israel. In the view of Muslim Arabs, however, who considered it an ominous promise, it was a token of a European conspiracy aiming at the establishment of an alien state in their midst, like a dagger in their hearts. The Arabs of Palestine, meanwhile (deprived of foreign support) were no longer capable of establishing an Arab state in Palestine on their own.

At the same time as arrangements were being made for the establishment of an Israeli state, the Arab countries were totally absorbed in their struggle for independence before and then after the Second World War. Amid their struggle, these countries saw their support for the Palestinian people as an expression of solidarity against two allying foes, colonialism and Zionism, and an indication to the persistence of Arab nationalism.

Finally, the eruption of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Cold War era included it in the context of confrontation between the East and the West. Although the Soviet Union and some of the countries of Eastern Europe were primary supporters of the establishment of Israel, the prerequisites of international competition shifted the East-West polarization to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was enhanced by a Czech arms deal with Egypt in the mid-1950s, yet most important was the harsh stance taken by the Arab leftist forces against Israel together with the nationalist forces.

It is no exaggeration to say that the establishment of the state of Israel on Palestinian land was the turning point in the contemporary history of the Arab world. Since this time, the main features, ideological priorities, and historic eras, whether of the Arab world as a whole or of its members separately, have been formulated in accordance with the prerequisites and development of the confrontation with Israel. Based on geographic closeness, the Arab countries were divided into countries in direct

confrontation (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) and those supporting it. Another division for the Arab countries was based on the levels of intransigence or easiness in their relations with Israel. In this regard, the Arab countries were divided into nationalist and reactionary or rather revolutionist and conservative. After the Camp David talks, the Arab countries were then divided into countries of endurance and resistance in the face of the "feeble defeatist" Egypt.

Therefore, it is no accident that the Arab world changed drastically after the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars, which brought with them immense psychological and emotional distress as well as enormous human and material losses, especially in the confrontation countries.

On the international level, the emergence of the Israeli state and the eruption of the long Arab-Israeli conflict came at a time in which drastic changes were taking place in the world order following the Second World War. These changes were represented mainly in the emergence of the United States as leader of the Western camp and heir to the fading British Empire, and the start of a new era of Cold War between the East and the West. It was not strange then that Jewish and Zionist powers focused their activities to secure support from the new superpower (the United States), just as they had previously secured support from Britain. Yet Britain's traditional cleverness to balance its support for the Jewish state in Palestine with the establishment of good relations with the Arab ruling elite (represented in its support of the establishment of the Arab League) was not matched by the attitude of successive US administrations, with few exceptions.

Over almost 50 years of Arab-Israeli conflict (including the developments of the peace process that started in 1979), the high levels of Arab political and emotional mobilization against Israel were only countered by similar levels of unwavering US bias towards Israel, and the general and provocative overlooking not only of Arab governments' demands and insistence but

also, most importantly, of the emotional feelings (of political and religious origins) of ordinary Arab people across the region.

We are in no need to review the compassionate attachment that links the United States and Israel from 1947 up till now.[6] Many references elucidate the various aspects of the US bias to Israel, which was clear in the eras of every US president who witnessed the birth of Israel and the conflict with it, starting from Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson until Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush the father, Clinton, and even Bush the son. According to official reports, the aid given by the United States to Israel stands at almost US$ 3 billion annually, though it could actually reach US$ 5 billion. Most of this aid takes the form of military equipment financed by taxes paid by the American people. In addition, the United States provides large amounts of money to Israel on a regular basis, in the form of collateral bonds allowing Israel to borrow more money from banks. On the political level, the United States overlooks the international community and even works to alter its perception of the legitimacy of Israel's actions. The United States has always made use of its permanent membership in the Security Council, using its right of veto against any resolution that criticizes Israel. More than once, the United States and Israel have been in awkward, if not shameful, situations, where they together faced the world in the UN General Assembly.

While the General Assembly has managed to issue resolutions that condemn Israel, it does not enjoy any real power or authority. Accordingly, no one in the Arab world, and especially not among the Palestinians, can separate Israeli actions that ran counter to international law and the criteria of democratic states — such as assassinations, torture, and the bombing of civilians by tanks and fighters — from the absolute support provided by the United States. The researcher in US policy towards the Middle East can easily perceive that the US focus has been centered on support of Israel all the way, regardless of its

being right or wrong, more than on promotion of the peace process between Israel and its neighbors. The United States has played a vital role that cannot be denied in bringing about the agreements of Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, as well as the agreements convened with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Yet it did not show any real interest in the introduction of comprehensive projects for a real and comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in a way that reflects its weight and capabilities.

Yet what is perhaps more worthy of attention while talking about "Islam" and "the West" is not merely US protection of Israel and all the justification given for its actions, but the influence exerted by Israel and its supporters inside the United States to formulate the US vision towards the Islamic world and the mechanisms of dealing with this world. The leaders of Israel, in all their willingness to confront Islamic resistance organizations inside the occupied Arab countries, such as Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, have spared no effort to mobilize the United States and European powers in their fight against Islamic fundamentalism, rendering it the primary foe of the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many declarations from Israeli leaders such as Yitzak Rabin and Shimon Peres allude to the threat represented in fundamentalist Islam threatening the entire planet and comparing it even to communism, Nazism, and fascism. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu strove to convince the Americans more than once that "the Arabs and the Muslims do not hate the United States of America for supporting Israel, but they rather hate Israel as it is an extension of US culture and civilization".

It was thus no coincidence—as observed even by US analysts—that the United States, motivated by its desire to defend its direct interests (the protection of Israel and the flow of oil) adopted a dual policy in the Arab countries of the Middle East, especially with regard to issues such as democracy and human rights. This policy is all too evident when comparing, for in-

stance, the US vision regarding the same issues in other Islamic regions, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.[7]

In this context, the destructive impact of US policies in the Middle East, and in particular the unwavering and flagrant bias towards Israel, on the Arabs' vision (both Muslims and Christians) of the United States is quite clear. So why can't the numerous US research centres and opinion-poll institutes figure out this close relationship between US policy, on one hand, and the negative attitudes of Arab public opinion against Israel, on the other? The overwhelming majority of the ordinary citizens of the Arab world have no background in the cultural contradiction between them and the Americans and have only slight knowledge about US hegemony over the world and their countries. However, they know only too well a very simple fact; that the United States usually supports Israel against the Palestinians and the Arabs.

Many researchers and specialists in Middle Eastern affairs, including some of the most prominent in the field, such as Bernard Lewis, admit the truth in the existence of a "refusal" or "hatred" towards the United States in public opinion in the Arab world, and the Muslim world as a whole. However, they criticize these feelings and tendencies, and regard them as illogical, attributing them, in essence, to reasons other than the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the forefront of the reasons used to explain the negative tendencies towards the United States are: the suffering of the people of the Arab world due to their non-democratic governments, the widespread fundamentalist and extremist religious thought that is hostile towards non-Muslims, and poverty and crippled economic growth, in addition to other widespread leftist and extremist nationalistic views.[8]

To a certain extent, these observations are valid. However, what is more important is that most of these reasons are also closely linked to the faltering and tragic consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not difficult to prove, for example, that

the excessive spending on armament and the colossal cost of war with Israel are reasons behind the economic hardships those countries in direct opposition with Israel have suffered, and this has undeniably hindered their economic development programmes. It is also not difficult to see that the public mobilization for war against Israel was a reason behind the popularity and existence of the leftist and extremist nationalistic views that reject Israel and American "non-imperialism", etc. However, we shall put more emphasis here on the effect the Arab-Israeli confrontation has on the existence and sustainability of the region's non-democratic regimes, and its strengthening of fundamentalist Islamic movements.

Firstly, since the establishment of Israel at the expense of Palestinian rights and freedoms, "supporting the Palestinian people" and confronting the Zionist threat has become a source of "legitimacy" for political powers in the Arab world. Since 1948, ruling Arab regimes have been keen to enforce their legitimacy by practicing some kind of activity that includes a role antagonistic to Israel. This may even stop at merely producing ardent slogans, participating in conferences, or releasing statements incriminating Israel and supporting the Palestinians. Therefore, the seven independent Arab states in 1948 made sure to participate in a war against Israel although the aim of the war was not clear to those armies involved in it, and they were not aptly prepared for it. The Arab defeat in 1948 was among the most important reasons behind the retreating popularity of the ruling regimes in Egypt and Syria, and hence their fall. On the contrary, Gamal Abdul-Nasser's political triumph in 1956 was at the forefront of the reasons that supported his legitimacy in Egypt and the Arab world. When Nasser was defeated in 1967, all the Arab countries hurried to support him against Israel as a means of reinforcing their own legitimacy. And as a matter of fact, it appeared as if just the proclaiming of stances against Israel in itself was a source of legitimacy. And it was no coincidence that the first public statement of every military coup

in the Arab world started with a promise to work for the support of the Palestinian cause and to combat Zionism. This also sheds light on the truth that the confrontation with Israel was in itself an important element that explains the absence or stumbling of democracy in the Arab world, and especially in the countries neighboring Israel.

This confrontation, and especially during the times of war, was a justification for repressing freedoms and undermining democratic development. In Egypt, for example, the war of Palestine in 1948 was the first occasion on which martial law was declared and civil and political freedoms were thus restricted.

During the era of Nasser, which witnessed many political and military confrontations with Israel, all forms of prohibitions appeared on the freedom of expression and other freedoms. "National security agencies" thrived under mottoes such as "confrontation first", "no cry is higher than the cry of battle", and "the freedom of our land is above all freedoms". On the contrary, though, it was no coincidence that some political liberation came only after the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

In reality, the link between the existence and practices of authoritarian systems in the Arab world and the slogans of "struggle" against Israel and "for the Palestinian people" is a normal and recurrent matter in the region as a whole. A prime example of this is Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. For although this system is among the most despotic and cruel, and is notorious for abusing and squandering resources not only in the Arab world, but in the world as a whole, it was and remains extremely successful in presenting itself to Arab public opinion as the regime capable of challenging Israel. Though that has never happened in a serious manner throughout its long and bloody history, this Iraqi regime's proclaimed position remains one of the most important sources of its Arab "popularity", which renders any attempt to strike Iraq a dangerous undertaking.

Secondly, there is no doubt that defining Israel as a "Jew-

ish" state affected the religious aspect of political life in the Arab countries. This occurred through either the establishing of contradictions with Jewish minorities and excluding them, or through developing political Islamic causes aimed at confronting "the Jewish threat". This is especially true after other political powers failed to do so. In Egypt, Jews enjoyed a safe and secure life, active and flourishing economic activities and religious freedom. Their numbers increased from around 5,000 individuals in 1830 to more than 65,000 in 1947. Some of them played an important role in Egyptian public life. Examples include Yakoub Sanoua, who founded one of Egypt's famous newspapers in 1877 and was considered an integral participant in the Egyptian nationalist movement. Or Youssef Katawi, who was a member of the committee that planned Egypt's constitution in 1923, minister of the treasury in 1924, and a representative in parliament for one of Egypt's southern electoral districts. The prominent role Jews played in Egyptian economic, financial, and commercial life was not met with any refusal or hatred by the rest of Egyptian society. Yet even so, most of these Jews were attracted to Zionism, and the establishment of Israel was the turning point that marks their departure from Egypt, especially after official circles started to view them with a doubtful eye.

However, what is more important is that the religious feelings that prevailed in the popular Egyptian reaction to the dangers facing the Islamic holy places in Palestine in the 1930s gave a strong push to the Islamic tendency within the Egyptian nationalist movement. Palestine was thus regarded as an opportunity for *jihad* against Zionism and a means of gathering more popularity and noticeable political weight. The defeat of Nasser's regime (which described itself as socialist and revolutionary) by Israel in 1967 presented an opportunity for Islamic political powers to present themselves as an alternative to the system. The Jewish nature of Israel contributed to the development of the view that the struggle was one between Jews and

Muslims. Later on, throughout the various stages of the confrontation, Israel's obstinate policies helped support violent Islamic groups, which seemed to provide the only logical answer to Jewish extremism. It was not difficult for fundamentalist Islamic organizations, via their leaders, to equate Israel with the United States, and consider the latter the most basic reason for not only the existence and continuation of Israel, but for its hostile colonial policies and its transgressions of Palestinian rights. Sayyid Qutb (the most outstanding theorist of the fundamentalist extremist movement in Egypt and also the most fanatical and uncompromising) explained this tendency with extreme clarity.

The dichotomy here was at its peak when the United States sponsored a number of Islamic powers—conservative and fundamentalist—to help combat communism, while these powers remained opposed to Israel, refused its very existence, denied its legitimacy, and loathed US' support for it.

This contribution aimed at highlighting the important role US politics plays in the Middle East, and its contributions to feeding the feelings of anger and hatred against the United States and the West in general. The central idea displayed here is that if there truly is a feeling of cultural and historical difference or antithesis and rivalry that the Arab and Muslim peoples feel towards the West, this in itself does not at all explain the feelings of hatred and enmity. So what turned this cultural difference and variety into hatred was in essence the political factor that influenced these relations, such as the old enmity between the Ottoman empire and the major European powers, the Western colonization of the Muslim world, and maybe what is most dangerous and hard-felt, the Western support and the flagrant American bias towards Israel, neglecting Palestinian and Arab needs which have attained international legitimacy.

It is no secret concerning the modern development of the Arab world that its major religious and political reform movements since the mid-nineteenth century started with an appre-

ciation and admiration of Western intellectual, political, scientific, and industrial accomplishments. They aimed at learning from the West and interacting with it, not to clash with it or make it an enemy. And if Western colonialism played a major part in twisting this relationship during the first half of the twentieth century, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the biased Western (and particularly US) stance towards Israel played a more unconstructive and dangerous role in the second half of the century. And this seems to have continued into the twenty first century. There is no doubt that the worst side of that truth is the appearance of fundamentalist extremist movements that unlawfully attribute themselves to Islam. These movements found in US and Western political bias towards Israel their largest source of legitimacy among the Arab public as well as political acceptance. It was by no means a coincidence that Osama bin Laden, who now leads the most dangerous of these movements, presents himself as a freedom fighter and struggler against Zionism and Israel and against the American hegemony which totally supports them, as did Saddam Hussein.

From all this we can conclude that reaching a fair, final, and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is among the most important elements that will contribute to removing the feelings of hatred and enmity against the West, and the United States in particular. Such a solution will also contribute to removing the legitimacy from the evil terrorist organizations that threaten everyone; in the Muslim world and in the West. And regarding the current developments of the stumbling peace process, I believe that the key to a solution could be presented if the United States proposed to personally formulate and enforce a resolution, without leaving either direct party — Israel or the Palestinians — space for tardiness, tarrying, or procrastination.

The peace and safety of the world, including the peace and safety of the United States, the West, and the Muslim world, is larger and more important a cause than should be left to the Palestinian inability to make a decision or the greed and short-

sightedness of the extremists in Israel and their friends in Washington.

Notes

[1] Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 13.

[2] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 47.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 209.

[4] Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Westview Press, Rand Study, 1995), p. 47.

[5] Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs* (Penguin, 1982), p. 10.

[6] George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, *The Passionate Attachment, America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 78.

[7] Augustus Richard Norton, "Rethinking United States Policy toward the Muslim World", in: *Current History*, February 1999, p. 51.

[8] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *The Atlantic on Line*, www.thealantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm.

Part 4

Muslim and Christian Minorities
in Western and Muslim
Countries

The September 11 Tragedy:
Crash or Breakthrough in
Muslim-Christian Relations?

Alex Soesilo Wijoyo, S.J

> Vermin, poison, atrocious death: what different resonance
> they have to our age of suicide as armament, anthrax,
> resurrected pox.
> Every other week brings new warnings, new false alarms;
> it's hard to know how much to be afraid, or even how.
>
> (C.K. William, "Fear", *New York Times*, August 29, 2002)

In the midst of the fear, paranoia, anger, and frustration that
C.K. William conveys and depicts in his poem "Fear" as the
general atmosphere that prevails in the West, particularly in
the United States in the aftermath of September 11, and in com-
memoration of its first anniversary, can we sincerely hope, with-
out sounding preposterous, that there will be any positive out-
come in the Muslim-West relation, and in particular, in the rela-
tion between religious minorities and majorities?

Is it possible to expect that from the ashes of the September
11 human tragedy a new dawn of understanding between East
and West could arise? Or could it be a beginning of a new con-

struct out of the old habitus that exists in the minority-majority relations?

Surely, our initial reaction would be one of cynicism or perhaps you will accuse me of being overly optimistic in my hopes for the future of the Muslim and Christian minorities in the West and in the Muslim world. "It is impossible," you will say as the September 11 tragedy has created a deeper chasm between the two civilizations and especially now if we consider ongoing world events.

As a matter of fact, right now we are on the verge of a possible pre-emptive strike against another Arab nation. The Bush II administration has been beating the drums of a possible unilateral war against Iraq. Despite opposition from senior government officials of the previous Bush I administration, President Bush junior seems bent on going to war without making a clear and persuasive case against Iraq. In response, the Arab League voted against supporting the US against such move.

After the September 11 incident, visitors to the US have noticed how far it seems to permeate the American way of life. In airports, security checks are stricter, pilots are now allowed to carry guns in the cockpit, the newspapers are saturated with the news of the latest developments, and people with Arabic sounding names get questioned.

Several cases are reported on how activities related to Islam are getting closer scrutiny and Muslim minorities are subjected to a variety of harassments. In academic circles several incidents have been reported. A computer-science professor of Middle Eastern descent from a university in Florida was deported to his country for staying in the US for over 10 years beyond his legal limit.[1]

Eager to find a provocative keynote speaker for a three days symposium in the context of the September 11 first anniversary commemoration, Colorado College invited Hanan Ashrawi, a forceful and articulate spokeswoman for the plight of the Palestinians. Her presence drew protest from Jewish groups in Colo-

rado and Jewish College students of the said school.[2] Conservative Christians raised a protest over the University of North Carolina's Decision to require incoming freshmen to read a book by Michael Sells, *Approaching the Quran: The Early Revelation* (White Cloud Press, 1999). Although inclusion of selected texts from various religious traditions as reading assignment has been a long-standing academic tradition in US Universities.

In the art and cultural world, Jackie Mason, a famous stand-up comedian of Jewish background, managed to squeeze out a decision from Zannion Comedy Club in Chicago to cancel an overture act by Ray Hannaia, an Arab American.[3]

Brad Foss of the *South-Florida Sun Sentinel* reported, "Some fliers keep a low profile. They attempt to avoid notice. Interrogations, body searches, and suspicious stares are common these days for air passengers with darker complexions and foreign names".[4] In addition to that, an increasing number of threats against mosques and other Islamic institutions have been reported. These are but few examples of the consequences of the tragedy towards Muslim minorities in the West.

The *New York Magazine* cover page of the November 5, 2001 issue shows a lot of the condition that minorities are going through. A nervous, terrified Sikh cab driver had to drape his cab with American flags in semblance of American patriotism to avoid being victimized by the situation. In other words if there is any group of people most affected by this terrorist act, it is the minority group and how they are being perceived by the society they live in.

Although the attack happened on US soil, the tragic consequences of this human tragedy have reverberated into the already divided world of the two civilizations of the West and the Muslims. Furthermore, it has further exacerbated the already strained relationship between Muslim and Christian minorities throughout the world, such as in several conflict areas like Poso and Ambon, Indonesia. The mass media has a crucial role in inculcating this (misleading) perception.

Let me shift gear here from the September 11 context. Let me instead relate a historical overview on how Christian minorities were perceived in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East. Since the classic studies by A.S. Trittion *The Caliphs and Their non-Muslim Subjects* (Oxford: rpr 1970) and by Antoine Fattal *Le Statut légal des non-musulmans en pays d'Islam* (Beyrouth: 1958) there has not been much development or interest in the study of the status and role of non-Muslims in Islamic countries, particularly as regards Christian non-Muslims. The main reason for this lack of interest is closely associated with post-Muslim colonialism in which the habitus of the world has changed, particularly with the formation of Muslim nation-states in former Western colonies.

Before the advent of Western colonialism, for many centuries Muslim rulers in the Middle East governed their subjects, including non-Muslims, under the *shari*ʾa* law and under the Ottoman *millet* system; non-Muslims enjoyed religious freedom in terms of practicing their religion, obtained the status of protected people (*ahl al-dhimma*), but including all the restrictions, disadvantages, and discrimination affecting their roles in society. The *dhimmi*s status became the *habitus* of the day, something acquired, reproduced, and maintained which was taken for granted as part of their way of life and this remained so for centuries. Until the end of the nineteenth century people's self-identity was drawn along religious lines. People lived together *en bloc* in quarters based on their religion or ethnic background. To the present day Lebanon and the city of Jerusalem are clear historical witnesses of this.

In the subsequent development of the political and economic encroachment of the Ottoman Empire by Western powers, the West found that the status of non-Muslim subjects and their treatment by the Ottoman rulers were unacceptable. With the aim of protecting non-Muslims, the West sought for legal exemptions of non-Muslims from *shari*ʾa* law. In the nineteenth-century, "European expressions of concern about the rights of

local non-Muslims could not be severed from the political agen-
das of European powers".[5]

In the post-colonial era, the founding of nation-states marks
another shift in the position and the status of non-Muslims in
Islamic counties. The question of their legal status as "protected
people" (*dhimmi*s) once again surfaced. This time the rulers of
these new Islamic nation states attempted to adopt the format of
the Western constitution, including matters enjoyed by the citi-
zens of the West such as equality before the law, a constitution,
and religious freedom, to name but a few. However, if we look
into the constitution of Islamic countries at present, we get the
impression that they have not adopted the principle of "equal
rights under the law" or perhaps they simply avoid addressing
the issue and thus continue to practice the *millet* system from
the Ottoman era.

In the modern and post-Muslim modern era, the status of
non-Muslims in Islamic countries was considered based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The principle
of equal protection under the law and of non-discrimination on
the basis of sex and religion is enshrined the UDHR, article 2
and in the ICCPR articles 2 and 26. In a subsequent develop-
ment, the UN General Assembly, November 25, 1981, proclaimed
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, thus affirm-
ing and strengthening respective articles in the UDHR that "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on reli-
gion or belief and having the purpose or as its effect nullifica-
tion or impairment of recognition, enjoyment or exercise of hu-
man rights or fundamental freedom on an equal basis." Fur-
thermore, articles 3,1-2 call for the member states to act to abol-
ish any patterns of discrimination in their legislations:

> All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation
> where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to
> take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the
> grounds of religion or belief in this matter.

For the first time, nation-state members of the UN were called to take action on these issues. In beginning this call to action sounded genuine to many Islamic countries. Even then, just like before, they were reluctant to take action, or simply avoided the issues, and instead argued for an independent Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. A.A. Mayer concludes,

> The Islamic Human Rights do not provide any real protection for the rights of religious minorities comparable to those found in international human rights laws. In fact .... it seems to endorse pre-modern *shariʿa* rules that call non-Muslims to be relegated to an inferior status if they qualify as members of the *ahl al-kitab* and for them to be treated as non persons if they do not qualify for such inclusion.

The problem is that the Western countries' call for human rights has been marred with colonialist politics of expansion and domination. This political agenda of the Western countries could jeopardize addressing the human rights' issue and the rights of the minorities in Islamic countries on their own merit.

So we can say then that minority groups in both Western and Muslim countries are marginalized based on the perception of their religion by people from the majority. What can we do then to alleviate the conditions of these groups in order for them to live in harmony in the society of their choice without being victimized because of their religion?

Crash or Breakthrough

We can safely say that each group acts according to its habitus. According to the French philosopher and sociologist, Bourdieu (*The Logic of Practice*, 54), habitus is "a system of durable, transposable dispositions, predisposed to function as a structure," "a product of history, [which] produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by history." Frames of mind and "rules of conducts" are acquired, produced, and conditioned by society itself through its institutions, particularly through education.

We are born into the habitus of the group or community we belong to.

Our behavior toward, and perception of, others are shaped by our habitus, and socially reproduced again and again until a breakthrough occurs. Let me share with you a funny poem by Robert Desnos, about a pelican:

Le capitain Jonathan	Captain Jonathan
Etant age de dix-huit ans	eigtheen years of age
Capture un jour un pelican	one day caught a pelican
Dans une ilê d'Extrême Orient	on an island in the Far East
Le pelican de Jonathan,	Jonathan's pelican
Au matin, pond un oeuf tout blanc	laid a white egg in the morning
Et il en sort un pelican	which produced a pelican
Lui ressemblant étonnament	that amazingly looked just like it
Et ce deuxiême pelican	and this second pelican
Pond, a son tour, un oeuf tout blanc	laid a white egg in its turn
D'ou sort, inévitablement	which of course produced
Un autre qui en fait autant	a pelican, which in its turn did the same.
Cela peut direr tres longtemps	This could have gone on and on
Si l'on ne fait pas un omellete avant.	but for the fact that one egg was turned into an omelet

(Robert Desnos, *Chantefleur, Chantefables)*

It's all social reproduction. A white pelican lays an egg that hatches a baby pelican, that in its turn lays another egg. The process goes on indefinitely, until somebody fries the egg as an omelet. Habitus is reproduced again until somebody breaks it, and thus starts a new beginning.

Our perception of the other is usually colored by prejudice. And prejudice is the result of our ignorance of the other person. Ignorance creates fear. Fear prevails in our relationship with the minorities in our society. We fear so many imagined threats that each of us has put up a wall instead of a bridge. We fear

that the difference of the other group of people will cause us harm. But we fail to consider that we could be different and agree to be different.

To counteract ignorance, it is necessary to educate people about the habitus of other religious communities in a religious literacy program. This will demystify issues that cloud understanding of them. This will perhaps make us appreciate them better as part of our own habitus. In this context, I challenge the Psalmists—who are scholars and experts—to bridge the gap between civilizations. They are full of knowledge, which will provide the answers or the missing links between all these problems. We can continue to pore at our books in pursuit of higher learning but it would not solve the problem. We have to be proactive and be part of the solution. We can start by making ourselves understood by continuing to speak out in a language the majority of the people understand. This is necessary so that the majority will have a shift in attitude toward minorities in our society, and vice versa.

According to Thomas L. Friedman of the *New York Times*,[6] right after September 11, the majority of books on Amazon.Com's top 100 bestsellers lists were about the Middle East and Islam. "There is a heightened interest in Islam, Islamic countries, and of course curiosity and bewilderment about Osama Bin Laden. Despite possible hardening in attitude, even solidification of stereotypes toward Islam and Muslims because of some literature in bookstores, there is no doubt that Western eyes are open to Islam, its faith and its people, in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia." There have been many discussions in American universities about Islam but Friedman regrets that there has been no upsurge in interest in American studies in academic circles in the Muslim world since September 11.

The planes that crashed into the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon attacked the symbols of commerce and of the military might of the United States. It is without doubt an act of terrorism. Allow me to parallel this event with the similarly

tragic event of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The historical perspective in the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbor tells us of a development in history where good triumphs over evil in the long run. The devastating attack on Pearl Harbor initially resulted in animosity, anger, and hatred towards the Japanese. It also drew a reluctant US Administration into the Second World War, which eventually led to dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After years of suffering the consequences of fatal devastation, and of diplomatic negotiations, a truce was agreed upon by both countries which ushered in a new era of cooperation and good relationships between the US and Japan and by doing so broke the old habitus between the two warring countries.

In a similar fashion, we can contend that from the ashes of the September 11 human tragedy, a new civilization can rise in harmony with the West. From my Christian religious background, such resurrection should not only be a belief, but should also be a plan of action: that there is hope for the deconstruction of the old habitus in the relation between religious traditions, particularly Islam and Christianity. And new developments may force that change to happen.

Impacts of Global Information Technology

Two revolutions became watersheds that changed the complexion of the world and its habitants: a communications revolution brought about by Johannes Gutenberg's invention of print technology in mid-fifteenth-century Germany, and the digital revolution in information technology with the invention of the computer by the end of the twentieth century. Fully aware of the impact of print technology on our way of understanding the world, our way of life, and which way we organize our society, we are, as it were, dashed by the avalanche of technological information the consequence of which has not yet become all too clear to us.

Two characteristics of the digital information technology,

however, will definitely change the relation among religious communities: the speed of communication and exchange, and its accessibility to the public.

Digital information technology "shrinks" and transforms the world into borderless cyberspace. Communication between people crosses new frontiers never traveled before. This is an era of virtual presence and reality. We watch the war of the coalition against Iraq on TV in our living room. We witnessed the tragedy of September 11 with our naked eyes. We are present in and part of the events themselves. The presence of other people who differ in cultural tradition, outlook, and way of live becomes very immediate. This immediacy of the other makes exchange, adoption, and appropriation of values, even of behavior, unavoidable.

Shaafeq Ghabra[7] shares his experiences during his student years in the United States and how these help him to cope with extremism back home in Kuwait.

> In graduate school, in the 1980's, the most Zionist of all my teachers would listen with empathy to my opinions and my differences of perspective, and then argue. This opened the way for respect, learning, and understanding. Tolerance, even without accepting the views of the other, does have a moderating power on people and permits for the repetition of the cycle of understanding. Tolerance breeds tolerance. As professor of political science at Kuwait University, I practice my old professor's technique on my own fundamentalist students.

Religious identity has been predicated upon differences. Value Judgment — usually negative — is involved in understanding and perceiving differences. Jacques Derrida concocted the term "difference" for the kind of difference when we say "black-white", "left-right", instead of simply "black" or "left". Communication and interaction help reduce the intensity of the difference. The terms "Muslim — non-Muslim" and "Christian — non-Christian" will diminish their separating power and their potential as sources of conflict, when people live next to one another and work together in a common pursuit.

In the context of global communication, the traditional understanding of the status and role of non-Muslims in Islamic countries and vice-versa will change sooner or later. The position of non-Christians as "protected people" and "freedom of religion" will be discussed once again. The difference is that now the debate is generated and facilitated by modern communication and by the fact of being-in-communication with others. Thus a new habitus is being in formation.

Global Communication Technology Impinge on Authority

Authority has an affinity to access to information. Religious authority used to claim ownership over "knowledge" and "truth" because they had the monopoly and privilege of access, in particular through literacy, to knowledge and truth. In Islamic traditional education (*pesantren*), a *santri* student studies Islam in interactive sessions with his *kiai* (*sheikh*) who holds authority over a repertoire of yellow books. Similarly in the Roman Catholic tradition, the clergy (*clerus*) used to be the literate class of the community, and thus had access to the deposits of faith. Gutenberg's revolution in print technology—without which the Protestant Reformation could not have happened—impinged on the traditional religious authority of the Roman Catholic Church, because people had direct access to the Bible.

The advent of the digital revolution, the information technology by means of computers, in particular the Internet—all the more when Internet will be accessible via regular electrical power cable—will widen public access to information, including that on religions. Via radio networks, TV channels, and the Internet, religious communities will be inundated with values that are not necessarily compatible with religious values, no matter which religion they belong to. This is, we contend, the biggest challenge facing religions in this era of global communication technology. The notions of non-Muslim minorities in Islamic countries or non-Christians in Western countries will

change thereby. A new habitus of relationships between religious communities will form, perhaps for the survival of religions themselves, because religious communities all together will be forced to turn into new types of "minorities" facing new types of "majorities" founded on interests quite different from what religions strive for.

The image of planes crashing into the Twin Towers was tragic. It cost so many lives and has caused so much pain. But we can also look at it with a different eye. It can be a symbol instead of a breakthrough in the relationship between the West and Islam. That perhaps will be a breakthrough that will open up both worlds to greater understanding. It was a painful sight. And now what is left in Ground Zero is a hallowed fresh beginning for a more solid relationship between the West and Islam by starting to reach out to one another, by educating one another, by being literate about one another. I sincerely hope that it will be an impetus for giving new meaning to how we view our "religious minorities". Finally I hope that in our minds we will build the Twin Towers of two great civilizations standing together as equals so that we will get rid of the so-called minority-majority state of mind.

Until then we can safely say that we are in the position to say with Goethe, "Here and now begins a new era in world history, and you can say that you were there".

Notes

[1] *South-Florida Sun Sentinel*, August 28, 2002.

[2] *New York Times*, August 29, 2002.

[3] *New York Times*, August 29, 2002.

[4] *South-Florida Sun Sentinel*, August 28, 2002.

[5] Aan Elizabeth Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights*, West View Press, 1995, p. 124.

[6] *New York Times*, August 28, 2002

[7] "What catastrophe can reveal", *New York Times*, August 26, 2002.

Historical Burden and Promising Future among Muslim and Christian Minorities in Western and Muslim Countries

Iik Arifin Mansurnoor

Evangelical tendencies highlight the difficulties and sufferings of Christians in some Islamic countries…. Active efforts to convert each other's members are still made by some Christians and Muslims, sometimes even using practical help and assistance as a means to conversion.

(Johnstone and Slomp 1998, p. 362)

[The religious] commonality has not hindered Muslims and Christians from fighting and hating each other over the centuries. But today, as these two largest and most dynamic of all the world's religious faiths stand eyeball to eyeball almost everywhere, … it may be the time to seek a reversal of history's precedent …

(Martinson 1994, pp. 99-100)

This contribution aims to analyse a number of historical episodes involving Muslim and Christian minorities in the context of contemporary society and state. These episodes will be shown to uncover bitter and sweet relations between these two religious groups. Even though this paper does not claim to provide irrefutable lessons from its findings, it is expected that

discussion of these historical episodes will, at least, lead to reflection on the common features and underlying spirit so revealed. It assumes that religion forms only a part of human cooperation and conflict, especially in a plural society. In examining these historical episodes, the macro-context and diverse backgrounds will be elaborated for clarity and evaluation.

Religious history is customarily perceived as an instrument for reviving sad stories and old hatreds. However, this variety of history, properly and critically read, potentially presents other, more optimistic, features. It is hoped that commonly held hatreds may be seen in a different light and that enhanced religious relations can be taken as a starting point to welcome and enrich a more open and truly global world.

In a collection of articles on interfaith dialogue during the early 1980s, 'Abd al-Ra'uf, then the Director of the Washington Islamic Center, argues that the remaining major contentious issue between the Muslims and the Christians hinges on the mutual recognition of each other's worth and the avoidance of coarse evangelism/conversion work.[1]

Well into the third millennium of our era, all religions, as shown by the UN Special Rapporteur in 2001, have failed to satisfactorily eradicate religious extremism and intolerance. However, as has been repeated again and again here and on many other occasions like this, religions, indeed, have emerged to bring spiritual perfection and world peace. Islam and Christianity, to be more specific, have inherent and down-to-earth messages of peace and love. Yet both, as missionary religions, also aim at bringing the world into their respective fold. The fact remains that not all peoples welcome them. The two are still in the process of finding a better way to deal with those who refuse to enter and accept them. Minority issues continue to pose unceasing challenges to these scriptural religions, especially in this age of open skies and globalization.

Both religions have offered some historical solutions to the issue of minorities. Seen from the perspective of the modern

world, these solutions seem to be rather outdated. This can be seen clearly in the formulation of the Charter of The United Nations (June 26, 1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 217A [III], December 10, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the Declaration on all Forms of Religious Intolerance (1981) and The International Religious Freedom Acts (IRFA 1998). Perhaps we should not compare them in form; but rather in spirit that the two, and in fact all, religions aspire to. Indeed, the value and spirit suggested by the religions *vis-à-vis* minorities should continue to inspire our contemporary and future policy makers, researchers, and practitioners.

As can be observed from the constitutions of states, with a Christian or Muslim majority,[2] it appears that these states insist on and adhere to the universal principles of equality and freedom of religion. Moreover, it is also evident that in the twentieth century more reports of human rights violations, especially published by such "neutral" bodies as Amnesty International, have come from third world countries, including Muslim ones. How can this be the case? I am convinced that non-religious factors play no less important and crucial a role than religious ones. Injustice toward a religious group, including a minority group, manifests itself only as a symptom or the tip of the iceberg of larger legal and social problems. I shall bring the readers to some concrete examples of how particular states, despite an excellent record as regard religious freedom, have failed to uphold it, even if occasionally, under certain conditions. In the late 1980s, for instance, France imposed a rule of not allowing female Muslim students to wear *headscarves* (*hijab*) at state schools, a ruling, which clearly contradicts her own time-honored principle of freedom in lifestyle and belief. Recently under the pressure of the "war against terrorism", which is obviously legitimate enough, the United States has committed many acts against her Muslim citizens considered unlawful by her own people, let alone American Muslims.

Despite many similarities and even cases of identical wording among modern constitutions on freedom of religious practice and belief, a major difference emerges concerning the propagation and dissemination of religious teaching and belief. Among Islamic countries the silence on this matter is very typical. In my view the singular most immediate reason is defense against the aggressive Christian missionaries. Why do Muslims choose this approach? Is it not self-contradictory to their own religious missionary vocation? For many Muslims, the imbalance of wealth and facilities between their own religious institutions and those of the aggressive missionaries or evangelists do not permit a level playing field.[3]

Persecution of minorities can also be contemplated in order to silence co-religionist critics and the emotional masses. In many parts of Indonesia, for example, pogroms and intimidation of Christians or Chinese at times were arguably sponsored by the hidden hands of the country's leaders for no other reason than safeguarding their own interests and political dominance.

The future of minorities, Muslim or Christian, and their better treatment hinge not so much on the inherent value and spirit of the Scripture as on the implementation of those ideas under a democratic system. As argued by several scholars, a democratic system is the best way to give minorities their rights and fulfill their dreams.[4]

A tendency to superiority, proclivity, or an inferiority complex, through whatever causes, do not lead to any conducive coexistence among the major world religions. In the past Muslims succeeded in establishing and pursuing a more open system for minorities, in no insignificant part due to their optimism, not superiority. Likewise in many advanced democratic countries, the provision of more opportunities and more equal treatment, at least relative to many other developing countries, cannot be separated from their optimism about their own achievement and modern vision.

As missionary religions, Islam and Christianity face the major

question of how each deals with evangelism among the members of the other faith. In theory Islam, from the very beginning, had a categorical position about the Semitic religions, especially Christianity and Judaism. Both are considered as scriptural and valid religions. In historical reality, however, Muslim scholars have put conditions on such an acknowledgement; for example, only those people who were Christians and Jews prior to the coming of Islam and their descendants are properly considered *Ahl al-Kitab*.

On the Christian side, only after the Second Vatican Council did the Roman Catholic Church formally endorse recognition of Islam as a religion, which deserves respect and recognition on its own terms. Protestant denominations have not come up with a universal or united approach to Islam. As Martinson argues, the Protestant denominations in the US may be conveniently classified into three categories in respect to their approach to Islam or Muslims: Those which avoid Islam; those which disregard Muslims and those which pave the way for more interaction and dialogue (Martinson 1994, pp. 103-6).

In order to clarify the thesis of this contribution that in the past Islam offered the best approach to minorities by its concept of *ahl al-dhimma* and that the West in modern times has transformed or rather surpassed that concept by a bold policy of equality and freedom of religion, this paper will examine the formation of minorities, give a historical overview of Muslim and Christian treatment of minorities, and discuss Muslim minorities in the West and Christian minorities in Muslim countries in our era. It is argued here that despite the outdatedness of the Islamic concept about minorities and the sophistication of the modern Western concept and approach to minorities, these minorities continue to ask for more and that this originates from disadvantages, discrimination, racism, and prejudice. It is also assumed that the two religions have many commonalities, which should be shared and developed in order to maintain themselves and to establish a better world order.

Christian and Muslim Minorities

The formation of the Christian and Muslim minorities has its origin in their respective early careers. As religions and systems of spiritual guidance, both religions clearly began their careers in peace and as minorities. As such the two religious communities by default share the history of other religious minorities, particularly before their transformation into major world religions. Yet the two religions insist on their universal mission. They are, indeed, missionary and evangelist religions *par excellence*. Although both declare that religion connotes neither compulsion nor use of force, in reality practices and policies developed otherwise. The Church declared to exterminate the anti-Christ and the caliphate launched wars of expansion, aimed at bringing humanity to their religious realm. Voluntary migration by Muslims from their lands to predominantly Christian countries has no precedent in Islamic history, no previous discussion in Islamic legal literature. The oft-discussed topics include the predicament of the Muslim under a non-Muslim government using such themes as: the new converts, alienated from their previous co-religionists; the temporary visitor, taken as a captive or traveling as a freelancer, an envoy or a trader; the unhappy inhabitant of a Muslim country conquered by unbelievers. "A mass migration, a reverse *hijra* of ordinary people seeking a new life among the unbelievers is an entirely new phenomenon that poses fundamental major problems" (Lewis 1994, pp. 16-17).

> [C]an Islam accept non-Islamic minorities within its realm of power as citizens with equal rights and guarantee them protection and freedom, including the freedom to propagate, within the framework of generally recognized human rights? (Martinson 1994, p. 210)

Christian minorities in Muslim countries today can be divided generally into two categories. First, are those Christians who had inhabited the land long before the rise of Islam. This

can be seen in the presence of the Copts in Egypt, and the Nestorians and other Eastern Orthodox in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran. The second group is those Christians who emerged after the coming of Europeans, especially the Portuguese and the Spaniards, and those who have accepted Christianity in the wake of missionary activities since the nineteenth century. Southeast Asian countries provide relevant examples for these phenomena, for example, the Catholics in the Philippines and Malacca as well as the Batak Protestants in Indonesia. The status and conditions of both minorities vary greatly. Muslim migrants in the West consider themselves much better off economically and socially. They earn more and enjoy concrete freedom in diverse fields. Yet they are not fully free from prejudice, discrimination, and other anomalies. Christians in Muslim countries found themselves more sophisticated and better educated, at least until the third quarter of the twentieth century. By virtue of their advantage in education and closer links with coreligionists in the advanced West, they occupy, if not dominate, the professional establishment. Although the constitutions of modern Muslim states have endorsed freedom of religion, mistreatment against Christian minorities continues.

A Historical Overview

"Muslim rulers from the first Arab caliphs to the last Ottoman sultans had allowed the Christian communities to live by their own laws of personal status and to provide for their own schooling and higher education" (Lewis and Schnapper 1994, p. 15). Later the European colonial powers emulated in their own ways this type of "communal legal autonomy" for the Muslims living under their rule.

Christianity, being older, is not specifically prepared to face the Islamic challenge; rather it has inherited a sense and mission of superiority to Judaism, which it transforms. Instead of focusing on change among the Israelites, under the Apostle Paul,

Christianity was introduced persuasively and peacefully to the Gentiles. Although Christianity, as shown by the Church and historians, started its career as a non-official religion, it grew rapidly under the wing of the Roman empires. Closely related to the Greek and Roman tradition of political monolithism and centralization, during the Medieval Period Christianity pursued its vigorous evangelism almost without trace of failure. Most, if not all, entities were quickly swept under its umbrella, not always under its original emphasis of peaceful approaches. It did not, at least, allow a minority in its realm.

At the same time it cannot be denied that the original style of peaceful and persuasive calls to Christianity continued to be pursued by individuals and more significantly by institutions or orders. Figures such as Augustine in late sixth century England and Robert de Nobili in sixteenth century India are well known in this regard.

Chart 1: Expansion and Conversion

Christianity			Islam		
Phase	**Period**	**Religious Call**	**Phase**	**Period**	**Religious Call**
One	The first three centuries of C.E.	Propagated peacefully without political patronage	One	The first two centuries	Conversion outside Arabia followed political expansion
Two	The 4th to the 15th	State patronage effected major conversion	Two	The 3th to the 14th centuries	Peaceful missionary activities
Three	The 16th to the 19th centuries	Colonial expansion paved the way for conversion	Three	The 15th to the 17th centuries	-Renewal of conquests under the Ottomans followed by slow conversion -Peaceful propagation of Islam
Four	The 20th century	Peaceful propagation	Four	Modern period	Peaceful propagation

The rapid spread of Christianity was partly due to state support in as early as the third century. Constantine the Great (from Nis, named Flavius Constantinus [275-337 CE]) was the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity. He rebuilt Byzantium and named it Constantinople. In 325 the first great ecumenical council (General Council of the Christian church) was held in Nicaea. Julian (331-63 CE) was the last Roman leader and then emperor to oppose Christianity. Moreover, the determination and religious push for missionary activities swept almost all segments of the Roman world to Christianity. Islam rose from the periphery and it thus has had from the very beginning some form of minority proclivity and character. No wonder then it nurtured not only pluralism but also a niche for minorities (*ahl al-dhimma*).

After conquering the territories of the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, Islam only slowly absorbed the population into its fold. The Ottomans from the fifteenth century failed to follow this pattern. Interestingly, in West Africa and Southeast Asia, Islam has spread without closely following its earlier pattern of conquest. Islam has taken roots in Western countries relatively recently, even though it once was a dominant system in the Iberian Peninsula. Unlike its arrival in the latter, in most Western countries it generally grew out peacefully, introduced by sailors, workers and immigrants in general. Thus, in the West until quite recently Islam was never a religion of the indigenous population. The majority of the Christians in Muslim countries consist of indigenous population. A significant segment had endorsed Christianity before the rise of Islam. The largest proportion, however, became Christians following the European expansion and especially in the wake of well-planned and well-funded missionary work, especially from the nineteenth century onward.

Chart 2: Historical Overview of Minority Status under Christian and Muslim Orders

Christianity   Islam

Period	Internal Context	External Relations	Period	Internal Context	External Relations
Early	Being itself a minority	*Vis-à-vis* the Jews and the Roman subjects in general	Early	Being itself a minority	*Vis-à-vis* the Meccans
From the 4th century	Encountering or rather facing the Jews, pagans and others	Rapid absorption and pressure for conversion	From the 620s	Arab tribes, Jews and others	Political subjugation with religious freedom as the protected subjects (*ahl al-dhimma*)
From the 9th century	Few pockets of isolated minorities	Slow peaceful absorption and toleration	From the mid 8th century	The Jews, the Copts, the Nestorians, the Zoroastrians and others	No more expansion, thus civil rule prevailed paving the way for peaceful propagation and more organized approach to minorities
From the 11th century	Face to face with Muslims during the crusades and the Reconquista	Competition, rivalry and also process of learning (in Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula, the Muslims had little to hope as citizens)	From the 14th century	In addition to the above, a new pattern arose as the Ottomans expanded to the Balkan	Muslim rule with religious autonomy (the *millet* system)
From the 16th century	Colonial expansion	Political subjugation and crude or peaceful conversion	From the 19th century	Under European domination	Warfare or accepting as the ruled
From the 20th century		Better concept and approaches to minorities as secular values predominated			Political and economic difficulties pre-vented a better approach to minorities

Muslim-Christian Encounters

As stated above both religions endorse evangelism as inherent teaching and mission. In the words of Jesus as reported by Luke (Acts of the Apostles 1:6-8) on the mission of converting the gentiles to Christianity:

> [b]ut you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be My witnesses in Jerusalem and all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth.

At times references to the following verses become the trademark of modern Christian evangelists. It is the belief in the necessity of bringing others, including Muslims, to the Christian faith that has been objected to by the Muslims. Indeed, the Vatican and some Protestant denominations have declared "acceptance" of other faiths, including Islam, in their own respective right. The following Biblical messages are at times quoted out of context: "Go and preach the Gospel to the whole world…". "Jesus is the Only one…". "No-one can go to Father but …" (www.cwmission.org.uk/ForumForm). Being a latecomer, relative to Christianity, Islam can simply be discarded as novelty or corruption.

Historically Islam suggested the first and innovative idea of coexistence among religionists. Conversion is not the only answer to the community, nor is elimination ever entertained. In the mo-dern era, especially after the Second World War, more advanced and progressive ideas of accommodation have been explored and promoted. The Islamic idea has become only one, not even the best, in this struggle of idea advertisement.

Neither Muslim nor Christian minorities are free from complaints and protests against treatment meted out against, and conditions faced by, them. At the same time, both minorities at different levels and stages have succeeded in pursuing their activities, religious and evangelical, among segments of the host population. Can we compare how the two communities have fared? Is it true that Muslim minorities in the twenty-first cen-

tury West have fared much better that the Christians under Muslim majority rule? Does the nature of demographic formation of these minorities play a role in this difference, if any? Generally, Muslim minorities in the West comprise a migrant population. Yet the increasing numbers of Afro-Americans and groups of Caucasians who accept Islam cannot be ignored. On the other hand, most Christians in Muslim countries consist of indigenous population who had been Christian before Islamization or who have converted to Christianity rather recently; thus they are not generally migrants. This demographic background, I believe, has a direct impact on the kind of response and psychological approach of the majority. In the West, the migrants can simply be ignored or avoided, if necessary. In Muslim countries, the converts at times pose an embarrassment and this results in maltreatment.

Christians in States Declared Islamic or States with a Muslim Majority

Being historically a latecomer, Islam from the very beginning of its emergence has experienced encounters with Christians. In many cases during the early period of political and military expansion, Christians found themselves ruled by the Muslims, for example, in Andalusia, North Africa, Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, and Mesopotamia. Thus it is no wonder that historically the early Muslim jurists specifically developed ways of dealing with the *Ahl al-Kitab* and the *dhimmi*s. For some jurists, this early historical experience has its specific legal meaning. For example, the permission for a Muslim to marry a Christian or a Jew is conditioned by their belonging to these pristine early *Ahl al-Kitab* who had accepted their faith before the rise of Islam. Almost all schools and sects of these early *Ahl al-Kitab*, especially the Christians, have survived until today. Indeed, it is not farfetched to suggest that many of them survived by virtue of being the *dhimmi*s under Muslim rule. Thus one contribution of Islamic society and state to religious pluralism is that during

its early period of expansion, it had developed a pluralist approach to religions. Perhaps the confidence in the practicality and the usefulness of the system, has made modern Muslims dilemmatic, or rather dogmatic, and at times seemingly too conservative when dealing with the latest model of pluralism and human rights.

Moreover, modern evangelism practiced alongside European colonialism from the sixteenth century onwards has introduced Christianity to new generations of believers inside Muslim territories. Such countries as Lebanon, Sudan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia have seen the spread of Christianity among significant segments of their population, even though they generally belong to ethnic groups, which never embraced Islam.

In the light of these developments and of the background of Christians in Muslim countries, this contribution will rely on relevant cases taken from countries, which represent this diversity. Egypt, for example, has harbored an old significant group of Christian Copts who continue to maintain their religion despite intensive Islamization. However, the Christians in Lebanon can hardly be considered a minority group, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively, as their strength in numbers and their muscle in the political and economic spheres compensate their location amid the ocean of Muslim Arabs. Christians in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq can generally be grouped into an Egypt-type one for their indigeneity and minority. Then, the next model can be seen in the emergence of Christian minorities following intensive evangelism and colonialism launched after the sixteenth century. In some cases, for instance, the Christians of Malacca, the Maghrib, Goa, and the Philippines, European settlements form the backbone of the Christian population.

The presence of different religions in Muslim countries is an accepted fact of life; but the question remains how these religions can be expressed and propagated.

Egypt: The Christians in Egypt generally belong to the well-

entrenched old Christian communities of the Copts and other Mediterranean groups. The Copts are allowed to build and renovate churches after obtaining permission from the government (based on Ottoman law). Certain conditions are laid down for a permit to be issued on this. Under Husni Mubarak certain restrictions on the matter were removed (Pope Shenouda's statement May 31, 2002; www.arabicnews.com).

In Egypt unwarranted detention and violence are not only meted out against non-Muslims but also against Islamicists suspected of radicalism or terrorism. "Police abuse of detainees is a widespread practice that occurs regardless of a detainee's religious belief".[5] In arguing that a neutral, non-religious authority should stand to administer religious freedom, it must be borne in mind that only a democratically elected government may be expected to function. Authoritarian government by nature of its origin of power — generally less people-oriented — always faces legitimacy challenges, and thus is continuously under threat of political dissent. Any group, including religious ones and minorities, can be the immediate object of arrest and harassment.

Iran: Iran was proclaimed as an Islamic republic in 1979. Islam is declared the official religion in the Constitution.[6] Yet Iran under the difficult time of revolutionary days and their aftermath continues to suffer multidimensional crises, including the establishment of universal justice. The US, for example, has been very critical toward Iran, about, among others, her violation of religious freedom. The official minorities, including the Christians, have been subject to legal and other forms of state discrimination. They are prevented from being elected, except for reserved seats in the National Parliament and from serving in the army, the security services, and the judiciary. They are also discriminated against in joining higher education and in having fair legal proceedings. The Evangelical Christians have been especially put under close watch and scrutiny, mainly for their willingness "to seek out and accept converts from other religions".[7]

In the same Report it is also revealed that discrimination and repression were not limited to non-Muslims and non-Shi'i adherents but even to the prominent Shi'i figures. Relevant to my perception, religious discrimination or religious repression form only part of the problems and difficulties faced by countries catching up with more advanced countries.

Saudi Arabia: As a Muslim country which openly declares the Quran and the Hadîth as the sources of law and the Constitution, the Saudi government should have no problem in administering non-Muslim minorities in accordance with the traditional concept of protection for the *dhimmi*s. Criticisms against the highhanded manner of the Saudi government in handling the minorities have been heard from many different quarters. In this context let's briefly examine the succinct but informative report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom in 2001. It quotes the State Department's report concerning *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000*, that the Saudi government's human rights record "remained generally poor in a number of areas". Indeed, it has not positively moved toward the Commission's hope as in Saudi Arabia "[f]reedom of religion does not exist". Thus the country has been recommended since July 2000 to be branded as a "country of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Acts (IRFA).

Nevertheless, such criticism has not come from among the non-Muslims only; even the Saudi Muslims, especially the Shi'i and Isma'ili minorities and also women groups, have many grievances against the government.[8]

Bangladesh: A populous, poor country inhabited mainly by Muslims, Bangladesh has attracted the attention of missionaries and aggressive evangelists. Generally, missionary works have not been very successful, even in many instances they aroused negative, and not rarely blatant, reactions from some Muslims. The Council of World Mission has even raised a discussion topic through its website under the title "Is evangelism [in Bangladesh] really worth it?" It highlights how difficult it

has been to undertake evangelism *vis-à-vis* the Muslim community. Some participants in the debate even cynically argue that selling goods rejected at home to Bangladesh does not represent the work of Christ.

Brunei: Brunei, an ancient Malay state, has officially made MIB (Malay-Islamic-Monarchy) as the state philosophy. Islam has been given prominence in the Constitution of 1959. Other religions are guaranteed freedom of practice. Minorities are protected. As practiced in neighboring Malaysia, propagation of Christianity and other non-Islamic religions to Muslims is not permitted. As argued by the two consecutive Muftis of Brunei,[9] allowing non-Islamic missionaries in Brunei contradicts Islamic teachings. Churches and Chinese temples continue to survive and pursue lively religious functions and services, even though strict regulation is implemented on the foundings of new ones.

Malaysia: Officially an Islamic state under a Muslim ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Agong), in Malaysia non-Muslims are guaranteed under the Constitution, articles 3:1 and 11:1, 2, and 3 to profess and practice any religion as well as to propagate it among non-Muslims.[10]

Malaysia is an Islamic state, as reiterated by PM Mahathir recently; however, Malaysia will continue to observe the contents of its Constitution, including protection and freedom for the non-Muslims (see Mohamad Shahir, March 7, 2002, JAKIM, Prime Minister's Office, Malaysia). Despite its Islamic emphasis and symbolism, Christian churches have succeeded in winning a large following among the non-Muslim indigenous groups, especially in Sabah and Sarawak.

Indonesia: Despite recurrent, even if localized, Muslim-Christian conflicts, the country has enjoyed inter-religious harmony. In order to streamline the missionary activities in this Muslim-majority nation, since 1969, the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs ratified several joint-acts (see SKB Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.1 Tahun 1969 and SKB Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri

No.1 Tahun 1979; cf. Sismono 1979, pp. 227, 238-40).

In the Moluccas and Sulawesi: "Though the source of the fighting in both conflicts was not exclusively religion, religious identity—whether one was Christian or Muslim—quickly became the defining factor and motivation for the continuation of the violence, resulting in thousands of deaths, primarily in the Moluccas. … Though the sources of the conflict were not religious, the multiple economic, political, and social tensions in the region coalesced around the religious communities and religion quickly became the primary motivating factor for the violence".[11] Like many other Muslims, Indonesian Muslims have been facing well-supported Christian missionary activities. It is this "unfair" competition that at times becomes the catalyst of religious jealousy and even violence. More particularly, Muslim leaders argue that instead of converting Indonesian Muslims to Christianity, why not making those established Christians in the developing world more Christian.

Muslims in the West

Historically the majority of the present day Muslims in the West comes from among immigrants or their descendants. They come from diverse backgrounds, ethnically, nationally, and socially and want to go to the West for the following reasons:

First, The West provides them with incentives to settle and work. Second, They have better facilities physically and formally. Third, They enjoy democracy and legal rights. Fourth, They also face some difficulties and prejudice.

Like any religious and social encounters, Muslims in the West—as their Christian counterparts in Muslim countries—stimulate the rise of stereotypes such as: Muslims should not be given full rights of citizenship as they are transient and have a different religious tradition; they are so conservative and so rigid that they cannot follow the ways of life in the West, they are ostracized or even denied equality; Islam is inherently violent

and Muslims are the perpetrators.

Similarly Muslims also develop their own stereotyping of Westerners, like: Westerners are morally and religiously corrupted and thus not worthy of emulation or interplay; Western superior mentality must be rejected by ignoring it; the continuation of religious crusades among Westerners, including coarse evangelism, must be contended.

In order to facilitate a better understanding of the structural conditions of the Muslims in the West, cases in this paper will be taken from particular states, which diversely endorse some patterned approaches and policy to Muslim minorities. Following Han Entzinger, these states may be categorized into those, which endorsed a *gastarbeiter* approach, an assimilation model, or an ethnic minorities' policy (pluralism) (Lewis 1994, pp. 19-20). The first model has been generally endorsed by Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. France has consistently maintained the assimilation or integration model toward their *beurs* immigrants. Lastly such countries as the Benelux, the Scandinavian states, especially Denmark and Sweden, Britain, and North America (US and Canada) have to some degree implemented the policy of pluralism in their treatment of minorities, including Muslims. Yet in such open and generous countries as the Netherlands, several economic and policy factors and public pressure have undermined any positive gesture to provide the minorities or immigrants with a better niche, let alone autonomy, culturally, economically and socio-religiously. In all these Christian majority states, freedom of religion and equality has been categorically stipulated in their respective constitutions.

Ziauddin Sardar provides us with a stimulating generalization concerning Muslims *vis-à-vis* the majority, read Christians, in the West. Despite all the formal and legal rights the Muslims, like the majority, have, they continue to face and live under difficult and strange realities, including alienation and discrimination. At the same time the Muslims carry a "ghetto and siege mentality", "frozen clock syndrome", return-home outlook, and

inward-looking tendency.[12]

As Christianity has experienced erosion in some countries, their churches have been more realistic in conducting closer contact and extending help to Muslim communities. "[T]he churches have taken care to point out that they do not threaten any persons who have an existing religious faith and commitment; there is work enough in reaching those who have no beliefs" (Johnstone and Slomp 1998, p. 362). Yet it is a fact, as shown earlier, that a strong ideological current among church leaders remains that evangelism must continue.

Politically Muslim minorities have been persuaded to join certain parties or programs in return for favors and not infrequently for demonic symbolism. Rémy Leveau suggests that the well-established approach to Muslim adaptation in the West in the context of "integration" and "individual social mobility" may be supplied or amended by the French experience under the label "*beurs* mentality or neo-communalism" as a response to "exclusion" (in Vertovec and Peach 1997, pp. 147, 154).

Despite some economic advantage, Muslims continue to suffer social prejudice. "[T]he Australian environment is basically hostile to Islamic practices…" (Margaret E. Pickles in Abedin and Sardar 1995, p. 111). A survey in the mid-1980s shows that "Across the Australian population as a whole, Asians (both Middle and Far Eastern) and Muslims face the highest level of prejudice" (Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 121). Jørgen Nielsen argues, "Christendom is less accepting of the "other" than Islam" (in Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. xxiii). It is "markedly intolerant of difference of religion" (in Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 265).

With a few exceptions, Muslims in the West generally consist of recent migrants. Even in the US the Afro-Americans who represent the majority of new converts to Islam among the established Americans belonged to "peripheral groups" of nonwhites and contract workers or even slaves. As such the Muslims in the West suffer some social and economic disadvan-

tages *vis-à-vis* the dominant groups. Indeed, the serious problems faced by the Muslims in the West today come from their social and economic low levels. Accordingly their religious well-being has been hampered by this condition.

Major problems faced by Muslims in the West:
1. Adjustment.
2. Culture shock.
3. Lack of skills and appropriate education.
4. Change from majority to minority status.
5. Child education and socialization.
6. Social and religious prejudice.
7. Status of Muslim women compared to those of the West.

The profile of social conditions of Muslims needs some generalization:
1. Socio-demographic profile.
2. Ethnic origin and composition.
3. Class position in the West.

Some issues which need to be addressed:
1. How do Muslims in the West pursue their political interest nationally and internationally? How do they perceive and understand such concepts as *jihad, hijra* and *da'wa*?
2. What organizations or bodies do the Muslims run and manage to pursue their religious affairs?

Muslims in the west received far more personal freedom, but far less communal autonomy than had been accorded to the Christian subjects of Muslim states (Lewis 1994, p. 16).

United States: With its unique background as the land of opportunities, for quite some time the US has attracted immigrants from all over the world, including from Muslim countries or communities. The Muslims in the US generally consist of, to borrow Martinson's terms,[13] three major components: Afro-Americans, immigrant peoples of nations with large Muslim populations, and Anglos. By virtue of their strict morals and migrant discipline as well as American conduciveness, the Muslims "constitute per capita the most highly educated Mus-

lim population in the world".[14]

American Muslims have built an important niche in the religious mosaic of the US. Benefiting from the liberal nature of American governance, they have founded Islamic institutions relevant to their belief and to their American way of life. As a minority Muslims in the US have not been free from stigmas. Concomitant with social segregation in the past, Muslims found themselves being discriminated.[15] Perhaps this was a blessing in disguise for them, as Islam emerged to give many Afro-Americans a firmer social identification, despite religious differences. Yet the liberal atmosphere and the legal certainty of minorities, including Muslims, have been conducive to Muslims' sharing the American way of life and participation in the public sphere.

Despite the general atmosphere of liberalism and openness as well as conducive formal legal arrangements, the US has not been totally free from religious bigotry and racial discrimination. Concomitant with the September 11 event, Islam and innocent Muslims have been victimized and stigmatized. To cite the most recent example, the influential evangelist Franklin Graham, the son of the flamboyant Rev. Billy Graham, categorizes Islam as a violent religion relying on force and intimidation.[16]

<u>Western Europe</u>: Muslims in Europe arrived in three stages and waves: first to the Iberian Peninsula, then to the Balkans, lastly to Western Europe. The coming of Islam to the Iberian Peninsula was concomitant with the major political and military expansion of the Umayyad regime (660-749 CE). In the Balkans, it was the Ottomans who launched untiring campaigns into Anatolia and then across the Bosporus and Dardenella Straits that led to control of the Balkans under Istanbul well into the nineteenth century. The coming of increasing numbers of Muslims to Western Europe accompanies European colonialism since the nineteenth century and intensified after the Second World War (1939-45).

Muslims in Western Europe come from diverse backgrounds and origins. In France, the earlier major Muslim settlers began

arriving during the First World War (1914-18). The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 paved the way for increasing numbers of Muslim sailors, particularly the Yemeni, to settle in British major port cities.

Nevertheless it was Europe's increasing need for manpower in industry and reconstruction after the Second World War, especially in the 1950s and 1960s that led to recruitment of labor from abroad in massive numbers; thus the influx of Muslim, and other, generally unskilled workers, to Europe. Muslim workers from North Africa generally flocked to France, its former colonial master. In Britain most migrants come from South Asia—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—and the Caribbean. Turks can be found in larger numbers in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Moroccan migrants prefer to work in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain.[17]

Not all churches, nor individual Christians, in Europe are enthusiastic about ecumenical or interfaith dialogue.

Britain: "The evidence of continued racism and sustained racial discrimination suggests that the Race Relations Act and a decade [written in 1990] of local authority positive action programs have not significantly reduced the level of race inequality in British society or within local government" (From Ouseley 1990 quoted in Lewis 1994, p. 93).

As a former world and colonial power *par excellence*, Britain has developed knowledge of and interest in Muslims from quite an early period. In return, Muslims started arriving in Britain almost concomitant with the British control over Muslim lands from the late eighteenth century or earlier. Many of them were sailors, naturalized individuals, plain migrants, and the educated. However, only after the success of independent movements in the wake of the Second World War have more numbers of Muslims decided to make Britain their home country. Many of them were professionals, members of the elite, and students. Despite problems of adjustment and challenge of and prejudice by the majority population, first generation Muslims generally

kept a low profile and accepted that is was their own choice to live in a non-Islamic land. As suggested by Gilliat-Ray, in contrast to earlier generations of British Muslims, "who often accepted racial intolerance as part and parcel of their situation in Britain, the younger generations have begun to challenge the racism directed towards them".[18]

With the emergence of second and third generations of Muslims, the type and level of anxiety and concern also changed. For elders, the future religiosity of the youth and of Islam forms their major worry.

Prevalent racism in society at large and exclusion in the job market for — and the reality of their new life of — young generations have led Muslim youth to return to the fold of Islamic fundamentals. This is especially felt as they previously enjoyed an open and friendly life in schools and campuses.

France: Although France has experienced the presence of a significant Muslim population, especially from among the Maghribis, since the nineteenth century, it has admitted larger numbers of Muslims only after the 1960s. Consistent with the strict separation between state and religion in France, it generally favors an integrationist approach to Muslim minorities in the country. Its secular and liberal character makes the country a haven for diverse segments of minorities and Muslims.

Increasing numbers of French people, however, supported white superiority claims of an extremist nationalist group, which has been considered "for ten years or more as the greatest threat to France, the presence, and practice of Islam" (see Roy in Lewis 1994, p. 65).

Germany: The rise of *Gastarbeiter* in Germany emerged concomitant with her major industrial expansion after the 1950s. The Muslim guest workers, especially Turks, came in larger numbers after the 1960s. Despite her neutrality towards religions and her lucrative material provision to her guest workers, Muslims in Germany have not won formal religious concessions in German society. Accordingly, many Islamic activities

in Germany—since Islam has not been formally recognized as a corporation—thus have been undertaken privately. State support is officially non-existent. Unlike in neighboring Holland, for example, no formal Islamic school exists in Germany. Islamic education—as in Belgium and Switzerland, funded by the state—is dispensed within the public school system. Yet, Islamic organizations based on ethnic support, especially among the Turkish Muslims, do prosper. Interestingly, Germany remains the only country in the European Union to fully apply the concept of the right by blood ties (*jus sanguinis*) for nationality or citizenship. *Gastarbeiter* and their descendants continue to be deprived of German nationality despite their socialization, mastery of the German language, German birth and culture. Indeed, citizenship is not given by default, say, through being born on German soil, but through formal naturalization. Such countries as France, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and Britain generally endorse the principle of *jus solis*; thus second-generation immigrants almost automatically earn the citizenship of their host country. With the increasing impact of the European Union on individual states, it is possible that some kind of a common approach to citizenship may develop in the near future in Western Europe. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such changes in citizenship rules may bring more advantages to Muslim minorities in the European Union.

Belgium: Islam was officially accepted as a recognized religion in Belgium as early as 1974. Various forms of government support for Islamic activities have materialized; for example, in the opening of Islamic classes in state schools for Muslim children and recognition of lay religious leaders. Nevertheless, the pioneering and bold moves by the Belgian authorities in pursuing an Islamic policy have recently not been progressing at the original speed. To add a further dilemma, Muslims themselves have not been very successful in presenting themselves as a strong, unified body. Some would argue that such a centralized body would provide the Belgium authorities with a better posi-

tion to establish a firmer control on the Muslim minorities in the country.

Despite all these differences in approach, one significant common pattern of thought toward the Muslim minority in the West did develop. The West cannot tolerate that the accommodation of Muslims jeopardize its national interest and unity. In Western Europe, the formation of the European Union has also indirectly led to the formation of more comparable approaches to minorities, including Muslims. For example, the Dutch "pillar" or "mainstay" model of dealing with minorities has seen a declining pattern of vigor and implementation and similar processes may be witnessed in the other countries of the Benelux and in the Scandinavian countries, especially since the late 1990s. The French model of "assimilation" or "proper integration" or a modified version of this may be expected to gain wider support under the European Union umbrella.

Integration under the promise of social reward and privilege has neither "the same meaning nor the same effect as integration achieved through sharing the same political values" (Schnapper in Lewis and Schnapper 1994, p. 156). Customarily when difficulties arise because of high unemployment due to economic crises or slowdowns, the process of integration may well face a dramatic reversal; and Europe seems to be afflicted by unemployment permanently.

Notwithstanding all the legal and constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and worship, integration or whatever term used in this direction for Muslims in the West will neither be free of conflict nor smooth. Schnapper (Schnapper in Lewis and Schnapper 1994, p. 157) lists a number of challenges and hurdles:

1. Uniform fantasy in the West with regard to Islam and fundamentalism.
2. Increasing public criticism of using the welfare system for minorities.
3. The everlasting memory of colonialism and the end of em-

pire continue to overshadow relations between immi-grant Muslims and the West.

4. Increasing opposition to newcomers in the West, even in immigrant countries like the US, Australia, or Canada based on the nativist movement.

5. Bitter historical experience toward Muslims undermines any positive gesture toward extending parity to Muslims in the West.

6. The Muslims face the difficult choice of taking a radical step toward accepting the view that religion has no role in public affairs; more importantly the tendency toward permissive-ness in the West puts Islam into a social menace, for ex-ample, the foundation of imposing mosques, the wearing of headscarves among Muslim school girls, and the Salman Rushdi affair in Britain show as much a symbolic value as a public expression.

7. Following Huntington's thesis, the decline of communism which during the Cold War formed a unifying factor among Western countries, Islam and the Muslims can be taken as another symbol of differentiation for Western identity and unity.

8. The continuing political uncertainty, if not crisis, and eco-nomic recovery make the identification of Muslims with de-mons a good product for sale for the Western public (ethnization of social and political problems).
   Hopes for the future of Muslims in the West:

1. The provision of full admission of Muslims to community life and participation in the political process.

2. The establishment of a more uniform legal approach to mi-norities, immigrants, and asylum seekers consistent with the foundation of the European Union.

3. Social and political integration with the "protection of sepa-rate identity" concomitant with democratic participation will bring diversity to ordered and harmonious co-existence rel-evant to manage continuing competition and conflict. The

presence and implementation of accepted rules help to re-solve these differences.

The marginal role of the Muslim minorities in the political process brings home the irony of our era that despite the liberal, open, and democratic foundation in the West, only until recently a few Muslims were elected to political positions of significance and appointed to posts of political and administrative importance. Yet, in some Muslim countries, whatever the reasons, despite less consistent in applying democratic principles, human rights, and pluralism, Christians and other minorities have occupied key positions in the government and/or private sector and have sent representatives to parliament.

Summary: Interfaith dialogue has brought positive results among intellectuals and participants. However, the recurrent outbreaks of religious violence have taken place with the support of the man in the street, not uncommonly manipulated, agitated, and made worse by some leaders. These people have generally been left out of the niceties of the dialogue. Is there any way to instill a better understanding of other faiths among the masses?

The more the state belongs to the people the more the minorities can expect to have fuller and stronger participation in public life and a freer expression and practice of their religions. Nevertheless, prejudice, racial, religious, or otherwise, or even racism cannot be dealt with and eradicated solely through the democratization process. As moderate a means, even if basic, as education, formal and more importantly at practical levels, continues to be indispensable to the campaign against prejudice and racism. The argument concerning the decreasing role of the government in propagating pluralism and ethnic-religious harmony in the face of increasing non-governmental institutions in society should caution religious sectors, scholars, and agencies to take note of possible political manipulation from minorities. Certainly the note is less relevant to developing countries

where the government remains the nation-state representative or, to be blunter, power holder *par excellence*, at least *de facto*.

Even though most Western countries, especially after the Second World War have shown a better treatment of and have imposed concrete constitutional and legal steps towards religious minorities, including Muslims, the fact remains that prejudice, discrimination, and undervaluation have not been totally eradicated. Indeed, the September 11 crisis has reopened a difficult path for many Muslims in West, especially in the US.

In Muslim countries, some improvement in the legal and constitutional sector dealing with minorities has been made. However, the problems and difficulties faced by the minorities form only part of many basic issues in political, social, and economic fields. Under guidance of religious values, humanism, and pluralism, any move toward political, religious, social, and cultural democratization will strengthen the voice of the people, including minorities, in government, parliament, and society. Our duties remain emphasizing the importance of religious tolerance and persuading decision makers to uphold equal opportunities and pluralism.

The more pressing issue to be addressed in the hope of reducing inter-religious tensions include the ratification of some form of recognition of other's faiths and an agreed formula for evangelism/conversion work, especially among the proponents of missionary religions.[19]

If Islam in its long history initiated an institutional accommodation for non-Muslims, including Christians (*Ahl al-Kitab*) as a protected and privileged segment of the *umma*, in the twenty-first century it has to move further hand-in-hand with international communities to uphold and implement human rights as universally accepted. In the meantime, Muslims should be encouraged or rather be given opportunities to settle their house, and advance as their Western counterpart so that they could face dialogue and debate on the same level. I believe that fair play can take place if players are on an equal footing and free

similar conditions. This is especially relevant and sensitive when recognition of the other's faith as legitimate on its own right, such as Islam has done toward the *Kitab* religions, needs to be formally declared. The Second Vatican Council of 1965 has categorically stated this recognition policy toward other faiths; so did some Protestant denominations or individual leaders. If the West, and implicitly the Christians, has declared freedom of religious adherence and change, is it also possible for Muslims to ignore the prevailing sanction against apostasy? Historically, but not legally, this has been ostracized; however, they are now challenged by the West to re-examine this maxim. In my opinion, first the Muslims should be allowed and if necessary supported to recover their lost pride and prestige in diverse fields. When they can stand on an equal level I do not see any problem for them in accepting the challenge of opening up.

Viewing the life and conditions of Muslims in the West, Westerners have no reason to be suspicious of and discriminative against Muslims as they have formally come to the West on their own choice. The West is considered a better place to live. Instead of their being negatively stereotyped, the Muslims in the West deserve equal treatment. This will eventually emerge as a model to be emulated with regard to the West *vis-à-vis* Muslims and migrant Muslims *vis-à-vis* the *umma*. On the Muslim side, Christian minorities by virtue of their international links should be cordially invited to participate with Muslims in pursuing a common future in the global world.

Notes

[1]'Abd al-Ra'uf, in Isma'il R. Faruqi, ed. *Trialogue of the Abrahamic Faiths* (Ann Arbor: New Era Publications, 1986). In completing this article I am indebted to a number of institutions and individuals. The University of Brunei Darussalam has been generous in supporting my research and travel to present the original version of this

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[2]In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is the Quran and the Ḥadīth of the Prophet which are categorically stated as the Constitution. It also declined to ratify the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and also in 1976 (Civil and Political Rights).

[3]A missionary group complains that without direct participation in distributing and implementing aid to non-Christians may end up in wrong hands, including government agents. "Foreign donors, tired of seeing aid wasted by the Bangladesh government, are delighted to channel aid to NGOs". *The Times of India*, July 19, 1998.

[4]See Henry J. Steiner, "Do Human Rights Require a Particular Form of Democracy?" In: Adel Omar Sherif and Eugene Cotran, eds. *Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam* (The Hague and Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 193-210; Allan D. Swanson, "Good Governance and Human Rights in Development and Democracy". In: Adel Omar Sherif and Eugene Cotran, eds. *Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam* (The Hague and Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 331-41.

[5]The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom's Annual Report, 2000, "Egypt" (internet).

[6]The Constitution specifies Islam according to the doctrine of the Twelver Ja'fari School and stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, must be based on Islamic criteria. Moreover, it provides that other Islamic schools of doctrine are to be accorded full respect in matters of religious rites, religious education, and personal status. It recognizes Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians as the only religious minorities who, as such, are free to engage in religious practices and act according to their own rules in matters of personal status and religious education "within the limits of the law".

[7]The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's Report to the US President, November 2000, "Iran". (Internet)

[8]As Johnstone and Slomp (1998:362) argue "Muslims in Europe are not assumed to be responsible for any infringements of liberty in their own countries, from which they may indeed themselves suffered".

[9]*Fatwa Mufti Kerajaan 1997* (Bandar Seri Begawan: State Mufti's Office, 1997), pp. 112-42.

[10]Article number: 3(1) Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.
Article number: 11

(1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.
(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.
(3) Every religious group has the right:
    (a) to manage its own religious affairs;
    (b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and
    (c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with the law.
(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Lubuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.

[11]The US Commission on International Religious Freedom's Annual Report, 2002, "Indonesia". (Internet, accessed July 29, 2002). Ironically the Report does not mention, not even alludes to, any reference to the bloody pogroms against the Madurese in Kalimantan around this time.

[12]Ziauddin Sardar, "Introduction: Racism, Identity and Muslims in the West". In: Syed Z. Abedin and Ziauddin Sardar, eds., *Muslim Minorities in the West* (London: Grey Seal, 1995), pp. 2-6, 9-11.

[13]Paul V. Martinson, *Islam: An Introduction for Christians*, tr. S.O. Cox (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1994), pp. 73-4.

[14]Yvonne Y. Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, *Islamic Values in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 5.

[15]Martinson, *Islam*, p. 87.

[16]See AMC on line report 9 August 2002 <media@amconline.org>.

Other than referring to his public speeches, Graham's book, "The Name", is identified as full of malicious remarks and slanders to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad.

[17]Johnstone and Slomp, "Islam and the Chruches", p. 356.

[18]Sophie Gilliat-Ray, "Multiculturalism and Identity: Their Relationship for British Muslims", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18/2(1998), p. 351.

[19]For centuries Muslims have been puzzled by the fact of why it is possible that they recognize earlier religions, including Christianity, while the adherent of these religions ignore Islam. As cited earlier, recent Muslim and Christian perspectives on mutual recognition and categorical declaration can be found in Johnstone and Slomp 1998, p. 362; Muhammad 'Abd al-Ra'uf in Faruqi 1986, p. 28.

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The Muslim Community of the Netherlands before and after September 11, 2001: Some Analytical and Comparative Notes

Johan H. Meuleman

On July 3, 2002, Naima Azough delivered her maiden speech in Dutch parliament. She started with the following statement: "The Netherlands is one of the most Islamic countries in the world, more Islamic than the countries of origin of many Muslims in the Netherlands. This is because the Netherlands has freedom of religion, freedom of expression, equality of man and woman, legal aid, and nobody here needs to starve. The Netherlands, in short, is an ideal Islamic state, because what is mentioned in the Constitution can also be deduced from the Quran".[1] On September 29, 2001, Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister, had declared that his state was Islamic.[2] Both statements were at least partly inspired by the September 11, 2001 events. They were almost identical in wording and similar in meaning. Nevertheless, they were made in different contexts and with different purposes.

Naima Azough, of Moroccan descent, is one of those young

politicians of Muslim immigrant background who, since a couple of years, have made their way into the Dutch parliament through the electoral lists of various political parties. In her case Groenlinks—GreenLeft—, a political organization originating from the fusion of various parties left from mainstream social democracy and/or with a particular concern for environmental issues. Religion receives no particular attention in its political programme, but the development of a "multicultural" society does and, moreover, quite a few persons for whom religious values are an important source for their aspiration at social justice and change feel at home in this party. Therefore, after a period in which many left-wing Christians supported this party, a growing group of well-educated Muslims have joined it. As far as I know, none of its Christian members has ever claimed that the Netherlands was a perfect example of a Christian state. In 2002, however, Azough started her public career as a member of parliament with the statement that it is an Islamic state. This novelty may be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, contrary to Christianity in modern political theory, Islam continues to be related to a particular type of public order. Secondly, in the Netherlands and most other Western countries, the compatibility of Islam—and therefore of Muslim inhabitants—with the fundamental principles of modern Western culture and public order has increasingly been questioned during the last decade. The September 11 events have intensified, not produced, this process. It was in this discussion that Naima Azough, who is both a conscious Muslim and an arduous defender of democracy, social solidarity, and fundamental human rights, took position with her uncommon statement.

Mahathir Mohamad, basically, meant the same when he characterized his state as Islamic. He also meant that his state was characterized by noble attributes such as democracy, social solidarity, and peaceful co-existence and mutual tolerance of various ethnic and religious communities. The context and the purpose of his statement fundamentally differed from those

of Azough's declaration, however. His purpose was not to defend Islam and the Muslims against claims that this religion was incompatible with the values of a modern state and society. Such claims, often voiced in the Netherlands, are practically unheard of in Malaysia. In Malaysia, it is rather the opposite claim that gains increasing support: Islam should be one of the cornerstones of the Malaysian state — the single foundation according to the more radical voices. For several years, political life in this Southeast Asian country has been colored by a competition between the Mahathir Government and the political parties behind it, in the first place Mahathir's United Malay National Organization (UMNO), on the one side, and the PAS–All-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) on the other. Both have continuously attempted to convince the people that they are the real champions of Islamic values. This outbidding each other, too, was born quite some time before September 11, 2001, but has grown in intensity by the terrorist acts this date refers to. The statement of the man who has led the country for the last twenty-odd years should be seen in this context.

This text will discuss the recent development relating to the Muslim minority of the Netherlands. It will focus on discussions about its place in Dutch society. This analysis will be developed in the broader framework of the relationship between Islam and the West and, as has been made clear in this introduction, some similarities and differences with developments in other countries will be highlighted in order to enhance its quality. Being prepared for a meeting exactly one year after the September 11, 2001 events, this contribution will ask whether and to what extent these events have influenced the developments it discusses.

Islam as a Civilization

The relationship between "Islam" and the "West" has always been complicated. Balanced studies have shown that it is

impossible to qualify this relationship in one single way. "Islam" and "the West" are no logical contraries and no univocal concepts, to start with. The first term, basically, refers to a religion, the second to a geographical entity. Even from a geographical perspective, both terms have no simple, fixed purport. Islam is often related to the Middle East, but, in the course of history, this idea has become increasingly at odds with reality. As for the "West", this term used to denote Central and Western Europe, but since a more recent period it has clearly included Northern America. Next, the ways both entities have approached and considered each other have often changed in the course of history and have always been complex and complicated. The studies referred to above have shown that the interest of the West in the world of Islam has been led by various military, commercial, scholarly, and religious motives. In other words, Islam was regarded as a military threat, a source of wealth or commercial partner, a treasure of wisdom, or a religion—a false religion in most cases.[3]

During the late European Middle Ages and Europe's early Modern Period, those Europeans who approached Islam as a civilization generally did so from the following perspective: they considered the Muslim world as a depository of wisdom from the Greek and other ancient civilizations as well as a source of later original developments in various branches of philosophy, the arts, and the sciences, which would be of great benefit to their own, Western, civilization and society. Interestingly, in the most recent period of relations between the West and Islam, the approach to Islam as a civilization or a culture—which in this connection basically means the same—has gained popularity again. Contrary to the earlier approach of Islam as a civilization, Western persons who have more recently referred to Islam as a civilization generally have had a negative image about this entity. They tended to emphasize its lack of freedom, dynamism, democracy, equality, and rationality, i.e. of the attributes considered to be the fundamentals of Western civilization.

Among the best-known advocates of this approach are the American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington and the Dutch politician to-be, Pim Fortuyn. Huntington's ill-famed article, "The Clash of Civilizations", has become the origin of a widespread controversy.[4] Fortuyn became world-famous after his murder on May 6, 2002. During the Dutch electoral campaign of spring 2002, he qualified Islam as "a backward culture". This caused him to be expelled from the party whose campaign he was originally leading. However, together with his murder, his statements about Islam and Muslims have been among the causes that led to his new, freshly created party gaining the second largest representation in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament.

The approach to Islam as a civilization or culture has become particularly strong in Western public discourse as a result of various factors. The first one is the incapacity of a growing part of the inhabitants of Western countries to understand a religion as a religion. Being not religious themselves anymore, they can only understand the religion of others as a set of more or less curious and anomalous social or cultural phenomena. Secondly, for constitutional and legal reasons, most contemporary Western states have no possibility to deal with religions or religious communities. However, they can take measures to deal with social problems and to preserve or promote culture. For this reason, public authorities in states as the Netherlands have been supporting various projects and organizations for the social and cultural development of marginalized communities and groups, including labor immigrants and their families, of whom a relatively large part are Muslims. However, they have not subsidized the construction of mosques or similar activities. At the end of this contribution, we shall see that one important exception is currently under discussion in a number of Western European countries: the training of "home-bred" *imam*s.

The third factor is the attitude of Muslims themselves. On the one hand, many Muslims have claimed that Islam is much

broader than what in the Christian and Western tradition is generally considered as religion. Islam, it has been stated, comprises *din* and *daula*, i.e. religion—and even this in a very large sense—and state. On the basis of sayings and writings of Muslims, many Western specialists and non-specialists have adopted this vision. The standpoint that Islam encompasses all spheres of life, including the state, whereas in Christianity rather the opposite is the case, does not stand up to critical study of the basic sources of Islam nor of the history of Muslim and Christian communities. This is not the place to elaborate this argument. The important point is that the opinion that Islam offers a blueprint for social and political organization, expressly defended by certain groups of Muslims and vaguely believed by yet larger groups, has become one of the main elements in the debate on the compatibility of Islam with Western values and principles. On the other hand, for many immigrants of a Muslim background in the Netherlands, Islam is mainly culture: it is various customs and models of behavior and social intercourse rather than religious beliefs and rituals.

Another factor enhancing the approach of Islam as a culture is the fact that a large majority of recent immigrants into Western countries are Muslim or originate from Muslim communities. The first few decades after the Second World War brought large waves of immigrant laborers to Western Europe, mostly from Turkey and North Africa, in which close to 100 per cent of the population is Muslim. More recently, legal labor immigration was severely limited, but illegal labor immigration has continued. At the same time, the stream of asylum seekers to Western Europe has grown tremendously. Most of them also originate from countries with a largely Muslim population, such as Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia. Bosnia should, logically, be included in this list, but Bosnian refugees are generally considered as neighbors who have fallen victims to cruel enemies and therefore are received with sympathy. This is less and less the case with the Asian and African immigrants. The social and

economic integration of this group of immigrants in the West-ern and Middle European societies faces increasing difficulties. It is not the objective of the present contribution to analyse the deeper causes of these problems. The point to be stressed here, however, is that, because they happen to be connected to per-sons who in their large majority have a Muslim background, these problems tend to be related by growing groups of Western citizens to Islam. More specifically, they are attributed to Islam as a culture or civilization so different from the Western one that it renders the integration of its bearers in Western society hard, if not impossible.

A final factor that should be mentioned is the dissatisfaction of growing numbers of citizens in Western countries and Cen-tral Europe with the ideal of a "multicultural" society, to which large parts of the social and political elites in their countries had subscribed during the preceding period. The negative atti-tude towards Islam, regarded as a culture, often contains an indirect rejection of this ideal, or at least of the failing policies it has inspired.

The emphasis on — religion understood as — culture or civi-lization in the discussion on problems related to minorities in Western society has to a large extent replaced the excessive con-centration on ethnicity. Ethnicity dominated the analyses by Western scientists and politicians of Muslim and immigrant matters during the last twenty-odd years until approximately the middle of the 1990s. In the Netherlands, for example, social workers and public authorities were always speaking in terms of "Moroccans and Turks" — a standard expression — and many students in social and religious sciences wrote papers on "Mo-roccans" or "Turks" or both together, then found correspond-ing jobs.[5]

Although the tendency to qualify "Islam" as the contrary of Western civilization had developed some time before, it has been very much strengthened by the September 11, 2001 attacks. Just after this ominous date, a number of Western and Muslim poli-

ticians and intellectuals made statements saying that the conflict was not between the West and Muslims and that something serious should be done on the underlying causes of Muslim extremism, such as repression and poverty in many Muslim countries and the Palestinian question. Not long afterwards, however, the difference between the global "war on terrorism" and a global war of [Western] civilization against Islam blurred. Many came to consider whether Huntington's much decried theory that the clash between the Islamic and the Western civilizations would characterize the future had not finally proved true. The approach to Islam as a civilization had reached its apogee: Islam had become the very antithesis of civilization.

Recent Discussions in the Netherlands

In recent years, the Netherlands, from a country in which the presence of Muslims hardly ever became a matter of public debate, has become a place in which various customs of Muslims have increasingly become the object of public discussion and criticism. In a preceding publication, I started my survey of this process on January 29, 2000, with an essay by Paul Scheffer, entitled "The Multicultural Drama". This Dutch publicist warned that the integration of immigrants into Dutch society was threatened with failure and that the development of a class of socially marginalized persons, mainly of immigrant origin, was imminent. Although the question was not directly related to Islam or even to Muslims as such, as the result of a mechanism explained above, many readers and commentators did draw this conclusion. Next, not directly connected to Islam or even to Muslims, but important in the general development of Dutch public debate, was the discussion from November that same year on the attitude of civil servants of registry offices who had conscientious objections to marriages between persons of the same sex. The alderman for personnel and organization of the capital city publicly announced that he would fire any civil

servant refusing to apply the new legislation that made possible this type of unions. One month later, a public discussion broke out when the principal of an Amsterdam public school denied Muslim pupils the right to use an empty classroom, during breaks, to perform the ritual prayer. Then, at the end of 2000 and during the first two months of 2001, Dutch media devoted much attention to the cancellation of an opera entitled *Aïsja en de Vrouwen van Medina* (Aisha and the Women of Medina), after Assia Djebar's novel *Loin de Médine*, included in a series of "multicultural" performances that would offer a special flavor to Rotterdam as that year's cultural capital of Europe.

The Moroccan artists had withdrawn under the pressure of certain Muslim circles, which considered this play staged around one of Prophet Muhammad's wives unacceptable. One of the local Muslim leaders who, in a subsequent public debate, opposed the performance was Khalil El Moumni, the Moroccan imam of the al-Nasr mosque in Rotterdam. A little later, in March 2001, and again in April, the declaration of Cisca Dresselhuys, the editor-in-chief of the Dutch feminist monthly *Opzij*, that she would in no case accept a woman with a headscarf as an editor of her magazine, aroused another public debate. The refusal of an applicant of Turkish origin for the position of assistant clerk at the court of Zwolle because she explained that she intended to wear her headscarf during court sessions gave rise to a larger debate. I ended the list of incidents with the upheaval sparked by a television interview with Imam El Moumni, in which he made some negative remarks on homosexuality. Once again, the compatibility of Islam with Western civilization was questioned.[6]

A colleague of mine rightly observed that this tendency had already been announced by the publication of Pim Fortuyn's *Against the Islamization of our Culture*, in 1997.[7] Today, we may well conclude that the trend has not stopped with the El Moumni case, but rather intensified. The September 11 events, here once again, have strengthened the trend, not caused it. The most im-

portant instances included an "Open letter to all Muslims in the Netherlands" by columnist Sylvain Ephimenco in the *Trouw* daily of October 5, 2001; a slightly later article in the *NRC Handelsblad* daily by Paul Cliteur, professor of the philosophy of law and a prominent theoretician of the VVD, a Dutch liberal party; a public suggestion by the Dutch minister for integration and large cities policy; and an article by Michiel Hegener in *Trouw* of August 17, 2002.

Ephimenco's open letter, written in Dutch, was accompanied by an Arabic translation and subsequently summarized in English in the *Washington Post*.[8] Shocked by the fact that some Muslims had expressed some understanding of—not agreement with—the terrorist attacks, the author called on all Muslims to introspection and in this way suggested that Islam, or at least the general attitude of Muslims, was to be held responsible for this type of acts. Cliteur, in his article, spoke about religion as an anomaly with negative social effects that could at best be tolerated, but should certainly not be supported by government subsidies for schools with a religious background. Therefore, he pleaded for the abolition of the Dutch system in which all schools satisfying certain general norms are funded by the government. Instead, he argued, public subsidies should be used to stimulate the dissemination of secularism, i.e. the separation of Church and State, of religion and morals, and similar principles.[9]

The Dutch minister for integration and large cities policy, Roger van Boxtel, proposed something similar, the abolition of denominational schools.[10] His argument was that these schools obstructed the social integration of minorities. Although, it was also addressed at Christian and other denominational schools, the indirect reference to the increasing number of Islamic schools in the Netherlands was clear. The author of the August 17 *Trouw* article went yet a step ahead.[11] He suggested that religious education of children by their parents should be forbidden because it violated the Dutch constitutional right of freedom of religion of the children. Just a few months earlier, in mid June 2002, a

series of broadcasts of *Nova*, the popular television programme offering almost daily background information on current news issues that had also sparked the controversy regarding El Moumni, once more was at the origin of heated discussions in the media and the parliament. It broadcasted parts of speeches by a group of Salafi imams in the Netherlands, opposing the integration of Muslims into Dutch society at large and confirming the Quranic right of Muslim men to beat their wives.[12]

A Short Analysis

These recent discussions in the Netherlands inspire a few comments. Firstly, they are partly the result of new ideas about the "public sphere" developing in the country. According to a number of authors, from a situation in which various communities were filling the public sphere on the basis of respect for certain common rules and principles and diversity in other matters, the Netherlands are moving towards a society in which expressions of cultural and, in particular, religious specificity are banned from the public sphere.[13]

A related tendency in contemporary Dutch society, according to some authors, is the development of a dominant culture and set of opinions that by imposing their version of tolerance leave no room for difference. Adversaries of this trend have described it as the development of a liberal, secular, and white majority culture (A. Kennedy), "fundamentalist liberalism" (John Gray), or a "new state religion" (Dutch politician, Bas van der Vlies).[14] In the El Moumni case, some of those who took offence at his statement called for the repressive means of prosecution and extradition. Quite curiously, in the same connection some also referred not only to the French state, known for its radical form of secularism, but even to the Turkish state as examples worth to be followed for their attitude towards religion.[15]

A significant fact is that, on the one hand, Western states, including the Netherlands, for at least one decade have tended to withdraw themselves more and more from the economic, so-

cial, and educational spheres in order to give more room to the "market mechanism"; on the other hand, however, they increasingly intervene in social and moral life by imposing their rules for what people should think and how they should behave. Rules on the absence of children from school have been made stricter and compulsory integration programmes have been introduced. They are defended as positive measures in support of the integration of immigrants in Dutch society. They are actually partly in the interest of these immigrants; partly they smell of paternalism. The most recent measures and proposals, originating from the recently replaced Minister van Boxtel among other persons, go yet much further in this direction and encroach on what hitherto were considered as fundamental rights and private matters. Van Boxtel, in addition to questioning the public funding of denominational schools, has suggested limiting the right of immigrants from certain countries to marry a person from their country of origin because this would impede their integration into Dutch society.[16] These restrictive measures are not directed immediately or exclusively against Muslims, but in practice, Muslims form the largest group of persons concerned and in many discussions these policies are related especially to Muslims.

Another observation would be that it is not adolescents, who might be expected to react against a stifling or uninspiring religious education by their parents, nor socially marginalized indigenous citizens who lead discussions that question the position of Islam and Muslims. It rather is not-so-young persons with well-established positions and a high level of education, including university professors. This phenomenon may partly be explained by the fact that it is this group who has the best access to the mass media. There is more to it, however. The growth of the Muslim population is reason for concern among various categories of inhabitants of the Netherlands. Among them are those groups within the political and social elite who were just rejoicing over the gradual advance of a French form of

radical secularism. It is this category of people that has gained a strong position in Dutch public discourse and, through various political parties that differ from other points of view, has acquired influence on government policy.

One more striking characteristic of these recent discussions is their frequent referring to the Dutch constitution. Most Dutch citizens used to receive one or two lessons about the constitution at school and hardly ever thought about their constitution afterwards. Even in the great public debates on fundamental questions such as abortion, euthanasia, or marriage between persons of the same sex, no reference was usually made to the constitution. In these recent discussions relating to Islam and Muslim immigrants, however, not a few persons have based their proposals for various coercive or restrictive measures on constitutional arguments.[17] Above, we have seen the extreme standpoint that religious education of one's children was contrary to the constitution. In a letter to the editor, one reader indicated two fundamental flaws in this argument: firstly, he wrote, the constitution is meant to offer a general framework for the state and the relationship between the government and the citizens, not to be a reference in various questions of social life, which are sufficiently regulated by the laws; secondly, the Dutch constitution guarantees freedom for all to adhere to a religion of their choice, not the freedom from religion.[18] Evidently, the fact that Muslims defend their right at practicing Islam by referring to the Dutch constitution has contributed to the "constitutionalization" of these discussions.

In an analysis of the present climate of communal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, the growing tendency to submit Muslim residents to various types of "tests" to see whether they are good citizens should also be mentioned. Standard catch questions that are asked to Muslims in newspaper and television interviews or on other occasions are about their opinions on the issues of homosexuality and beating wives. These issues are often considered to be points of

fundamental differences between Islamic believers and regular Dutch citizens. The fact is that homosexuality has only become accepted by wide circles of Dutch citizens since a few decades and acknowledged in legal and administrative rulings for an even shorter period. As for beating wives, most Muslims will recognize its mentioning in the Quran. With very few exceptions, the more knowledgeable will explain that the relevant Quranic passage aims at restricting rather than encouraging the beating of wives. In actual practice, some Muslims beat their wives and some non-Muslims do. For none of both groups, however, it is the Quran that inspires this behavior.

Polygamy is another issue considered by some to mark the divide between Muslims and good Dutch citizens. Because very few Muslims practice it, it is not an important object of discussion. Dutch naturalization regulation, however, makes special reference to the question. The Dutch law on nationality requires a reasonable degree of integration within Dutch society from all persons who acquire the Dutch nationality through naturalization. The official manual for the application of the law elaborates this condition. Significantly, in its clarification about the condition of social integration, the one obstacle to naturalization it mentions explicitly is polygamy. The condition of knowledge of the Dutch language, however, is watered down: the mere participation in a Dutch language course or the fact that at least the spouse of an applicant for Dutch nationality manifests some Dutch language skills is considered sufficient. The condition of monogamy seems to have been framed in particular reference to Muslim immigrants. Nevertheless, its practical importance is very limited, as only a small majority of Muslims actually have more than one wife at a time.[19]

The Impact of September 11

The September 11 events have strengthened tendencies that existed before. They have led to the intensification of restrictive

and paternalistic measures directed especially at Muslims. In addition, they have led to stricter security measures leading to a significant reduction of rights of residents and visitors. Many of these security measures have been aimed directly at Muslims. Although their official objective is to prevent Muslim terrorists from acting, they clearly affect the Muslim communities as a whole, especially measures such as the systematic screening of large groups of male Muslim residents, as have been disclosed in Germany. Not only public authorities, but also the common citizens and enterprises of many Western countries have adopted a mistrustful attitude towards Muslims.[20] Cases of non-Muslim citizens refraining from visiting Muslims after September 11, 2001, and of insurance companies refusing insurances to noble Muslim foundations because they consider the "political risk" too high, have been reported from the Netherlands.

As has been the case in many other Western states, including the Netherlands, the September 11 events have intensified the trend to put Muslim residents and their organizations to the test. Especially, the tendency to divide the world into two camps, those in favor of "civilization" and those against it, regularly related to Osama bin Laden and his network in particular and even Islam in general, has been strengthened. In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, the secret services have been involved in these testing and screening practices. Although the Dutch Interior Security Service (BVD) had already published a report on Islamic extremism in the country a few years earlier, government authorities have revealed that its supervision of Muslim residents and organizations was intensified after September 11, 2001.[21] Significantly, although the publication of reports is not BVD standard practice at all, in February 2002 it published a second one relating to the Muslim population, entitled *De democratische rechtsorde en islamitisch onderwijs* (The Democratic Order of Law and Islamic Education).[22]

In comparison to some more alarming or negative statements on Islam and Muslims in the Dutch media, this BVD report was

quite moderate. It basically declared that the threat of Muslim residents and movements to the Dutch democratic order was rather limited. Moreover, for keen observers of the Dutch Muslim community, it contained nothing really new. Some of its information was even erroneous. The probable objective of this publication was to calm down the discussion on Islam in the Netherlands and to support those Dutch Muslims who are in favor of social integration and oppose foreign influence on Muslim educational institutions against their adversaries in school boards and the umbrella organization of Islamic schools in the Netherlands. In fact, in an immediate reaction to the publication, the board of the umbrella organization resigned and after protracted deliberations a new board, with a stronger commitment to Dutch society, was appointed.[23]

Similarities and Differences

The opening section of this contribution has suggested that recent processes of change relating to the position of the Muslim communities in various countries bear a number of close similarities besides some significant differences. The present section will develop this comparative analysis. It will concentrate on the Netherlands and Malaysia, but will add a few comparative notes relating to other countries from both regions, i.e. Western Europe, in which the Muslim population forms relatively new minorities, and that part of Southeast Asia in which Islam has been well established for many centuries.

The comparison will start with similarities. The first one concerns the discussion of whether Islam and democracy are compatible. This question is widely debated, through newspaper articles, books, conferences, and even in parliaments, in both the Netherlands and Malaysia, as well as in most other countries in which Muslim majorities or minorities live. In Muslim majority countries, the term "civil society" is often adjoined to democracy.

A number of Western aid organizations, including the Asia Foundation, have shown themselves extremely generous in sponsoring various seminars, research projects, and publications relating to questions such as those of whether Islam is compatible with civil society; whether, Islam — or Muslim groups and organizations — do or may play a role in the development of civil society; and, especially, how the particular type of Islam or Muslims considered to conform to the ideal of civil society may be supported. For several reasons, including the ambiguity of their basic concepts and the underlying aspiration to develop Muslim societies in conformity with Western models and interests, especially those of the United States, these discussions have questionable sides.[24]

A second similarity lies in the development, both in the Netherlands and in Malaysia, of a stricter supervision over and coercion on the thought and behavior of Muslim citizens and residents. The development of this trend in the Netherlands has been discussed above. In Malaysia, during the 1990s the position and power of religious authorities, especially the *mufti*s or fatwa councils of the various states composing the Malaysian federation, have recently been elevated to a level unprecedented in the history of the country or of Islamic jurisprudence. The Administration of Islamic Law Act was amended in order that *fatwa*s should have legal force merely by their being gazetted. No debates in legislative bodies are required and any effort to dispute or to give an opinion contrary to a gazetted *fatwa* henceforth constitutes a criminal offence.[25] Furthermore, special services have been created for the supervision of public and even private life of the Muslim community from the viewpoint of Islamic morality. Similar moral security forces are being formed in the autonomous region of Aceh and in other Indonesian regions voices have raised in support of the same type of institutions.

On further examination, both similarities between recent tendencies in Western countries and the dominantly Muslim part

of Southeast Asia immediately reveal a fundamental difference between the two zones. In the Netherlands and other Western countries, the Muslim minority is supervised and put under pressure to conform to the norms of the non-Muslim majority. Islam and Muslims, in this case, are a priori suspect and have to proof their innocence. In Malaysia and Indonesia, almost the opposite is the case: Muslims have to prove that they are good Muslims. In Malaysia, the competition between the government coalition and the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia opposition, concentrated on an outbidding of each other in matters Islamic, is an important underlying factor. Both sides are claiming that they have brought or will bring, respectively, a true Islamic state. For the government coalition, the Islamic character of the state lies in the rule of values like justice, solidarity, and clean government; for the Islamic opposition, it lies in the strict application of various rules of traditional Islamic jurisprudence.

The difference just mentioned between Western countries and Southeast Asian countries with majority or near-majority Muslim communities partly explains another difference: whereas, in some Western countries the call for a more radical form of secularism grows stronger, in these Southeast Asian countries, it is the call for an Islamic state that is increasingly heard. In order to complete this contribution, one should have a closer look at this phenomenon in the Netherlands and compare it with developments in the same field elsewhere, in this case in France.

In political and social analyses, the Netherlands is known for the phenomenon of *verzuiling*. *Verzuiling*, or pillarization, is the mechanism through which, during the past two centuries, various Dutch communities, such as the Protestants, the Roman-Catholics, and the labor class of social-democratic conviction, each through the development of their particular social and political organizations, could achieve, one after the other, a respected place within the common, Dutch society and state. This "peaceful co-existence" of multiple communities in vari-

ous spheres of social and political life, including the state, was well compatible with the principle of secularism, as it had developed in most modern Western states.

"Secularism", in this connection, may be defined in a general way as the absence of a privileged relation between the state and a particular religion. This differs from the more radical and specifically French idea of *laicité*, which implies the total absence of religion, in any form, from the public space. Any reference to religion in public schools, for example, even in the form of comparative studies respectful of all denominations and non-religious worldviews, is banned from this perspective. On the basis of various observations, of which some have been mentioned above, one may conclude the following: from a state based on *verzuiling* and the general, moderate understanding of secularism, the Netherlands is moving towards a society in which expressions of cultural and in particular religious specificity are banned from the public sphere, which is more in conformity with the idea of *laicité*.[26]

Nevertheless, one religious issue is considered of extreme strategic interest for the integration of the Muslim immigrant minority into Dutch society. In this question, the Dutch government has been looking for ways to involve itself as far as is possible without transgressing the limits of a secular political system: for several years it has been discussing the ways not to create, but to facilitate a Dutch imam training. The interesting fact is that similar processes are going on in a number of other Western countries. These include France, the champion of *laicité* and at the same time one of the Western countries with the largest group of Muslim immigrants. For this reason, one might say that the Netherlands and France are moving towards each other: the former country is moving from moderate secularism towards *laicité* and the latter in the opposite direction. In both countries, the September 11 events have intensified these processes. The victory of right-wing parties at the parliamentary elections of 2002 in both countries, with very reserved attitudes towards

immigration and foreign cultures, can partly be attributed to these events. The new governments of both countries have not revised the standpoint that the government should stimulate the domestic training of imams, however. On the eve of the French legislative elections, President Jacques Chirac announced that the right-wing government he hoped to appoint after the elections would continue the process that should lead to the creation of a representative council of French Muslims, which had been one of the main projects of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and various other former socialist ministers of home affairs. Chirac added that the domestic training of imams would be one of the main objectives to be realized through this institution.[27] Since, Nicholas Sarkozy, who has become Chirac's minister for home affairs, has emphasized the importance of homebred imams on various occasions.[28] In the Netherlands, the new government so far has remained silent on this issue, but in this respect at least, continuity in government policy may be expected.

Conclusion

The Muslim community of the Netherlands is steadily growing. Immigration from countries with cultures that differ from mainstream Dutch tradition is the main source of this growth. This is one of the reasons for which various social problems this country is facing are often attributed to a lack of integration of Muslim immigrants. Moreover, they are frequently imputed to Islam, understood as a culture or civilization incompatible with those values and principles considered to be the foundation of Western civilization. The September 11, 2001 events have not produced this attitude, but they have intensified it. Similar tendencies exist elsewhere, both in Western countries and in countries with well-established Muslim communities, such as a number of Southeast Asian states. Each country, however, also has its particularities. Therefore, in order to understand

the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and to find solutions to problems its development faces, one should take into consideration both global trends and local circumstances. Moreover, although particular events, such as those of September 11, do have an impact, historical transformations cannot generally be attributed to them alone.

Epilogue

Momentary incidents, such as the September 11, 2001 events, generally have not the large impact that is sometimes attributed to them. They rather intensify longer-term tendencies that started already before. Between the moments this text was originally presented in September 2002, and the time it was finalized for publication, no major changes, which would make its analyses and conclusions obsolete, have taken place. Minor ones do have occurred, at least in the Netherlands. The presence of a large delegation from the "Lijst Pim Fortuyn" (LPF) – Pim Fortuyn's List" – in Dutch Parliament after the May 2002 elections proved a factor of great political instability. The cabinet formed after these elections, which included a number of LPF ministers, fell within a few months. In the ensuing new parliamentary elections, the LPF lost most of its seats. Naima Azough, whose maiden speech inspired the opening words of the present text, lost hers too. Another "allochthonous" woman made her entrance into Dutch parliament, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. This woman, who originates from a Somali Muslim family and established in the Netherlands as a refugee, showed a quite different attitude towards Islam.[29] So far, the Malaysian political establishment has proved more stable than the Dutch one. Of both politicians referred to in the introduction of this text, the second one, Mahathir Mohamad, remains well established in office. Discussions about his replacement have continued too.

Notes

[1] *Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal* [Acts of the Second Chamber of the States General], 2001-2002, p. 5364 (90th session, Wednesday, 3 July 2002). Translated from the Dutch by the present author.

[2] See Peter G. Riddell, "Islamisation, Civil Society and Religious Minorities in Malaysia", paper presented at the Conference on Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, ISEAS, Singapore, 2-3 September 2002, to be published by ISEAS in the collection of the papers presented at this conference (ed. K.S. Nathan).

[3] See Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "The Image of Islam in the West. Some Historical, Present and Future Perspectives". In: Aswab Mahasin, *et al.* (eds), *Ruh Islam dalam Budaya Bangsa* [The Islamic Spirit within the Islamic Culture], Jakarta: Yayasan Festival Istiqlal, 1996, vol. 3 (Wacana Antar Agama dan Bangsa [Inter-religious and International Discourse]), pp. 148-63, referring in particular to Maxime Rodinson, "Les étapes du regard occidental sur le monde musulman". In: Maxime Rodinson, *La fascination de l'Islam*, Paris, Maspero, 1982.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 3 (summer 1993), pp. 22 ff.

[5] *Cf.* Ron Haleber, "Etniciteit, antiracisme en moslim-identiteit. Versluierde ideologie in de Nederlandse wetenschappelijke discussie" [Ethnicity, Antiracism, and Muslim Identity. Veiled Ideology in the Dutch Scholarly Discussion]. In: idem (ed.), *Rushdie-effecten. Afwijzing van moslim-identiteit in Nederland?* [Rushdie Effects. Rejection of Muslim Identity in the Netherlands?], Amsterdam: SUA, 1989, pp. 183-220.

[6] See Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams in the Netherlands", *ISIM Newsletter*, 8 (Sept. 2001), p. 33 [original and full title, as used in the Internet version of the article: "Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams. The Netherlands between verzuiling and laicité" (http://www.isim.nl/newsletter/8/meuleman.htm)].

[7] In Dutch, *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur*, Utrecht: Bruna, 1997.

[8] *Washington Post*, 14 October 2001.

[9] Paul B. Cliteur, "Alleen oecumenisch humanisme brengt licht" [Only Ecumenical Humanism Enlightens], *NRC Handelsblad*

(Rotterdam, daily), 22 December 2001.

[10] Van Boxtel made his controversial statement in an interview of April 6, 2002 with the Geassocieerde Pers Diensten [Associated Press Services], an association of Dutch regional daily newspapers. He later declared that he had made this suggestion in his capacity of a private person only. Most commentators were not impressed by this subtlety. The title "minister for integration and large cities policy" is the literal translation of the Dutch name of the position. The usual English translation, also found in government documents, was "minister for urban policy and integration of ethnic [sic – a rest of the old paradigm] minorities (reference: various Dutch daily newspapers, April 8, 2002 and following days).

[11] Hegener, Michiel, "Kind inlijven in godsdienst is achterlijk" [Incorporating a Child into a Religion is Backward], *Trouw* (Amsterdam, daily), August 17, 2002.

[12] Salafism is a school in recent and contemporary Muslim thought adhering in a rigid way to the way of life of the salaf, i.e. the "ancestors" or earliest generations of Muslims. One of its best-known representatives was Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-91), after whom the term "Wahhabism" has been created. Today, Wahhabism is dominant in Saudi Arabia and public as well as private institutions from this country play a prominent role in the dissemination and support of Salafi ideas around the world.

[13] Kars Veling, "Klem in een 'tolerante' samenleving: Het totalitaire karakter van een 'verlichte' samenleving" [Jammed in a 'Tolerant' Society: The Totalitarian Nature of an 'Enlightened' Society]. In: Marcel ten Hoovenl, *De lege tolerantie. Over vrijheid en vrijblijvendheid in Nederland* [Hollow Tolerance. On Freedom and Indifference in the Netherlands], Amsterdam: Boom, 2001, 129; James Kennedy, "Oude en nieuwe vormen van tolerantie in Nederland en Amerika: Tolerantie als ideologie maakt verdraagzaamheid kwetsbaar" [Old and New Forms of Tolerance in the Netherlands and America: Tolerance as an Ideology Renders Forbearance Vulnerable]. In; idem, p. 253.

[14] Kennedy, *loc. cit.*, p. 253; John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 21, applied on the Dutch case by Theo W.A. de Wit, "De trivialisering van de tolerantie: Zowel 'te veel' als 'te weinig' bedreigt de verdraagzaamheid" [Trivialization of Tolerance: 'Too much' as well as 'too little' Threatens Forbearance]. In:

Ten Hooven (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 94-8; Bas J. van der Vlies, "Paars is niet de wet der dingen" [Purple {indicating the liberal-cum-social-democratic coalition government that ruled the Netherlands from 1994 until 2002 and the spirit it was supposed to represent in general} is not a General Law], *NRC Handelsblad*, May 19, 2001.

[15] *Cf.* Meuleman, *op. cit.*, for an elaboration of these points.

[16] During the final period of his office, Minister Van Boxtel made various suggestions in order to limit migration through marriage. The most important one among those that were finally included in his ministerial note *Integratie in perspectief* (Integration in Perspective), adopted by the Dutch cabinet in January 2002, was to have candidates for immigration in the framework of marriage—or their prospective spouses—advance the costs of their Dutch integration programmes.

[17] Afshin Ellian, a lecturer in law affiliated to the Universiteit van Amsterdam, played a conspicuous role in the "constitutionalization" of the discussion on Islam, Muslims, and their integration into Dutch society. Because of his Iranian origin, he was easily associated with Islam and the fact that this person would speak in fluent Dutch about the need of both Muslim immigrants and the original Dutch citizens to honor the Dutch constitution made him a popular interviewee of various Dutch newspapers and television programs. In fact, his emphasis on the constitution was not typically Dutch; he originated from a Christian and not from a Muslim Iranian family; and his tendency to project the problems left-wing intellectuals like he had suffered under the nascent Islamic regime of Iran on questions relating to the position of Muslim immigrants in Dutch society was rather shortsighted. An example of his articles is "Leve de monoculturele rechtsstaat" [Long Live the Monocultural State of Law], *Trouw*, Nov. 30/Dec. 1, 2002.

[18] One might wonder if the fact that in Dutch "freedom of religion" and "freedom from religion" are rendered by the same phrase has played a role in this discussion.

[19] *Handleiding voor de toepassing van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap 1999* [Manual for the Application of the State Law on Dutch Nationality 1999], 24, 39 ff. (concerning chapter 4, article 8, section 1 of the law). The most recent law on Dutch nationality, adopted by Parliament in 2000, gazetted in 2002, and applicable from April 2003, has laid down stricter conditions for naturalization, especially a pass at

a test covering, in addition to the national language, the subjects of Dutch society and public constitution.

[20] *Cf.* Amnesty International, *Report 2002*, Introduction, p. 1; http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/liberties/libertindex.htm: 9/11, Civil Liberties (published on the Internet by the Global Policy Forum); Richard Carver, Human Rights After 11 September: Civil Liberties, Refugees, Intolerance and Discrimination, paper presented at the International Meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights – Before and After September 11, organized by the International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, January 10-12, 2002 (© 2002, International Council on Human Rights Policy; Not for public distribution or quotation, but published at http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/67.doc); "Die falsche Antwort auf den 11. September: Der Überwachungsstaat. Presseerklärungvon Bürgerrechts organisationen vom 24.10.2001" (published on various German Internet sites); and many similar documents.

[21] This earlier report was entitled *De politieke islam in Nederland* [Political Islam in the Netherlands] and published on June 26, 1998. BVD is short for Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst [Interior Security Service]. In 2003, this service was reorganized and rebaptized Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst [AIVD – General Intelligence and Security Service].

[22] *De democratische rechtsorde en islamitisch onderwijs. Buitenlandse inmenging en anti-integratieve tendensen* [The Democratic Order of Law and Islamic Education. Foreign Interference and Anti-integrative Tendencies], The Hague: BVD [part of the Dutch Minestry of Interior Affairs], February 20, 2002.

[23] These remarks are partly based on discussions with staff members of the umbrella organization, Islamitische Scholen Besturen Organisatie (Organization of Islamic School Boards – ISBO).

[24] For a discussion of these questions, also concentrating on Malaysia, see Patricia A. Martinez, "Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Is it always Civil Society versus Islam", paper presented at the Conference on Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, ISEAS, Singapore, September 2-3, 2002.

[25] See the "Memorandum on the Provisions in the Syariah Criminal Offences Act" addressed on August 8, 1997 to the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, by Sisters in Islam (published at http:/

/www.muslimtents.com/sistersinislam/resources/msyariah-criminaloffencesact.htm, accessed April 11, 2003); see also Zainah Anwar [the executive director of the Malaysian organization Sisters in Islam], "Islam, Politics and Governance in Southeast Asia. Law-Making in the Name of Islam–Implications to Democratic Governance", paper presented at the Conference on Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, ISEAS, Singapore, September 2-3, 2002, especially pp. 2 and 3.

[26] *Cf.* Meuleman, "Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams".

[27] See e.g. "L'élection du CFCM retardée", *El Watan* (Algiers, daily), June 6, 2002.

[28] See e.g. "Société: M. Sarkozy rappelle aux imams l'importance de leur formation en France", *Le Monde* (Paris, daily), April 1, 2003.

[29] During the previous few years, Ayaan Hirsi Ali had become known as a keen observer and critic of certain social attitudes among Muslim immigrants and of Dutch policy relating to the social integration of new immigrants (cf. various articles republished in Ayaan Hirsi Ali, [ed. Chris J.C. Rutenfrans e.a.], *De zoontjesfabriek. Over vrouwen, islam en integratie* [The Sons Factory. On Women, Islam, and Integration], Amsterdam: Contact, 2002). More recently, however, she developed into an outright critic of Islam. A few weeks before her election, she went as far as publicly declaring the Prophet Muhammad's attitude in social matters below accepted standards of human rights and dignity (Hirsi Ali [edited by Arjan Visser], "Politiek schadelijk voor mijn ideaal" [Politics Harmful to My Aspiration], *Trouw*, January 25, 2003). Various complaints were lodged against her, but Dutch Public Prosecution decided not to take legal action against her because, in its opinion (which may have been inspired by political expediency, cf. "Smalende Godslastering" [Scornful Blasphemy], editorial, *Trouw*, April 25, 2003), insulting the Prophet was not identical to blasphemy—insulting God—or to insulting the Muslim community. Since, this new Member of Parliament apparently has been instructed to distinguish between Islam and traditions of particular Muslims (cf. the article "Steniging laat moslims koud" [Lapidation Leaves Muslims Cold], co-authored with Geert Wilders, another member of parliament for the VVD, *Trouw*, March 20, 2003).

September 11:
The Issue of Terrorism and
the Growing Tension between
Islam and the West

A Theology of Terror: The "Religious" Thought of Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami

Mark R. Woodward

In the wake of the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in northern Virginia scholars, journalists, policy makers, and people the world over have struggled to understand how, by whom, and why these brutal and unspeakable acts of violence were carried out. The how and by who questions were answered with amazing speed. The why question is perhaps more difficult. It requires careful investigation of the history and religious underpinning of Middle Easter Muslim radicalism.[1]

Several answers to the Why question have circulated in the press. One is that the terrorists were motivated by a blind and unbending hatred of the West. Another is that they are strict or "fundamentalist" Muslims. An explanation more common in the Muslim world is that these acts were retribution for Western, and particularly American, complicity with Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the "occupation" of Saudi Arabia by American forces. While all of

these theories contain a grain of truth, none is sufficient. There are many Muslims who hate the West, just as there are many Europeans and Americans who hate Muslims. Hatred and bigotry are, unfortunately, human universals. Many Muslims who have little love for all manner of things Western were repulsed by the events of September 11. Similarly Islamic scholars and movements actively involved in struggles against Western influence deplored this wanton destruction of human life. There are millions of strict or fundamentalist Muslims who believe that personal, social, and political life should be based on *shari'a* (Islamic Law). Most would say that these acts of terror were gross violations of basic principles of Islamic Law.

Here, I will attempt to describe the worldview or general system of thought that moved a particular group of Muslims to shed the blood of thousands of people from many countries, ethnic backgrounds, and religions—including Islam—at the cost of their own. It is also reasonable to assume that those who planned and conducted these attacks were fully aware of what the nature of the response would be. In my view, this worldview or ideology is as perilous as the financial and logistical networks that made the attacks possible. This theology of terror is at least as perilous for Muslim countries as it is for the West. To resolve this problem those who seek peace in the world must undertake theological as well as economic, political, and military initiatives.

There is nothing particularly novel about the theology of terror. Individual elements including the concept of the renewal of Islam, commanding the good and prohibiting the evil, struggle in the path of God (*jihad*), fond remembrance of the community of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, and the conviction that Islamic Law is the basis for social justice are among the building blocks of many Muslim theologies. Three things are unique about this particular variety of Muslim radicalism. The first is that it globalizes notions of the Islamic state and Islamic law. The second is that through circuitous and tor-

tured reasoning it circumvents the Islamic legal prohibition against attacking non-combatants in times of war. The third is the view that only they are genuinely Muslim. All other self-professed Muslims are denounced as unbelievers or apostates against whom Muslims are obligated to conduct *jihad* and who are subject to execution.

Historical Background

Radical Muslim groups are very fractious. It is often difficult to determine historical connections precisely. Many of the current generation can be traced in some way to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was a renewal movement. It sought to solve the problems of colonial and post-colonial Egypt through a combination of modern education and a return to the "original" principles and practices of Islam. It was brutally suppressed by Nasser in the 1950s. The brothers who survived went underground. They resurfaced during the Sadat period (1970-81). Most advocated a combination of participation in the political process, social service, and educational activities. Splinter groups influenced by the writing of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) took a more radical and violent stance.

Sayyid Qutb was the father of the virulent anti-Westernism of contemporary Muslim radicals.[2] He was educated in Egypt and the United States receiving an MA from the University of Northern Colorado in 1951. He was deeply affected by what he saw as the moral laxity of 1950s' American culture and came to have a bitter hatred of everything Western. He was also the first to advocate the use of force to establish a universal Islamic state. For Sayyid Qutb "nationalism is belief, home land is *Dar al-Islam* (the world of Islam), the ruler is God and the constitution is Islam". He termed Arab as well as Western nationalisms "unbelief" and advocated eliminating all Western influences in the political and cultural systems of the Arab world. He was executed in 1966 for plotting to assassinate Egyptian president

Nasser. His works are widely read in radical Muslim circles and have been translated into many languages.[3]

Qutb's influence is apparent in an Arabic text *al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah* (The Neglected Duty) written by the Egyptian Muslim radical Abdul Salam Faraj. It is a call for *jihad* against the "unbelieving" rulers of Arab states and their Western supporters. It describes *jihad* as the duty of all Muslims when nonbelievers "occupy" a Muslim country.[4] It is important to note that Jamal and his associates consider the rulers of Arab and other Muslim countries to be *kafir* or worse still *munafiq* (people who claim to be Muslims but who are actually striving to destroy Islam and the Muslim community). This work is the political and religious manifesto of the Jamaat al-Jihad, the association responsible for Sadat's assassination.

This theological orientation or worldview is the ideological foundation of radical Muslim groups throughout the world. While they differ concerning strategy and tactics, they share a common goal. However a basic distinction can be drawn between groups that operate within one country, such as the Indonesian Laskar Jihad, and those like Bin Laden who choose to conduct the *jihad* on "enemy" territory.

The Afghan war led to the spread of the internationally oriented *jihad* ideology and groups throughout the world. Radicals, including Bin Laden and the Taliban credit themselves with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once the evil of communism was defeated they turned their attention to the struggle against the West, which they also see as a great evil. Volunteers from all parts of the Muslim world participated in the Afghan war often with active support from the Saudi government. They received religious as well as military training. They expected to be welcomed as heroes when they returned home. This did not happen. The combination of military and theological training they received made them a potential threat to nearly every Muslim government.

The Taliban

The Taliban are best known for extreme anti-Westernism and equally extreme interpretations of Islamic law, particularly those portions of the law concerning gender relations. Their self-proclaimed goal was to purge Afghanistan of all vestiges of unbelief. Television, Internet, dancing, tape recorders, kite flying, and nail polish are but a few of the "evils" of Western materialism to have been prohibited. The Taliban have also conducted a campaign against traditional social and religious practices that they regard to be un-Islamic. They also conducted campaigns against the human vestiges of unbelief, persecuting small Hindu and Christian communities, and slaughtering thousands of Shi'i Muslims in the northern part of the country. Taliban leaders have stated repeatedly that the Shi'i are not Muslims and can be legitimately killed.

The Taliban understand themselves as restoring the purity of the Islamic faith. Their goal is to "return" to what they believe to have been the social and religious norms of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. The Taliban differ from other revivalist communities in their emphasis to seek a return to ancient social as well as spiritual norms. In this sense they are very different from more mainstream revivalists such as the Indonesian Muhammadiyah, which actively embraces the modern world. It should also be added that some of the practices they seek to establish including the rigid segregation of women have more to do with Pushtu culture than with Islam.

Were it not for Bin Laden and the now global network of Afghan war veterans, the Taliban would have been of little importance beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Given the extreme views and the almost inherent political instability of the state it is unlikely that they could long endure. Even before September 11, Taliban leaders were aware of their tenuous hold on power. They have something of a bunker mentality, believing that the forces of evil are arraigned against them. These take the form of

Shi'i/Iranian/Communist conspiracies, internal subversion by Afghans that do not share their extreme views, Saudi subversion (by means of free trips to Mecca and bribes), UN use of food and health programs to compete for the loyalty of the populace and to encourage conversion to Christianity, and the activities of American, Israeli, and Arab intelligence operatives (who were blamed for a series of bombings).

The Taliban also worried about military threats other than the one that lead ultimately to their demise. In early 2002, a few spoke of a Shi'i/Communist conspiracy that also included India and Turkey. They expressed confidence that they could defeat such an alliance through a combination of military might and divine intervention. They described themselves as liberators of the Muslim world from "the atheistic, faithless American tyranny". Mullah Muhammad Omar has take the title *Amir al-Mu'minin* or Commander of all the Faithful in the World. This title was used by the caliphs of the classical age of Islam. It suggests that the Taliban see themselves as the center of a new and universal caliphate. They stated repeatedly that if they were attacked it is the duty of every Muslim to come to their aid.

Osama Bin Laden

The Taliban refer to Bin Laden as the "Commander of the Arab *Mujahidin*" and describe him as a *Sheikh* (religious teacher). In reality Bin Laden, despite his pious statements has only a "lay" religious education and cannot be considered to be an *'alim* (religious scholar). His style of argument and use of scriptural sources resembles that of Abdul Salam Faraj, the author of *The Neglected Duty*. Intellectually and politically Bin Laden has strong ties to the radical factions of the Muslim Brotherhood. He is known best for his *fatwa* commanding Muslims to kill Americans wherever they can be found.[5]

From this text, and from interviews published in Western and Muslim media it is possible to elucidate a simplistic, and

yet powerful theology. It consists of five principles.[6]

First, commanding the good and forbidding the evil. This is the most basic principle of Islamic law. Like the Taliban and other Islamists, Bin Laden does not rely on the centuries of legal scholarship revered by other conservative Muslims. He relies primarily on the relatively few passages in the Quran concerning the "just war". He interprets "forbidding the evil" with "destroying the lives and property of those who do evil". Unlike the vast majority of Muslim jurists, Bin Laden defines this *jihad* as an individual rather than communal obligation.

Second, the West is entirely evil. Like many Islamists Bin Laden's view of history is highly conspiratorial. He maintains that there is an organized international conspiracy including Christians and Jews dedicated to the destruction of Islam as a religion. He often cites the Gulf War as an example of Western terror:

> For seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spear head through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

He states that the United States and its allies are waging war on God, his messenger (the Prophet Muhammad) and Muslims. There is nothing original about this claim. It is directly linked to the writings of Sayyid Qutb. Similar conspiracy theories can be found among Muslims throughout the world. Bin Laden's contribution to this discourse is the argument that all Americans are to be killed. This conclusion is based on two lines of reasoning. The first is that the US has attacked civilians and "executing more than 600,000 Muslim children in Iraq". The second is that because the US government was chosen by popular vote, US citizens, individually and collectively, are guilty of terrorism and murder. He regards Presidents Bush Sr., Clinton, and Bush Jr. as the embodiment of evil:

> Mentioning the name of Clinton or that of the American Gov-
> ernment provokes disgust and revulsion. This is because the
> name of the American government and the names of Clinton
> and Bush directly reflect in our minds the picture of children
> with their heads cut off before even reaching one year of age.

Third, Arab and other Muslim governments are evil. Bin
Laden states that Arab and other Muslim governments are evil,
and their leaders *kafir* (non Muslim) because they are agents of
the United States and the Jews who, he maintains, control US
foreign policy. Much of his hatred is directed at the Saudi royal
family. They are singled out for allowing US forces to occupy
the Holy Places, for jailing '*ulama*' and for refusing to allow
Muslims to command the good and prohibit the evil. Bin Laden
has stated that the Saudi royal family has replaced *shari'a* with
human law and that he will return to Arabia when "God's Law
rules in that land". He has stated that Afghanistan is a place
where it is possible for him to command the good and prohibit
the evil and that he intends to instigate rebellion in Saudi Arabia.
Struggle against unjust rulers is a collective Muslim duty. Bin
Laden understands it as the duty of all Muslims as individuals.
Few Muslim scholars would accept the view that the presence
of US troops in Saudi Arabia defiles the holy places in Mecca
and Medina. Non-Muslims are not allowed to enter the *Haram*
region that includes these two cities, but are most clearly not
prohibited from other parts of the country.

Fourth, the goal–a global Muslim community. Bin Laden
thinks in global terms, both in the contemporary sense of the
term and in that of the classical Islamic doctrine of the caliph-
ate. His immediate goal is to drive what he considers to be occu-
pying forces from Muslim territory. He credits his *mujahidin*
with the destruction of the Soviet Union and has now turned
his attention to driving US unbelievers from the Muslim world.
His ultimate goal is the establishment of a global Muslim com-
munity in which nation states will dissolve and give way to a
universal Muslim caliphate.

Fifth, the method *jihad*. There are Muslims who share much of Bin Laden's view of the world, but who are convinced that the goals are pursued best through peaceful means. Bin Laden is convinced that the only way to achieve the goal is through armed struggles against the Jewish Crusader alliance and the Muslim governments and leaders they dominate. Bin Laden has described the coming war in Arabia as "something that will make the Americans forget the horrors of Vietnam". Bin Laden's reading of the Quranic discourse on *jihad* is very selective. He emphasizes the command to fight the enemies of Islam, but chooses to ignore elements of this discourse that stress the defensive nature of *jihad* such as "Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God does not like aggressors" (QS 2:190) and Hadith traditions prohibiting treachery, mutilation, and the killing of children and other non-combatants.

Bin Laden's Religious Connections

Bin Laden is associated with, and frequently praises, a group of Saudi *'ulama'* that stand in opposition to the Saudi royal family. The scholars opposed the Gulf War and the presence of US troops. Several were jailed for publicly criticizing the government. Salman al-'Awdah and Safar al-Hawaly are two who Bin Laden regards as heroes. Both of these scholars were trained in Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia. Both stated that Islamic law forbids the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia. In other respects they are very different. Al-'Awdah is a specialist in law and theology. His writings concern justice, the need for Muslim unity and the desirability of avoiding minor religious disputes. Bin Laden makes very similar arguments. Al-Hawaly is rather eccentric. In *The Day of Wrath* he criticizes Christian messianic and apocalyptic thought. He argues that there is a coming apocalypse, but that it is one that will begin with *jihad*, the utter destruction of Israel and the United States and conclude with the

Day of Judgment. Hawaly calculates that these events will tran-spire in 2012.[7]

Fellow Travelers

The alliance between Bin Laden and the Taliban was unique only to the extent of its ability to train, equip, and finance a significant military force. There are numerous other groups that share similar worldviews. Among these Hizb al Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) is among the most articulate and well orga-nized.[8] It was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-77). Al-Nabhani studied at al-Azhar in Cairo and was subsequently a religious teacher and judge in Pales-tine. The ILP was found when he and a group of associates split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Their primary goal was to re-store an authentic Islamic way of life to the Muslim community and purging it of the vestiges of colonialism, Westernization, and secularism. This is to be achieved, and all of the problems of the Muslim world solved, by the re-establishment of the uni-versal caliphate.

Another of ILP's goals is to expose the Western conspiracy to destroy Islam and the complicity of Zionists in this agenda. The Balfour Declaration, the founding of the state of Israel, the 1967 war, and the Gulf War are mentioned as elements of this conspiracy. It also includes fanciful elements including the claim that US soldiers murdered, cooked, and ate children in Somalia.

ILP has pursued this goal unfalteringly for almost half a century. In the 1950s and 1960s the party established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq. Today it is a global organi-zation with branches throughout the Middle East, Europe, Cen-tral, South and Southeast Asia, and the United States. The coun-tries in which it is presently most active include the United Kingdom, those of central Asia and Indonesia. There is no pub-licly available evidence to link ILP with Osama bin Laden or the Taliban. What is clear is that they share a common theological

understanding of world events.

ILP has employed tactics ranging from attempts at coups in the late 1960s to the publication of religious tracts and books first in print editions and now on the Internet. The party is highly centralized. It maintains web sites in Arabic, Urdu, Turkish, Indonesian, and many other languages. The contents of these web sites are nearly identical.[9]

Officially ILP denounced the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A sermon delivered in London a few days after the tragedy stated that the proper Islamic way to establish the caliphate was the "self improvement" of the Muslim community, but that it is not difficult to understand the rage of the Muslim community. Subsequent statements of the ILP in Pakistan take a stronger position. What follows is the text of an email message I received on September 25, 2001:

> This is a Message for mankind, in order that they may take heed. Alliance with America is a great crime forbidden by Islam. In the Gulf war against Iraq in 1991 America set up an alliance to enter that war. After this she established what's known as the 'New World Order' as an attempt to impose her dominance over the world. Now America is striving to set up a new international alliance claiming that it is for the fight against terrorism. In reality she aims to develop the 'New World Order' so as to strengthen her hold over the world, especially the Islamic world, which includes the states not under her control in Central Asia and the states which form a threat to her influence like China.
>
> We, at this point, are not concerned about looking into who undertook the attack in New York and Washington on 11/9/2001. However we assert that America has directed an allegation against Bin Ladin without providing any evidence. Not one American official dared to say that he had a single evidence or proof against Bin Ladin. All they have claimed is that he is a prime suspect. He has issued a statement categorically denying that he had anything to do with the attack. Likewise, the Taliban government has unequivocally denied that it has anything to do with it. It has demanded evidence for this accusation in order to try him, should it be proven, but America is unable to present any evidence. Furthermore, those who are

well informed of the matters, know that the American secret service has infiltrated the Taliban through Pakistan and consequently it has infiltrated the Al-Qa'idah organization led by Bin Ladin. If Bin Ladin was responsible for this attack America would have known about it, especially as such an attack requires a great number of people to execute it and long period of time to prepare for it.

We are used to Americas' lies and willful deception in such situations. In the attack on the FBI building in Oklahoma in 1995 the blame was immediately pointed at the Arabs and Muslims, then a short while afterwards it appeared that the perpetrator was an American.[10] When she destroyed a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan she claimed that it was a weapons factory whilst she knew with certainty that it was a medicine factory. This is because she knows about every issue in Sudan whether it is big or small. She attacked the factory in order to absorb the anger against her at home.

After pacifying her own people she apologized to Sudan for the air strike. She did something similar when her planes bombed Libya. Now, one expects that America had known who was behind this attack, but deliberately ignores them and directs the blame in a different direction to realize a number of targets: to appease the public opinion of her people and absorb the anger after the strong shock they felt; to extend her influence in the world, especially in Central Asia; to plunder funds from the states in the world not least from the oil producing states so as to gain twice as much as she lost during the destruction that took place; and to create Islam as an opponent to the Western civilization so that the followers of this (Islamic) civilization stay in a constant state of fear.[11]

On Friday 14/9/2001 the assistant to the American Secretary of State William Burns summoned the Arab ambassadors and explained the terms of the alliance which his government was forming. They are the following: *First*, to declare support for the American initiative in a forceful and public manner. *Second*, to undertake executive steps on the ground such as stopping individuals, closing offices and pursuing the sources of funding. *Third*, to work with the United States in the field of exchanging intelligence and being prepared to join the operations of the American military response and providing assistance when the American response is decided. The American foreign department distributed a document to a number of

Arab and European states, Latin America, and states in Asia regarding the general principles Washington will follow in its so-called war against terrorism. It reported that dealing with the Europeans will be classified under 'co-operation'. As for what relates to the Arab group and some Asian states, including Pakistan, that will be classified under 'demands' or 'orders'. America will not negotiate with these states, rather she will say categorically, "Are you with America or with terrorism?"

O Muslims! The Shariah obliges you to reject this American demand, which looks down upon you with disdain and contempt. America has no high values so as to lecture you on who you should support and who you should fight. You are the people who have a divine Message. You are the ones who carry the Guidance and Light to mankind.

Allah has described you with His words: "You are the best of peoples ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin the Good (ma'roof) and forbid the Evil, and you believe in Allah..".

The rules of this Message forbid any aggression against civilian non-combatants. They forbid killing of children, the elderly and non-combatant women even in the battlefield. They forbid the hijacking of civilian airplanes carrying innocent civilians and forbid the destruction of homes and offices that contain innocent civilians. All of these actions are types of aggression that Islam forbids and Muslims should not undertake such actions. As for Jihad to fight the enemy who commits aggression against Muslims, usurps their land, plunders their resources and attempts to control them; not only is this a legitimate matter but it is an obligation (fard). It is the highest peak of Islam.

Allah said: "And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war to put fear into the hearts of the enemy of Allah and your enemy".

The Messenger of Allah said:"The head of the matter is Islam, its pillar is the prayer and its highest peak is Jihad".

Oh Muslims! Shariah does not permit you to give America anything that she tries to impose upon you. It is not allowed for you to submit to Americas' orders or give any form of assistance to her whether it is security information or facilitates for passage through land, air or regional waters. It is not

allowed to give America fixed bases. It is not allowed to co-ordinate or cooperate with her in any military issue. It is not allowed to enter her alliance or seek her friendship because America is an enemy to Islam and the Muslims.

He said: "Oh you who believe! Take not My enemies and your enemies as friends, showing affection towards them, while they have disbelieved in what has come to you of the truth".

Allah has alerted us to what they conceal (in their hearts) for Islam and the Muslims.

He said: "Hatred has already appeared from their mouths, but what their breasts conceal is far worse.... Lo! You are the ones who love them but they love you not, and you believe in all the scriptures".

We have noticed the hatred in the actions of the officials, even in the actions of ordinary people after being incited by the malicious Jews who made them think that Muslims are terrorists. Thus, they began to attack mosques and Muslim women in the streets. As for the president of America, Bush, has described the war, he will launch as a revenge for the attack of 11 September on New York and Washington as: "A crusade".[12] He said this on 16/9/2001.

How can America demand that the Muslims join their ranks while their president announces without shame that he will wage a crusade on all Muslims who do not bow before America, and not only on Bin Ladin and Afghanistan. This is humiliation, servitude and absolute control of the future of the peoples. Indeed, this haughtiness and arrogance is what gave rise to the hatred for America in the hearts of people and made them sacrifice their lives in order to harm America and seek revenge on her. America is reaping what she has sown.

Oh Muslims! You are one Ummah (community. He said: "The believers are nothing else than brothers" The Messenger of Allah said: "The Muslim is the brother of another Muslim, he does not do injustice to him nor desert him". And he said "The Muslim is the brother of another Muslim, he does not oppress him, forsake him nor hate him".

He said: "The believers to one another are like one solid structure where one part strengthens another". And he said: "The similitude of the believers in their mutual love, compassion and sympathy is like that of a body: when one part hurts then

the rest of the body calls out in sleeplessness and fever". And he said: "The blood of the Muslims is one. The nearest as well as the furthest of them gives pledge of protection (to anyone) in their name. And they are one hand against the rest".

The Messenger of Allah wrote the constitution of Madinah shortly after the Hijrah which describes the state of the Muslims: "They are one Ummah to the exclusion of other people ... the believers are helpers to each other to the exclusion of other people ... the peace of the believers is one, a believer does not make peace excluding another believer in (the process of) fighting in the path of Allah".

There we see America mobilizing her garbage, setting up her alliance, making her preparations, and issuing her ultimatum to Afghanistan wishing unjustly and aggressively to humiliate her. She threatens all the Muslim lands and warns that her war will continue for many years. Your rulers, O Muslims, are agents and cowards who have neglected their Deen (religion), lost their dignity and began to behave like slaves before the haughty America. There is no hope left in them.

So will you allow these rulers to enter the American alliance and take you with them, to kill your Muslim brothers? Will you leave your rulers to permit America to use your airports, seaports, land and airspace so as to take off for the occupation of a Muslim land? Do you allow them to turn your army into slaves used by America to kill your believing brothers? By Allah, the action of those rulers is indeed an abominable crime which is one of the biggest crimes. It is by Allah a great shame and great sin upon you if you allow them to execute for America whatever she wishes. The immediate and rapid action, which you are obliged to do, is to prevent the rulers from opening the doors to America and forcing them to expel America from the Muslim lands.

As for the radical work which will solve the problems of the Islamic Ummah, it is the establishment of the righteous Khilafah (calif) which will unite the Islamic lands and peoples in one state and convey the Message of Islam to the rest of the world.

He said: "And hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah, and do not be divided". So if you, O Muslims, were one Ummah under the banner of one Caliph holding onto the Book of Allah and Sunnah of His Messenger would then

America or any other kufr states have ambitions over you?13 Would they have the courage to do anything against you or enslave your rulers without taking any account of you? By Allah, no! So rise up towards the radical work which will save your Ummah and the whole world.

He said: "Allah is with you, and will never decrease the reward of your good deeds".

In a subsequent message, distributed throughout the world ILP stated: The Muslims must establish the caliphate and treat the US the way Allah has instructed in the Quran: Satan is your enemy deal with him as an enemy.

Conclusions

Attacks on US installations abroad and the recent strikes on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were motivated by a theology of terror that dates to the early 1950's. This theology defines both Western governments and those of most Muslim states as inherently evil. Radical Islamists are a small, but well-financed and well-organized component of the world Muslim community. They can be found in almost every country on the planet. Immediately following the September 11 attacks many Indonesian Muslims and those of us in the West who devote ourselves to the study of Indonesian Islam said and wrote that radical Islamist movements were unlikely to surface in Indonesia. We were wrong. We were lulled to complacency by our desire to believe that "it can't happen here". During much of the New Order period there was little evidence of radical Islamist influence. This speaks for the efficiency of Soeharto's repression. Almost as soon as the New Order collapsed increasingly militant Islamist parties, with ideologies similar to those of Bin Laden, the Taliban and Hizbul Tahrir began to emerge. The Bali bombings proved beyond doubt that they are capable of mounting terror attacks.

Military, financial, and political initiatives will not stop ter-

rorist zealots. Their weapons of choice are very "low tech" and readily obtainable.[14] The theology of terror must be eliminated if terrorist acts are to be brought to a halt. If this is to be accomplished the legitimate grievances of Muslim communities must be addressed. It is equally important that future generations of '*ulama*' (Muslim Scholars) be encouraged to enter into serious dialogue with their Euro-American counterparts. Sayyid Qutb's negative impressions of American culture are, in large part, responsible for the current crisis.

To avoid what Samuel Huntington has called the "clash of civilizations" it is essential that Western intellectuals and religious leaders engage the '*ulama*' in serious ways. Government to government and scholar-to-scholar contacts must be joined if Crusader/*Jihad* conflicts are to be avoided in coming years. Educational exchanges can make a major contribution to bringing peace to the world to avoid further death and destruction, be it from highjacked airliners or B-52s.

We must come to an agreement that we are all children of Abraham and that we will work together to solve our common problems. The voices that would resort to terror, violence, and murder, be they Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, must be silenced. This may require sustained and prolonged military and diplomatic action. If the Peace of God, which all of these religions promise, is to be found we must move from military force toward economic cooperation and religious dialogue. Western "Islamaphobia" and Muslim "West-phobia" must give way to a search for common ways to solve the economic, political, and moral problems that confront the Muslim and Western worlds. In the contemporary global world system this is the only way that we can effectively "command the good and prohibit the evil".

Notes

[1] I will refer to these individuals as Muslim rather than Islamic in respect for the consensus of Islamic scholarly opinion that the beliefs and actions associated with these movements does NOT constitute submission to God — the literal meaning of the Arabic word Islam.

[2] For an overview of the history of Muslim radicalism see Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*. London: Routledge 1988.

[3] On Sayyid Qutb and the history of radical Islamism in Egypt see Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

[4] Most Muslim scholars argue that *jihad* can be undertaken only when there is a reasonable possibility of success and that it is a communal, not individual obligation.

[5] It is not clear if Bin Laden actually wrote the *fatwa*. Leaders of *jihad* groups in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh also signed it.

[6] A 1996 interview with Bin Laden is located at http://www.islam.org.au/articles/15/LADIN.HTM

[7] English translations of these works are located at http://www.islam.org.au/articles/21/r-introduction.htm

[8] The ILP web sites can be located at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/

[9] See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/

[10] This statement is correct. In the hours following the Oklahoma City bombing many Americans assumed that it had been conducted by "Islamic terrorists". On that day I received numerous Phoenix area journalists one of whom asked me: "Which Muslims did it?"

[11] Throughout the Muslim world many believe that Bin Laden was not responsible for the attacks of September 11. There are numerous conspiracy theories attributing them to some combination of US and Israeli intelligence agencies. There are similar theories concerning the Bali bombing. One which received considerable attention in Indonesia claimed that the explosion was that of an Israeli or US "micro-nuclear bomb". Curiously this theory was first proposed by an ultra rightwing radio station in New York City.

[12] President Bush's choice of words was very unfortunate. In American English the word crusade is used in many contexts. There are

crusades against cancer and other diseases. There is a student Christian movement called the Campus Crusade for Christ and even secular political movements are sometimes referred to as crusades. In the Muslim world the term crusade is more precisely defined. It means a Christian war of a aggression against Muslims, the legitimate response to which is *jihad*.

[13] Sunna is the customary behavior of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate companions. It is recorded in the Hadith literature and one of the basic sources of Islamic law.

[14] Extremely powerful bombs, such as those used in Bali and Oklahoma City can be made with fertilizer and Diesel fuel. The weapons used by the September 11 highjackers were box cutters.

Islam and the West

Abdurrahman Wahid

I think one thing should be made clear in advance, and that is that the radical terrorist attacks in New York on the WTC on September 11, 2001, were the result rather than the cause of something else; they were the result of a combination of many things. First, the geopolitical situation has made clear to Muslims, or parts of the Muslim community, that they have no other way to win the encounter with the West except by committing violence. And violence means terrorism. That is why some Muslims carried out these attacks. They made sure that by enacting terrorism against the United States, the whole world would learn about this. This of course cannot be seen as a right thing. But we have to know the reasons for that.

Second, we are tackling the problem of the terrorist by such means as bombing Afghanistan, sending special forces there by the US and so on. Although, in many ways, this has a link to what happened to the WTC on September 11, 2001, other considerations also dictated these actions. This we have to remember always. There is not one single factor. According to several writers—Muslims of course—the geopolitical consideration, especially the sources for oil in the Middle East and Central

Asia, was the cause for bombing Afghanistan. There was also the view, expressed to me by several Ambassadors — Muslim of course — that the bombing was caused by something else. Now we see the emergence of across-the-border-merchants who are not tied to specific national perimeters. They have become international and hence they are not bent to any nation state. Because of this, the United States has to act in order to subdue these people. This is one theory. But the most important thing for us is that the September 11 tragedy was a reaction that caused another reaction taken by the United States, the bombing of Afghanistan.

These are two separate things, which are not directly connected. Thus, the first thing is that we have to try to find the reasons for that terrorist act in New York on September 11. We have to do this seriously, not in the way it was done by the United States who were loudly yelling about terrorism in a generalized way. I do not think they were right because different people have different reactions to the phenomenon. Because of this, we had a meeting several months ago here at the J.W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta with representatives from Islamic countries — intellectuals, and people from various professions — who came here especially for the occasion. The result was that we decided to organize ourselves into a non-governmental association. We called it, the Association of Individual Muslims (AIM). We had a subsequent meeting about this in London last month, and we would like to officiate this association in Senegal, maybe at the end of this year.

The aims of this Association are to explain to the West and to other countries — the so-called advanced countries — the real situation in the Islamic World, and about Islam, because as was related by Muslims living in America right after September 11, 2001 they now know how they feel being a minority because they are treated badly in the United States. So, I think it is most important to explain to advanced countries, especially to Western ones, that Islam is actually an anti-terrorism religion, be-

cause in Islam the use of violence is not condoned. The only reason for Muslims to resort to violence—as described in the Quran—is if they are evicted from their houses. At present, they are in no way subdued or colonialized by other powers, and thus they should not resolve their problems through violence.

Third, we should explain to our fellow Muslims that reactions to developments in technology and science of course different. To mention but one example. When Professor Samuel Huntington came to Tokyo, I was also invited by the biggest newspaper in the world, and we talked about the counter of civilizations or clash of civilizations. I said to professor Huntington,

> You see the trees but not the forest or the forest not the trees. You said that there is the clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the Western world, but please remember that hundreds of thousands of Muslims study in the West every year, among them those who support Western civilization. And we took from you the fact that I now wear trousers instead of a *sarung* to show that I took more from the West than study alone. But of course we cannot be equal to the West because, of course, we have our own traditions. So you see the differences but not the similarities created by education when thousands of Muslims, hundred thousands go to the West every year. And you also use double standards in your treatment of Islam and other civilizations. The double standard is evident in your relating to orthodox Jewish groups in Jerusalem who thought that on the Sabbath people should not work. Because of that they threw stones at cars passing on that day, because in the passing cars there are people working. But you always said that, well they are dissimilar to us, but they are still our children. So the use of double standards must be stopped.

By that time, the former Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, said, "Professor, I declare in boxing terms, you are defeated by your enemies". That was the first time in my life, that a discussion had a winner and a loser.

The fourth item I mentioned was that there are of course actions that show Muslims using violence because they feel

they are threatened. You know it is always important to remember that in reacting to the challenges of the modern world, Muslims always resort to their own traditions with the result that they feel that there are differences between their Islamic tradition and the Western tradition. But the reaction to that difference is sometimes violent, and sometimes not. This is what we should remember. Hundreds and thousands of Muslims in so-called Western states have resorted to their Holy Books and Prophetic Traditions — the Quran and Ḥadiths — directly without using any interpretation such as those developed throughout the centuries. It is like this ʻaḷim, this man of religion, from Pakistan during Benazir Bhutto's days who came to my office and said to me "please recite *al-Fatiha* for Pakistan". I said, "Why?" He said, "because they are led by a woman, and the Prophet said that a community that is led by a woman will go astray". I said "well, that Hadiths was given by the Prophet in the seventh or eighth century A.D. on the Arabian Peninsula. At that time, society saw leadership in a personal way, in terms of matters in their personal life. So a leader, especially a tribal chief, had to find and distribute water for irrigation, had to wage war, had to lead tours of commercial caravans to other countries, and had to do this and that, and all this needed strong physical work. Because of that, women could not be leaders. But now it is different.

Leadership has the agreement of a cabinet. The majority counts. A cabinet always has to consider the acts of parliament. The majority of the membership of parliament is male and parliament is overseen and observed by the Supreme Court, to check whether they violate the constitution or not. And the Supreme Court is all male, so I said, "what are you worrying about the leadership of Benazir Bhutto?" He said to me "Ok, I understand you, but please recite *al-Fatiha* anyway".

So you can see here that the reactions are different because they do not quite develop the appropriate historical perspective of things. Because the people are disappointed with the West,

and especially those who failed in the competition against people in the West such as Osama bin Laden, turn to violence. It is important to explain this to Muslims at large.

The fifth thing to do is that we have to convince Muslims and non-Muslims that the so-called humanitarian approach and pluralistic way of thinking should be introduced to the Muslim community everywhere. This is important because we see now that people always say that Islam has something else, something unique, not related to the so-called "West". For me those are all lies. For me, Islam, throughout history, has interacted with other civilizations including the West. As the previous speaker put forward, in Islamic society, rights of minorities, including non-Muslim ones, are protected. But how can we protect them if we do not understand them? This is important. Inter-religious dialogues should be encouraged as much as possible, especially among the Islamic community.

So these steps are, I think, the most important ones to be taken after September 11, 2001, in order to face the reality that we are different from the West but we are headed towards the common goals of humanity, and the common goals of enlightenment. Democratic institutions should be established; it should be introduced bit by bit to the Muslim community everywhere. So, there is so much to do now to enlighten Muslims that we need democracy, we need humanity, and we need progress as well.

The traditions of our societies play an important role on this matter. In the Middle East, there is no tradition of NGO activities. That is why—in the Middle East—if you are against the government's policy and the government is repressive like in Egypt, you have no other choice but to say that you are against the West. And if you are against the West in one issue, then you are against the West in other issues as well, and against all Western types of activities and manifestations. We have to introduce the tradition of NGOs, real NGOs, because the so-called NGOs in the Middle East, like al-Hilal, the Red Crescent—the

Muslim equivalent of the Red Cross — are not really NGOs. The President installs the chairman. The government does everything just like in Singapore. So then we have to make sure that there are differences between Islamic societies everywhere. The traditions of NGOs are more apparent in this region, in Southeast Asia for example, while the NGOs in South Asia, such as India and Pakistan are becoming so extreme that it is difficult to talk to them. This is why different kinds of responses to factual developments within communities should always be borne in mind.

Back in 1998, I went to Japan at the invitation of the United Nations University under the late Dr. Sudjatmoko. I was asked to present some notions about the idea of Islamic Research. I said that in Islamic Research we have to create so-called "area studies" of the Islamic world. In my view, research is very important for Muslims. We should study them at length. One area is the black African Sub-Saharan communities. They have their own distinct Islamic civilization. Then we need to study North Africa and Arab cultural, economic, political, and scientific traditions, as their cultures are very different. The third one is the Turkish version or Afghan cultural manifestation. The fourth one would be South Asia, or the area that encompasses Nepal, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The fifth would be Southeast Asian Islam and the sixth would be the Muslim minorities in technologically advanced countries, like the West. So we should do things properly by conducting research in area studies in Islam. This is very important since we cannot talk without touching on the subject of a particular culture of area.

Islam and the West
Post September 11, 2001

Juwono Sudarsono

The most frequently asked question after September 11 was: what were the reasons for so much hatred against the United States and the West among Al-Qaeda and its followers? The answers have varied, depending on the educational background, social standing and cultural perspective of the respondents across the Muslim world.

As an Indonesian Muslim academic still influenced by pre-Islamic values and with a training in contemporary International studies, my tentative answer would be: September 11, 2001, was in a sense an inevitable consequence of the combination of America's overpowering role as the world's real time "24/7" superpower in all of its dimensions—political, economic, military, scientific, cultural—and the unique combustible atmosphere of contemporary Middle East Political Economy. American preponderance begets defiance most tellingly in most Islamic societies whose governments often fail to address comprehensive political and economic reform. Anti-Americanism is linked to the anger and desperation of the Muslim poor against

established Muslim governments seen to be rampantly corrupt.

Fortuitous circumstances created the phenomenon of Osama bin Laden whose virulently anti-American thrust is based on his personal marginalization and ostracism by the Saudi royal family and his particular view of Middle Eastern regional and domestic politics since the early 1990s. I believe Bin Laden's personal psychological scars defined his main goal, which was to fuel acerbic hatred against selected Arab governments—especially in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt—whom he saw as corrupt, immoral, repressive, and essentially clients of United States economic imperialism.

Bin Laden and his followers main objective was to polarize the Islamic world of the *umma*, and further the cause of an Islamic revolution in the Arab states allied to Western interests but more generally throughout the world in order to regain the moral high ground for what he believed was the interest of Islam's true believers. In fact, the United Stated was not the prime target of his real objective; it was merely the modern idolatry Hubal and most ubiquitously powerful "Christian" nation which happened to support Arab leaders seen to be unbelievers who had exploited and usurped power from the Muslim *umma* in their respective countries.

The perpetrators and masterminds of the fatal hijacking of the planes in New York and Washington were middle-class Saudi and Egyptian nationals who saw their governments being hand-in-glove partners of the American "infidels" since 1981, made worse by recognizing and supporting Israel politically, military, and economically.

It is this symbolic "intra-Muslim" and "intra-Arab" ideological struggle which explains more cogently the September 11 phenomenon and which to my mind is more important than analyses centering on the traditional notion of "challenge and response" of Arnold Toynbee, the patronizing theme of "Islam on the defensive" of Bernard Lewis, or the popular but misplaced the "clash of civilizations" of Samuel Huntington. Un-

derstanding the ideological struggle "within political Islam" in the Middle East, in Africa, and in Southeast Asia, I think, sheds more light on September 11 than rehashing variations on the theme of discord between Islam and the West.

In the contemporary world of the Middle East, leaders of the Arab governments that for reasons of economic and military strategy are perceived clients of the fulcrum of global idolatry are despised by Bin Laden and his followers as hypocrites, *munafiqun*. These leaders are also shrewdly demonized as those who formally believed in Islam but reject its precepts after having been corrupted by the greed and materialism of Western "particularly American" economic interests.

Worse, they were branded as mere apostates, since they were depicted as never having embraced "true" Islam in the first place. Al-Qaeda ideology derives much of its precepts from the more extremist of the *Salafis*, who believed in the imperative of the return to the pure teaching of the Prophet. In the view of these *Salafis*, all states with Muslims majorities must apply the *shari'a* exclusively. Failure to adopt it would constitute idolatry.

These extremist versions of Islam maintain that it is the duty of the purist to go on the path of *jihad* against those governments that do not adopt the *shari'a* as state identity and that these despicable regimes should therefore be overthrown by violent means. In the "Declaration of war against the Americans" on 1996, Osama bin Laden saw himself as having a common cause with members of the Islamic *Jihad* in Egypt whose members had been involved in the assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Both groups viewed members of the Egyptian government and the Saudi royal family as having renounced Islam both by refusing to apply Al-Qaeda's view of the *shari'a* as the basis for political life and because of their dependence on American economic patronage and military backing.

For us in Indonesia, events in the Middle East can resonate quickly into our domestic situation. What happens to our brothers and sisters in the Middle East may affect our future, politi-

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cally, economically, and even strategically. But the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims believe that they can provide and enrich the discourse and constructive dialogue about the need for all members of the Islamic *umma* throughout the world to adjust peacefully in coming to terms with contemporary American-dominated globalization.

Indonesia has had its share of Islamic extremist movements in the 1950s and early 1960s that demanded immediate application of the shari'a in the Indonesian constitution. In fact, the three Islamic parties, which presented similar claims for the application of the *shari'a*, were defeated in the proceedings in the annual session of Indonesia's Assembly last month.

Indonesia believes strongly in the notion that Islam in Indonesia can be enriched by our encounter with globalization and through embracing a more liberal, tolerant, and inclusive interpretation of the Quran. Indonesian Islam remains confident of its syncretic blend with national and local traditions as well as with healthy eclecticism with liberating values of foreign cultures.

Most people in the Islamic community of Indonesia are convinced that a robust and self-confident dialogue with the polities, economies, and cultures of the West as well as of the East will enrich Indonesian Islam in peacefully coming to terms with social problems and of the urgency to undertake comprehensive economic and political reforms. Indonesia must undertake stronger efforts to provide sustenance to the vast majority of the poor—most of them Muslims—by providing basic human needs: improved health-care, education, and employment. Only if Indonesia provides greater social justice can Indonesian Islamic scholars, academics, ulama, and members of civic societies determine that post-September 11, 2001, mainstream Islam in Indonesia will not be hijacked by a perverted ideology that refuses to come to terms with the need to reshape a world vastly different from the time of Islam's birth so many centuries ago.

Part 6

Some Remarks on
Obstacles and Solutions
in Search of a New World
Civilization

Clash and Dialogue
in the New World of Noopolitik
(Globalized Knowledge Politics)

John O. Voll

Introductory Note

This is a preliminary study. The first obstacle to finding so lutions in the search for a new world civilization is the need to recognize that the usual conceptualizations are part of the problem. In this paper, most of the effort has been to set a framework for reconceptualizing the situation in which humanity finds itself. Obstacles and solutions need to be correctly articulated before they can be understood and acted upon.

In a world filled with violence, famine, and disease, it is important to ask: what are the obstacles and solutions in the search for a new world civilization? In seeking answers, it is equally important to think in terms of the actual existing conditions of the contemporary world at the beginning of the twenty-first century and not try to impose concepts and programs from an earlier age. Reimposition of the concepts and structures of a West-centered imperialist hegemony or nostalgic memories of past ages of power and glory will not provide the answers needed

for humanity in the new millennium.

The terrorist actions of September 11, 2001 are stark remind-
ers of the high stakes that are involved in trying to find solu-
tions to the major problems. The specific events and responses
highlighted the importance, within this broader global context,
of seeking understanding of the dynamics of relationships be-
tween Islam and the West. The interactions between the West
and Islam are an important part of the structure of contempo-
rary global affairs, and these interactions provide both obstacles
in the search for a constructive new ordering of world affairs
and possible lines of solutions. Without positive relations be-
tween Islam and the West, a constructive global network of
peoples and societies will not be possible.

Major lines of conflict and disagreement in the contempo-
rary world are sometimes defined in ways that make it more
difficult to find solutions to humanity's problems. In more spe-
cific terms, such definitions may be obstacles to improved rela-
tions between Islam and the West. A number of critical issues
need to be defined in ways that reflect contemporary realities
rather than older images and concepts. In particular, it is im-
portant to recognize that a number of basic lines of conflict are
not as they are sometimes defined. The fundamental issues do
not involve having to decide whether or not to accept globaliza-
tion or modernity, or choosing between Islam and the West, or
deciding between a world of peace and a world of war. The
redefinition of each of these issues provides a way of building
better relations between Islam and the West and of approach-
ing the search for a new world civilization.

Clash of Globalizations

The protests in recent years against the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and other international economic and finan-
cial institutions have brought to the world's attention people
who are seen as opposed to globalization. Demonstrations

against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999 are described as "the birthplace of the 'backlash against globalization'".[1] Organizers of major demonstrations in Seattle and elsewhere describe themselves as developing an "emerging alliance of progressive forces fighting globalization"[2] and actions in Seattle and Washington, DC, are described as "anti-globalization demonstrations" that were "remarkable victories for grassroots activism".[3]

Both supporters and opponents of the "anti-globalization" actions present the situation in terms that assume that "the tide of 'globalisation', powerful as the engines driving it may be, can be turned back".[4] Some analysts put this into a longer historical perspective of the ebb and flow of world trade in the past three or four centuries, and argue that "although it is often said today that globalization is irreversible, it proved very reversible early in this [twentieth] century. After economic integration reached a peak in the late nineteenth century, there was an astonishing retreat after the First World War and especially after the Great Depression".[5]

These perspectives identify globalization as something that can be chosen or rejected in general terms. However, this definition of globalization ties the term and the associated processes with a particular aspect of contemporary globalization, the global interconnections of market capitalism, with the critics arguing that globalization is, "in essence, the capitalist exploitation of weak nations".[6] Globalization is, however, a much broader set of developments that has been abstractly defined as a "social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding".[7] Put in more direct terms, globalization "implies greater connectedness and deterritorialization".[8] In terms of its impacts on societies, globalization is "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice

versa".[9]

Globalization is an important part even of what has been seen as reversals of globalization or anti-globalization. While the Great Depression involved a retrenchment of capitalist economic enterprises, the world historical phenomenon of the Great Depression was a major global event that both illustrated and increased the high level of globalization existing at that time.[10] The "anti-globalization" attacks on major multinational corporations and institutions show a similar situation. "As Debra Spar of the Harvard Business School points out, the activists have globalised faster than the firms they target".[11] Even the forces opposed to "globalization" have become effectively globalized.

Rather than a choice between accepting or rejecting globalization, the major lines of tension involves a "clash of globalizations", representing conflict between advocates of different visions of globalized futures. In the opposition to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998, for example, one scholar described the clash "between the type of globalization favored by investors and a newer type represented by electronically networked global civil society actors who oppose economic globalization".[12] A different vision of clashing globalizations presents a Manichean image of one mode of globalization representing "universal intervention, unilaterally decided by American leaders", involving world domination by the United States, in contrast to a second mode representing a globalized chaos created by terrorist attacks, "humanitarian disasters, or regional wars that risk escalation".[13] In this broader context, terrorism is, in many important ways "a product of globalization"[14] and creates networks and organizations that are as "global" as corporations like McDonald's. This anarchic matrix of global affairs is also a mode of globalization.

In the world of the "clash of globalizations", *jihad* is as globalized as McWorld.[15] The particularist revolt of the Chechens against the Russian "foreigners", for example, has drawn

Chechnya into the broader world of globalized *jihad*. Similarly, the local Zapatista revolt in Chiapas in southern Mexico became a part of the global network of groups supporting the economically exploited. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the major modes of globalization that are in competition create problems. The competition itself creates dangers on a global scale. Benjamin Barber, who articulated the conceptualization of "Jihad vs. McWorld", argues, "Neither *jihad* nor McWorld promises a remotely democratic future. On the contrary, the consequences of the dialectical interaction between them suggest new and startling forms of inadvertent tyranny that range from an invisibly constraining consumerism to an all too palpable barbarism".[16] Both globalizations create ob0stacles in the efforts to create a constructive new global ordering. The challenge becomes finding ways to encourage the modes of globalization that transcend the exploitations of the material globalization and the violence of particularist fanatics. This becomes a significant dimension of understanding the relations between the West and Islam since often each of them is simplistically identified with one of the clashing modes of globalization, the West being identified with hegemonic capitalism and Islam with particularist fanaticism. A widespread analytical framework utilizing the concept of "civilization" strengthens these erroneous identifications.

Civilizations and Noopolitik

The world of clashing globalizations presents a challenge to older conceptualizations of the nature of world interactions. It involves transformations, both in concept and in practical affairs, of the understanding of the nature of relations among fundamental units of human identity in the global arena. In particular, it represents a dramatic challenge to the conceptualization of world affairs as involving the relationships among vast human entities called "civilizations". Much of the analy-

sis for understanding world history and international relations for the past four centuries is built on the concept of "civilizations" and the new global conditions undermine the effectiveness of that analysis. This type of analysis has been used in recent years to describe the different modes of globalization.

Some have seen the mode of globalization that involves domination and hegemony as leading to and involving the "clash of civilizations". A contrasting mode of globalization has frequently been described as the "dialogue of civilizations". These two visions of globalized interactions provided the basis for much of the debate in the 1990s about the problems and prospects of the emerging structures of global interactions. The "clash of globalizations", especially as it related to the relationships between Islam and the West, took the form of a contest between visions of a globalized world order based on a concept of the inevitable "clash of civilizations" and visions based on the necessity of a globalized world order built on the "dialogue of civilizations".

Both of these clashing visions of globalization, however, are based on a conceptualization of world affairs as involving the interactions of "civilizations". Basing the vision of the future on the concepts of interactions of "civilizations" creates problems. In order to understand the obstacles in the way of creating a positive new global order, it is necessary to understand the structure of the "civilizational" perspective and how it creates difficulties for understanding the contemporary situation.

In the "civilizational" analysis, a civilization is "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species".[17] There are key elements that define civilizations, but of "all objective elements which define civilizations… the most important usually is religion… To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions".[18] In addition to the cultural-religious dimensions, civilizations had spe-

cific geographic locations and territories. "Civilizations, vast or otherwise, can always be located on a map".[19] Although civilizations may have shifting geographic and religious boundaries, they are conceived of as being distinct historical entities. For most accounts of world history, civilizations are the main unit of analysis and the key to the story.

The civilizational narrative thus became a natural framework for description and analysis of global interactions in the modern world. It became especially important for interpreting global relations in the era after the Cold War. Up to that point, the major conflicts, even if global in terms of theater, had frequently been wars fought by major powers within one civilization, the West. However, the conflicts of European imperial expansion, the First and Second World Wars, and then the great ideological clash between two Western ideologies in the Cold War were all in the past by the 1990s. In this new phase of world power politics, Samuel Huntington articulated a broad framework: "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic… The clash of civilizations will dominate politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future".[20]

While there are a number of civilizations discussed in the civilizational narrative of contemporary global conflict, "Islamic civilization" is the one viewed as most involved in conflict. Huntington asserted that "Islam has bloody borders"[21] and argued, for example, against applying diplomatic pressure on Russia for its suppression of the Chechens in 1999 because the war in Chechnya was "one of many conflicts along the borders of the great Islamic bloc stretching from Morocco to Indonesia" and was "one front among many in the contemporary global struggles between Muslim and non-Muslim peoples".[22]

In this line of analysis, the emerging great clash of civilizations was seen most significantly as the conflict between Islam and the West. This conceptualization was strengthened by a tendency to identify "the West" with "modernity". This identi-

fication then envisioned problems of modernization in the Muslim world as reflecting difficulties of Muslims' relations with the West in general and, especially, by the 1990s, the United States in particular. In identifying the "roots of Muslim rage", Bernard Lewis noted, "the struggle of the [Islamic] fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism… The war against modernity… is directed against the whole process of change that has taken place in the Islamic world in the past century or more".[23] However, in this analysis, modernity is identified with the West in the historic global interactions, so Lewis concludes that:

> We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations — the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.[24]

The clash in this analysis is not just a war with "fundamentalists". It is a conflict between whole civilizations and religious traditions, as Huntington made clear: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam… The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the US Department of Defense. It is the West".[25]

This civilizational vision gives little attention to the profound transformations created by the processes of globalization. In this mode of analysis, the dynamics of world history in the twenty-first century are described as being fundamentally the same as in the past and are presented in a civilizational narrative. In this view of history, civilizations rise and fall, and are replaced by new dominant civilizations. "In such a perspective, cultural innovation is not and never has been the monopoly of any one region or people… In every era of human history, modernity, or some equivalent term has meant the ways, norms, and standards of the dominant and expanding civilization".[26] Although modern Western civilization has the distinction of

being "the first to embrace the whole planet, … there have been other dominant civilizations in the past; there will no doubt be others in the future.[27] In the description of events presented by the "civilizational" analysts, for example, if appropriate changes and reforms are completed in Middle Eastern societies, people in the region "can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization".[28] In the end, regardless of globalization, the future, from this perspective, is tied to regionally and religiously separate civilizations that will interact and probably inevitably clash as they have in the past. This is the old civilizational story extended into the future with little hope of a single "new world civilization". The old civilizational narrative denies the possibility of a single "world civilization" and it is an obstacle to understanding the new global order that is in reality emerging.

The "clash of civilizations" conceptualization provides little to explain the dynamics of globalization other than to assert that "the dominant civilization is Western, and Western standards therefore define modernity",[29] with the assumption being that since globalization is an aspect of modernity, globalization simply means the spread of Western domination in ways similar to other civilizational expansions. However, there are many reasons for arguing that "the West" and "modernity" are not the same.[30] In the conditions of globalization of the past century, "multiple modernities" developed when themes that were initially couched in European terms found resonances in the traditions of many world societies.[31] Even extremist religious and cultural fundamentalist movements develop their own "modernities" as they "promulgate distinct visions of modernity formulated in the terms of the discourse of modernity, while attempting to appropriate modernity in their own terms".[32] The creation of multiple modernities is the result of the profound impact of globalization on both the West and the other premodern traditions. It involves a major reorientation of perspec-

tive. "The de-Westernization of modernity involves the grow-ing diversification of the visions and understanding of moder-nity, of the basic cultural agendas of different sectors of modern societies, far beyond the homogenic and hegemonic visions of modernity that were prevalent in the 1950s".[33]

The new world of multiple modernities is not simply a new version of civilizations in conflict in which there are "several closed civilizations which constitute continuations of their re-spective historical pasts and patterns".[34] Instead, a whole new matrix of interacting modernities creates vast global networks of contacts, involving the "greater connectedness and de-terri-torialization" of contemporary globalization.[35] These interact-ing modernities have "undermined the old hegemonies" and involve the "development of new multiple common reference points and networks".[36] In this context, the old concepts of closed civilizations interacting are irrelevant and can lead to danger-ous misunderstandings of the nature of contemporary global relationships.

Many observers have struggled to develop an appropriate terminology for discussing the contemporary world of global-ization and multiple modernities, in what might be thought of as the "post-civilization" age.[37] The key features of the current world represent significant changes even in the concepts of in-ternational relations. Increasingly it is recognized, as noted by Jeffrey D. Sachs, that the world is "quickly shifting from a model in which wealth was derived mainly from exploiting resources. 'Most growth now comes from increased knowledge, not the mining of nature.'"[38] In strategic planning, there is recognition "that 'information' and 'power' are becoming increasingly in-tertwined. Across many political, economic, and military areas, informational 'soft power' is taking precedence over traditional, material 'hard power'".[39] Although old style power politics are not disappearing, new realities are changing the bases of power. Politics and policies based on products of the mind (*noos*), that is, "based on ideas, values, and ethics transmitted through soft

power", are the basis for a new mode of politics, *noopolitik*, which contrasts with old style *realpolitik* ("politics based on practical and material factors").[40] The key to power in the contemporary world is knowledge and information. Viewing global relationships within the framework of noopolitik provides a better hope for understanding the obstacles and solutions for conflicts in the emerging world order than is provided by the civilizational paradigm. It is a world of the clashing globalizations and multiple modernities in a post-civilization era.

Religion and "Civilization" in the World of Noopolitik

The heart of the new global relationships is the importance of knowledge and information. Already in the 1950s, Peter Drucker argued that humanity had entered a new, "post-modern" age in which "the foundation of power is knowledge".[41] By the 1990s, the implications of the great transformations were becoming clear in the dynamics of globalization. In economic terms, knowledge became "the only meaningful resource… The traditional 'factors of production'—land, (i.e., natural resources), labor, and capital—have not disappeared, but they have become secondary. They can be obtained, and obtained easily, provided there is knowledge".[42] The fact that "knowledge has become *the* resource… changes—fundamentally—the structure of society. It creates new social and economic dynamics. It creates new politics".[43]

Globalizations and the transformations of knowledge create increasingly interactive networks of information and human relations. These vast networks have been described in terms first used by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. As early as the 1920s, Teilhard de Chardin discussed the formation in human history of "an added planetary layer" outside of and interacting with the geosphere and the biosphere which was "an envelop of thinking substance, to which, for the sake of convenience and

symmetry, I have given the name of the Noosphere" (from *noos*, "mind").[44] In this sphere of knowledge, the "total of what is known by the human race is far larger than the contents of any one mind. Yet because of our capacity to communicate the sphere of knowledge does act as a total system".[45] By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the added density of communications and information-creation and exchange resulting from the development of computers and global electronic communications networks has made the noosphere a vital and possibly central part of world affairs. Noopolitik is the policy framework for operating in the world of globalized knowledge networks, the noosphere.

Distinctive cultural traditions are reflected in the variations of the multiple modernities, but these traditions no longer represent separate, isolatable "civilizations". In the middle of the eighteenth century, the profound dynamics of the modern era began the transformation of global human life. "Within one-hundred and fifty years, from 1750 to 1900, capitalism and technology conquered the globe and created a world civilization. Neither capitalism nor technical innovations were new; both had been common, recurrent phenomena throughout the ages, in West and East alike. What was brand new was their speed of diffusion and their global reach across cultures, classes, and geography".[46] This new "world civilization" was not the same type of entity as a "civilization" as defined by scholars like Huntington or used in the "civilizational narrative" of world history.

The "world civilization" is not defined by specific religion, ethnic tradition, or geographic location. It has been described by Alvin and Heidi Toffler as a supercivilization, a general definition of a type of human society rather than particular examples of that type. "A civilization is an entire, all-encompassing [particular][47] way of life; a supercivilization might be described as a way of life that is shared widely across cultures, languages, religions, ethnic groups, and states".[48] In human history, within

this perspective, there have been two great supercivilizations or transcultural lifestyles that have emerged and a third is now in the process of emerging. The first great supercivilization provided the framework for the historic separate "civilizations". It began with the Agricultural Revolution (perhaps 10,000 years ago) and was reshaped by the developments of urban style societies as the foundations for the separate "civilizations". In the past three or four centuries, this agrarian-urban way of life or supercivilization faced the dramatic challenge of the new style of society associated with the Industrial Revolution. The clash and competition between the two supercivilizations became a main theme in the early processes of globalization. By the late twentieth century, it was clear that a third, new supercivilization was emerging, based on the transformation of the power of knowledge. To combine the conceptualizations of the Tofflers and Teilhard de Chardin, the emerging "world civilization" of the twenty-first century is the new supercivilization that represents the structures and networks of globalized knowledge, the noosphere.

In this new world civilization, the great historic conflicts are between the grand modes of human organizations, the supercivilizations, not the remnants of the old "civilizations" whose foundations were in the first, the agrarian-urban supercivilization. The new supercivilization leaps over older boundaries of physical geography and traditional civilizational identities. People whose origins are in all of the different world religions and old-style civilizations are on all sides of the new identity boundaries and conflicts. As in the clash of the first two supercivilizations, "the creators and inhabitants of this latest supercivilization share more with one another, even at a distance, than with the members of the two older supercivilizations. They may have more in common with an email contact in Vancouver or Hong Kong than with the blue-collar worker next door — let along the peasant left behind in one of history's backwater regions. Software moguls, investors, knowledge workers,

scientists, computer gurus, entrepreneurs, and entertainment providers—and the hackers and crackers who prey on them—form the core of the new way of life".[49] One does not have to be European or North American, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, to be a part of the new supercivilization; the old identifications are not inherent in the new.

Relations between Islam and the West are an important part of the noopolitik of this new world supercivilization. There are conflicts and tensions as well as dialogue, but the most significant dimensions are less related to the millennia-old structures of Muslim-Christian relations than they are to the issues of interactions between the modes of life represented by the two historic and the newly emerging supercivilizations of global human experience. For almost a millennium and a half, Islam and the West can be viewed as two civilizations interacting in conflict and dialogue. However, the new global conditions make it essential to recognize that neither "Islam" nor "the West" are simply two separate "civilizations".

In the era of the agrarian-urban supercivilization, Islam provided the foundation for one of the regional specific "civilizations" of that era, along with other major particular civilizational traditions, like China, India, and the European West. However, by 1500 CE, "the world of Islam" extended far beyond the cultural and geographic boundaries of the regional "Middle Eastern-Islamic civilization". Islam had become an important part of other particular civilizations and non-urban societies stretching across the Afro-Eurasian landmass from West Africa through the Balkans and Central Asia to China and the islands of the western Pacific basin. Islam, as an historical entity, was no longer simply the foundation for a separate regional civilization; it had become a transcivilizational repertoire for expression of a wide variety of cultures within the frame of the Islamic monotheistic tradition.[50] It represented a significant alternative world system to the capitalist world-system centered in Western Europe described by Immanuel Wallerstein as developing

in the early modern era.[51] In the sixteenth century, it is possible to speak of competing world systems in the age of the beginning of globalizations. At the beginning of the modern era of globalization, there was already a clash of globalizations that transcended the older interactions and conflicts among regional particular civilizations.

Similarly, in this interaction, "the West" is also not functioning in global interactions as a separate particular civilization. One might see it, in Wallerstein's terms, as a developing world-system that was globalizing in nature. It was also, in Toffler's terms, the first large-scale human society to experience the transformations of the emergence of the urban-industrial supercivilization. Often the expansion of this second supercivilization was misperceived as simply being a process of the expansion of "Western civilization", when, instead, traditional Western civilization may have been the first particularist civilization to be dissolved by the globalizing forces of emerging global modernity. The "West" represents in modern history not a "civilization" in the traditional terms; it is a developing mode of society articulated in the terms and definitions, initially, of industrial modernity.

Understood in this perspective, the clashes and dialogues between Islam and the West in the past two to three centuries have not been clashes and dialogues of "civilizations". Instead, they represent the interactions of two transcivilizational operational modes and visions of societal and moral order in the context of first, the globalization of the Industrial Revolution, and now the globalization of knowledge or the emerging world of noopolitik.

In the first of these sets of interactions, material dimensions of human life and society were the most significant as the economic and material foundations for the urban-industrial supercivilization were being laid. Power was built on control of material resources and capacity to mobilize physical force to establish that control. Classically, in international relations, it

was the world of the realpolitik of the Westphalian era, reaching a climax with the European imperialist domination of the world by the beginning of the twentieth century. In the emerging global industrial society, issues of control of the means of production and justice in distribution of material wealth helped to define the basic issues of conflict. Muslims and Westerners fought over control of territory, resources, and wealth, while at the same time, frequently cooperating in reforming and restructuring social and political orders in the Muslim world. Both in clash and in dialogue, these interactions were not simply interactions between two separate "civilizations" that would maintain their distinct separateness, despite the interaction. The interactions involved new modes of societal, economic, and political structures that were transforming societies in both the West and the Muslim world.

In the emerging urban-industrial supercivilization, "there developed a tendency to universal, world-wide institutional and symbolic frameworks that have been new and practically unique in the history of mankind".[52] This provided new ideologies both for support of the new controlling institutions and for opposition to them. In this context, the older religious foundations for worldviews seemed to be of decreasing importance. Analysts could write, "the major transformation that has occurred concomitantly with modernity [i.e., the urban-industrial supercivilization] has been the growing secularization of the centers, the non-acceptance of the status quo of their contents or symbols, and the spread of the assumption that these contents and symbols can indeed be re-examined anew".[53]

This seemingly inevitable "secularization" of modern society opened the way for interpreting the relationships between Islam and the West as a clash between Islam and modernity. However, such interpretations misread the underlying dynamics of the emergence of multiple modernities rather than a series of carbon copies of Western-style industrial societies around the world. "In the belief systems of societies undergoing a pro-

cess of transformation in the modern era, tradition does not represent a pole that is abandoned during the progressive movement towards its opposite, but rather an element that plays dynamic and crucial roles in the very evolution of this process".[54] As a result, even in the interactions of Islam and the West in the context of the globalization of urban-industrial society, it is possible to identify "multiple modernities" in which Islam and Western-style modernity are complementary as well as competitive.

The conflicts and syntheses of the global urban-industrial supercivilization are themselves being transformed in the new world context of noopolitik and globalized knowledge as the base for power. Already by the early 1980s, it was apparent to many analysts that the nature of relations both within emerging post-industrial societies and globally was changing significantly. In the "old" politics, competition and conflict had involved issues of material welfare, distribution of economic goods, and those issues that had helped to create the twentieth century welfare state. Scholars noted "the thematic change from 'old politics,' which revolve around questions of economic, social, domestic, and military security, to 'new politics.' This entails problems of quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, participation, and human rights".[55] Jürgen Habermas summarizes the change: "The question is not one of compensations that the welfare state can provide. Rather, the question is how to defend or reinstate endangered life styles, or how to put reformed life styles into practice. In short, the new conflicts are not sparked by "problems of distribution", but concern for the "grammar of forms of life".[56] One important dimension in the rise of new movements and awareness in the late twentieth century was "the emergence of new value priorities" and the recognition that "postmaterialist values underlie many of the new social movements".[57] These values represent a significant change in value priorities. "In the takeoff phase of industrial revolution, economic growth was the central problem. The postmaterialists

who have become increasingly numerous in recent decades place less emphasis on economic growth and more emphasis on the non-economic quality of life. … It is not that the postmaterialists reject the fruits of prosperity — but simply that their value priorities are less strongly dominated by the imperatives that were central to early industrial society".[58]

While much of this analysis began with the examination of the transformations of Western industrial societies, it reflects the broader transformations of the emergence of the knowledge society and the global dynamics of noopolitik. In both the West and in many other parts of the world, especially the world of Islam, the new dynamics reflect what is commonly called the "resurgence of religion" in general and the "resurgence of Islam" in particular. Throughout history, it has been "religion" that has been the key in defining the "grammar of the forms of life". In an information-knowledge age "that emphasizes the primacy of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics",[59] it is not surprising that "religion" is seen as having a crucial role in defining policy and action alternatives.

Religion becomes an important dimension of the clashes and dialogues of noopolitik. However, this does not involve the old-style interactions of civilizations, each of which are somehow defined by "a religion". In an era when knowledge is the base of power and competition is in a context post-materialist priorities and the broadest clash is between supercivilizations, not "civilizations", the role of "religion" is also changed. Some of the most important clashes are within "religious traditions" and some of the most important syntheses and cooperation cross old religious boundaries. In every society, those trying to maintain an exclusive mode of defining priorities and who demand hegemonic control for a particular mode of societal operation are in constant conflict with those who recognize the necessity of an open, pluralist set of priorities for a healthy world order in the age of knowledge and noopolitik.

Islam and the West: Dynamics of Noopolitik

In a world of multiple modernities and the clash of globalizations, it is clear that "knowledge, more than ever, is power".[60] There are clashes and conflicts but they are not between civilizations; they are between alternative visions of organizing and controlling information. In these clashing visions, one of the most important lines of division is between those who argue within the framework of old-style realpolitik and those operating conceptually within the framework of noopolitik. In this context, realpolitik, in international relations "may be defined as a foreign-policy behavior based on state-centered calculations of raw power and the national interest, guided by a conviction that might makes right".[61] Noopolitik, in contrast, is "foreign policy behavior and strategy for the information age that emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics. Noopolitik is guided more by a conviction that right makes for might, than the obverse".[62] In the world of information-power, the structure of effective operational units is changing. The "information revolution is impelling a shift from a state-centric to a network-centric world".[63]

In this vast interacting global noosphere, the generic distinction between "Islam" and "the West" is one of increasing irrelevance, except in the minds of religious fundamentalists and old-fashioned *realpolitik* pundits. In broad terms, the conflicting globalizations of the new world supercivilization represent two unlikely and often unconsciously allied formations of forces.

In both the Muslim world and the West, perceived in non-territorial and non-civilizational terms, there are vigorous and sometimes violent advocates of exclusivist and hegemonic modes of globalization. Among these groups there is an unconscious, shared consensus that Islam and Christianity or Islam and the West are mutually exclusive and that any effort to see commonalities reflects the seductive evil of relativist modernity.

To a remarkable degree, more radical fundamentalist Christian clerics like the Reverend Franklin Graham and older, established Islamic fundamentalist groups provide support for each other's views by emphasizing the alleged evil of recognition of commonalities. This exclusivist view emphasizes the need for homogeneity in culture and society and actively opposes trends toward diversity and pluralism both in domestic and global contexts. This position also tends to perceive the structures of human society in relatively hierarchical terms and is state-centric both in program and concept.

This is especially true among Muslim fundamentalists, who frequently articulate their programmatic goals in terms of the establishment of an "Islamic state" and see the state as the agency for implementation and enforcement of "Islamic Law". In many ways this state-centric vision represents the adoption of the Western conceptual model that these Muslim groups claim to be opposing. These exclusivist visions are not conservative; they actively seek to transform social and global realities. They are not anti-modern in the old Luddite sense of desiring and working for a return to medieval conditions and perceptions. They have a reshaped vision of modernity, which provides the basis for their programs of action aimed at creating a homogeneous world defined by their exclusivist ideology. Globalization provides the inspiration for the hope of the conversion of all of humanity to the particular faith that grounds the specific exclusivist vision.

The alternative vision for the new world society is inclusivist, recognizing the strength and power of multicultural syntheses in the contexts of modern experience. No single "traditional" worldview (or modern universalist political ideology) is seen as providing the necessary vision. Many recognize that society in the urban-industrial supercivilization is both organizationally and intellectual diverse. In the 1980s, Bassam Tibi, for example, argued that the "industrialization of a society means the functional differentiation of its social structures, and for its sys-

tem of religion this means secularization".[64] However, secularization, as understood by Tibi, was different from the process normally described by advocates of old-style modernization theory. In his view, "secularization does not mean the abrogation of religion, because in a functionally differentiated system religion merely takes on social significance of a different nature and thus maintains meaning".[65] While this type of vision opposes the fundamentalist vision of specific religions (whether Islam or Christianity) as necessarily hegemonic in their particular forms, it recognizes that "industrial society… is not in contradiction to the preservation of religion as an ethic".[66] In this broader framework, an inclusive openness becomes a crucial characteristic of the vision that is the alternative to that of the fundamentalists.

The exclusivist and inclusivist visions deserve much fuller description and analysis. They each represent highly diverse groupings of peoples, movements, and conceptualizations. In the emerging world ordering of the twenty-first century, however, they also represent two relatively clear and competing modes of globalization. They represent the alternative core visions of the clash of globalizations. This, and not the so-called "clash of civilizations" is the crucial conflict of the coming era. Modernity has the potential for creating absolutist authoritarian regimes and social orders, as well as pluralist democratic ones. The emerging "multiple modernities" of the contemporary world are not just defined by different, longstanding cultural traditions. There is also the more generic multiplicity, which divides modernities into authoritarian modernities and pluralist modernities.

This context provides an important framework for consideration of the obstacles and solutions in the search for a new world "civilization". The choice is not between having a globalized world order or not. The alternatives are rather, whether that emerging world order of the twenty-first century will be primarily conflictual, authoritarian, and violent or will be a more

inclusive, pluralist, and constructive. The "obstacles" and "solutions" must be viewed within that framework.

Obstacles and Solutions in the Emerging World Order

The dynamics of noopolitik create challenges for the development of a constructive and non-violent world order. Often people have an unrealistic vision that a "world civilization" is inevitably positive and the emergence of the noosphere means an end of really significant conflict. Similarly, it is often assumed that "soft power" is inevitably benevolent power. However, noopolitik is a method and framework, not content for program. Knowledge can be used to control and suppress peoples as well as to free them.

Important changes are taking place in the nature of conflict itself in the global arena. "The information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the spectrum. … As the information revolution deepens, the conduct and outcome of conflicts increasingly depend on information and communications".[67] The structure of actors and the nature of conflicts take new forms. "Information-age threats are likely to be more diffuse, dispersed, multidimensional nonlinear, and ambiguous than industrial age threats".[68] Increasingly, the network organizational format is becoming the most effective structure for mobilizing power in the age of knowledge-based power.

The stark tragedy of the acts of terrorist destruction on September 11, 2001, emphasizes the importance of recognizing the realities of the changing nature of conflicts. In the conflict of which the 9-11 actions were a part, there is "a major confrontation between hierarchical/state and networked/non-state actors".[69] In the clash of globalizations, the destruction of the World Trade Center showed that the exclusivists, utilizing the methods of violence, had already gone beyond the old-style conflict methods of state-supported terrorism and are capable of

effective action in the era of noopolitik.

In at least one important dimension, a major obstacle to a constructive world order is the effectiveness of exclusivist terrorists in engaging in "netwars" as a strategy in the world of noopolitik. Analysts of "netwars" suggest that there are "five levels of theory and practice that matter: the technological, social, narrative, organizational, and doctrinal levels. A netwar actor must get all five right to be fully effective".[70]

From the perspective of the relations between Islam and the West, the "narrative" level is of great importance. The major visions of the future involve significant narratives that identify the foundations for legitimacy and the inspiration for actions. In the noopolitik of netwars, networks "are held together by the narratives, or stories, that people tell. The kind of successful narratives that we have in mind are not simply rhetoric… Instead, these narratives provide a grounded expression of people's experiences, interests, and values".[71] Narratives provide the ways that people, movements, and governments frame their methods and goals. As the narratives are articulated, they utilize repertoires of images and symbols from within the experiences of the target audiences.[72]

In the current clashes of globalizations and modernities, the competing narratives are based on the available repertoires of mobilization. "Particular groups have a particular history—and memory—of contentious forms. Workers know how to strike because generations of workers struck before them; Parisians built barricades because barricades are inscribed in the history of Parisian contention; peasants seize the land carrying the symbols that their fathers and grandfathers used in the past".[73] It is not surprising that in the conflict of which the destruction of the World Trade Center is part the combatants would present narratives framed in the familiar repertoires. In the current conflict, "at the narrative level, there is a broad contention of Western liberal ideas about the spread of free markets, free peoples, and open societies versus Muslim convictions about the exploitative,

invasive, demeaning nature of Western incursions into the Islamic world".[74] This is not, however, a clash of civilizations nor a conflict between medieval and contemporary mindsets;[75] it is part of the conflicting narratives seeking to define the nature of relations in the emerging global order.

The real clash is between those modes of policy and action demanding an exclusivist resolution to conflict and the more pluralist modes that are shaped by the demands for openness in the new world where knowledge is power. This is a world in which "soft power" is of increasing importance, with "soft power" being "the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion".[76] Utilizing soft power in the current globalized context means to be able to present a narrative vision of the world's future that can appeal to a global rather than simply a particular cultural or societal audience.

"Solutions" come when the narratives themselves are inclusive. Some analysts note that the "new political and technological landscape is ready-made for the United States to capitalize on *its* formidable tools of soft power, to project the appeal of *its* ideals, ideology, culture, economic model, and social and political institutions".[77] However, reducing tensions in the relations between Islam and the West in the new global context will need to go beyond having the United States project the appeal of *its* ideals. This simply puts one local narrative in competition with another local narrative, that of extremists like Osama bin Laden who use the repertoire familiar to Muslims of the world to present a narrative of necessary militant *jihad*.

The soft power narrative of the United States has substantial global appeal. However, in the netwar against terrorism, the most effective soft power narrative will be one that brings together inclusive visions from both the West and the world of Islam and rejects exclusivist visions of both Western and Muslim origins. This will require a major effort to transcend the immediate clashes by engaging in real dialogue. Such dialogue

demands that those seeking solutions recognize their allies across the older civilizational boundaries.

Notes

[1] "Angry and Effective", *The Economist*, September 23, 2000, p. 85

[2] Vince Beiser, "Moving Toward a Movement?" *Mother Jones Magazine*, April 20, 2000, in magazine archive at http://www.motherjones.com.

[3] Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, "What We've Won", *Mother Jones Magazine*, April 21, 2000, in magazine archive at http://www.motherjones.com.

[4] "The Case for Globalisation", *The Economist*, September 23, 2000, p. 19.

[5] Nicholas D. Kristof, "At This Rate, We'll Be Global in Another Hundred Years", *New York Times*, May 23, 1999.

[6] Jagdish Bhagwati, "Coping with Antiglobalization", *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 1 (January/ February 2002), p. 4.

[7] Malcolm Waters, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 3.

[8] Waters, *Globalization*, p. 136.

[9] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 64.

[10] See, for example, the analysis in Dietmar Rothermund, *The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939* (London: Routledge, 1996).

[11] "Angry and effective", *The Economist*, September 23, 2000, p. 86.

[12] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p. 48, citing Stephen J. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations", *Foreign Policy*, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 97-109.

[13] Stanley Hoffmann, "Clash of Globalizations", *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 4 (July/ August 2002), p. 114.

[14] Hoffmann, "Clash", p. 112.

[15] This utilizes the terminology made popular by Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

[16] Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, p. 220.

[17] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 43.

[18] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 42.

[19] Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (trans. Richard Mayne; New York: Penguin, 1994), p. 9.

[20] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 22.

[21] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" p. 35.

[22] Samuel P. Huntington, "A Local Front of a Global War", *New York Times*, December 16, 1999.

[23] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, No. 3 (September 1990), p. 59.

[24] Lewis, "Roots", p. 60.

[25] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 217.

[26] Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 150.

[27] Lewis, *What Went Wrong?*, p. 150.

[28] Lewis, *What Went Wrong?*, p. 160.

[29] Lewis, *What Went Wrong?*, p. 150.

[30] John Obert Voll, "The Mistaken Identification of 'The West' with 'Modernity'", *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 13, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-12.

[31] S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities'", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, No. 3 (2000), pp. 507-98.

[32] Eisenstadt, "Reconstruction", p. 600.33 Eisenstadt, "Reconstruction", p. 609.

[34] Eisenstadt, "Reconstruction", p. 610.

[35] Waters, *Globalization*, p. 136.

[36] Eisenstadt, "Reconstruction", p. 610.

[37] For discussion of the "end of the era of civilizations", see John Obert Voll, "The End of Civilization is Not So Bad", *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 28, No. 1 (July 1994), pp. 1-8 and Robert Erwin, "Civilization as a Phase of World History", *American Historical Review* 81, No. 4 (July 1966), pp. 1181-98.

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[39] Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik*, p. ix.

[40] Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik*, pp. 4-5.

[41] Peter F. Drucker, *Landmarks of Tomorrow: A Report on the new "Post-Modern" World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 267.

[42] Peter F. Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1993), p. 42

[43] Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*, p. 45.

[44] Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Future of Man* (trans. Norman Denny; New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 163.

[45] Kenneth E. Boulding, Elise Boulding, and Guy M. Burgess, *The Social System of the Planet Earth* (Preliminary edition; Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1977), p. x.

[46] Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society*, p. 19.

[47] Word added by author for clarity in the context of this analysis.

[48] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, "Supercivilization and Its Discontents", *Civilization*, February-March 2000. For a more complete discussion, see Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating *a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995).

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[50] John Obert Voll, "Islam as a Special World-System", *Journal of World History* 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 213-26.

[51] For his description, see the following and subsequent volumes. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974).

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[53] Eisenstadt, "Introduction", p. 6.

[54] Shimon Shamir, "Historical Traditions and Modernity in the Belief-System of the Egyptian Mainstream". In: Eisenstatdt, *Patterns of Modernity*, Volume II, p. 116.

[55] Jürgen Habermas, "New Social Movements", *Telos* 49 (Fall 1981), p. 33.

[56] Habermas, "New Social Movements", p. 33. Emphasis in original.

[57] Ronald Inglehart, "Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements". In: *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*, ed. Russell J. Dalton & Manfred Knechler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 44-5.

[58] Inglehart, "Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization", p. 45.

[59] Arquilla & Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik*, p. x.

[60] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., & William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge", *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), p. 20.

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[64] Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (trans. Judith von Sivers; Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), p. 127.

[65] Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, p. 131.

[66] Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, p. 145.

[67] John Arquilla & David Ronfledt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 1.

[68] Arquilla & Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. 2.

[69] Arquilla & Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. 364.

[70] Arquilla & Ronfledt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. x.

[71] Arquilla & Ronfledt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. 328.

[72] For a discussion of the concept of "repertoire" in this kind of situation, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 30-1.

[73] Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p. 21.

[74] Arquilla & Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. 365.

[75] Here I disagree with the analysis of Arquilla & Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*, p. 365

[76] Nye & Owens, "America's Information Edge", p. 21.

[77] Nye & Ow0000ens, "America's Information Edge", p. 29 (emphasis added).

The Clash of Ideologies:
Secularism versus Islamism

M. Amin Abdullah

The history of humanity has already entered its third millen nium since the birth of Jesus Christ. Much progress has been achieved: more luxurious facilities have been added, more computer and digital equipment have been invented, and more mobile transportation has been refined. Nevertheless, human beings suffer and are seriously perplexed by the violence they experience in their daily life, such as conflicts among ethnic groups, clashes between religious affinities, quarrels between neighboring countries, wars between nations, and unfair rivalries between East and West increasingly become the headlines of regional, national, and international electronic media and daily newspapers. What is the destiny of humanity living on this planet in this new millennium? Will it survive until the end of the third millennium? What should be done to minimize and reduce violence and to defend the dignity of humanity?

Events in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s and recently the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, remind people that prob-

lems of identity are not limited to the Middle East, Africa, or Southeast Asia. Is there one single country where the problems of multiple identities have been thoroughly and permanently solved? Canada, the United States, Europe, Great Britain would all have difficulty making such a claim. The clash between cultural identities and political order, both national and international, has been sharpest in the third world and in predominantly Muslim countries. The reasons for this lie embedded in the history of Islam and in the history of the West. This international seminar on Islam and the West one year after September 11 would have all of us understand these histories as a means towards reconciling the universal with the particular, the oneness of human experience with the diversity of beliefs and identities that constitute the modern world.

For that purpose, it is not sufficient in the post-colonial era to maintain a dichotomous way of thinking, using concepts such as Western and non-Western, familiar and alien, us and them, modern and primitive, modernity and traditionality, Islam and Christianity, developed and underdeveloped, Northern and Southern, and so forth.[1] This dichotomous thinking is the source of much of the the sufferings and difficulties we face in our present-day world. To reduce them and to be more humane, we need to study Eastern and Western culture simultaneously. If we do not, cultural, religious, ethnic, and racial prejudice will be sustained which will endanger the sustainability of human life on this small planet forever.

As we know from world history, the West knows the East. It co-opted and dominated it through exchange trade and political intervention during the time of imperialism and colonialism, and also from its social–anthropological scientific approach through Oriental studies. It is time now for the East to study the West not in the same way as the West did, but from a critical and humanistic social scientific approach through Occidental studies. The new world civilization after September 11 should not constitute separate cultural entities such as between the

East and the West, or the domination of the West over the East as is presently the case. Furthermore, this new world civilization should not use the jargon of "globalization" awareness and sensitivity as its fundamental mode of thought. This new world civilization should prefer to use the cultural term "co-existence" between nations, religions, ethnicities, and races. In this way, Orientalism and Occidentalism should not treated as separate entities as we do academically and culturally today, but as a single coin with two sides.

In the era of "co-existence" the way of thinking that should be promoted is what people in religious studies mean by saying: "to be religious today is to be inter-religious". By the same token, to be Western or Eastern today means to be fully conscious of the intricate interplay between West and East in all fields of life: religiously, economically, socially, culturally, scientifically, and technologically.

The ideology of "globalization" as is widely and strongly promoted by Western countries today tends to repeat the logical and cultural fallacy of the former heydays of colonialism and imperialism by using competitiveness, rigidity, exclusiveness, dominant interests, hierarchy, conflict, and win-lose scenarios as its primary parameters to deal with, and to treat other nations and countries, while the ideology of "co-existence" — suggested to be a new worldview in the new world civilization — emphasizes the need for mutual understanding, reciprocity, co-operation, suppleness, inclusiveness, symmetry, transformation, and win-win scenarios.[2]

Secular Globalization

Ever since the Renaissance increasing devotion to secularity, rationality, and universalistic ideals has marked the history of the West.[3] Despite countercurrents of romanticism, nihilism, and postmodernism, the West continues to propose a single, rational way of organizing the economy (the market), a single

way of organizing the polity (liberal-democratic), and a single way of doing science (empirical).

The intricate interplay between economy, polity, and science is expertly shown in the age of information technology by using the term "globalization" as the new ideology, or the new religion if you like. Globalization, as it is formulated and presented today, is an invention of the North Atlantic countries, and the rest of the world can take it for granted that it is intended to enrich them further and enhance their domination of the world. They already dominate the world, of course, but they want to strengthen that domination to ensure that they will not be successfully challenged by the big East Asian countries let alone by the weak Muslim countries.

The dangerous and disastrous impact of rationalization and secularization in the area of international relations and politics is very obvious. Although American laymen citizens are relatively religious,[4] their political leaders are secular in the real meaning of the word. They are very proud for being called proponents of "liberalism", but they are insensitive to sustain the dignity of the human race and human beings in general.

Every American president since Franklin Roosevelt has regarded acts of war as the equivalent of "rites of passage". Roosevelt was inevitably embroiled in the Second World War, Harry Truman helped to initiate the Korean War; Dwight Eisenhower ended the Korean War but started planning for the Bay of Pigs operation on Cuba, John F. Kennedy unleashed the Bay of Pigs operation and helped to initiate the Vietnam War; Richard Nixon bombed Cambodia; Gerald Ford sent marines in a disagreement with Cambodia over the US cargo-ship, Mayaguez; Jimmy Carter attempted to thwart the Iranian revolution and paid heavily for it; Ronald Reagan perpetrated acts of war in Lebanon, the Caribbean, Libya and in shooting down a civilian airliner in the Persian Gulf; Bill Clinton led military action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo and bombed Sudan and Afghanistan; George W. Bush has already inherited a decade of

bombing Baghdad and subsidizing half a century of Israeli militarism against Palestinians. Now this younger Bush is about to embark or what he calls a "crusade against terrorism".[5]

The commander-in-chief has to "act presidential". The political constituency celebrates warrior-presidents. Heads of State shoot up in popularity with acts of war. And yet the United States hardly ever calls these engagements "acts of war". Even the war in Vietnam, which cost nearly sixty thousand American and millions of Vietnamese lives, was never officially declared by the United States. America needs to find more "rites of passage" for its leaders, particularly their political ones. The warrior president does not call his own military action *jihad*, but the rhetoric of "patriotism" used is not really different from the rhetoric of "piety".

Terrorism is getting globalized, but the definition of an "act of war" is not. Its definition is still highly selective, depending upon the power of the perpetrator or the status of the victim. For the immediate future it may also depend upon making sure that Osamaphobia does not degenerate into Islamophobia.

A Totalistic Islamism

The Islamic movement has developed over half a century, beginning more or less in 1940. Concepts have of course evolved, historical circumstances have changed, and splits and differences have brought diversity. Nevertheless, there is a conceptual matrix and a sociological base common to all groups.

According to Oliver Roy, seen from a sociological as well as from an intellectual point of view, the Islamist movements are products of the modern world. The militants are rarely products of religious learning institutions. They are young products of the modern educational system, and those who are public university educated tend to be more scientific than literary; they come from recently urbanized families or from the impoverished middle classes.

Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an "ideology", and it is a neologism, which they introduced, and which remains anathema to the `ulama` (the clerical scholars). They received their political education not in religious schools but in college or university campuses, where they rubbed shoulders with militant radical left wings, whose concepts they often borrowed (in particular the idea of revolution) and injected with Quranic terminology. For them taking control of the state will allow for the spread of Islam in a society corrupted by western values, and for the simultaneous appropriation of science and technology. They do not advocate a return to what existed before, as do fundamentalists in the strict sense of word, but a re-appropriation of society and modern technology based on politics.[6]

The claim of contemporary Islamist movements is that reason must be subordinate to faith. The contemporary resurgence of Islam—whether on the West Bank or in Iran, Algeria, or Egypt—follows not from the reformist premise of the incompatibility of Islam with Western reason but from the initial rejection of reason in the name of faith and the subsequent embrace of reason as a tool for confirmation, clarification, and administration of that faith. The hidden premise in much Islamist thought is their appeal for an explicit rejection of Western-centeredness and its replacement with a new, more rigorous, less tolerant version of Islam-centeredness. They presume to know who is or is not a "true Muslim" (the late president of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, and the late Shah of Iran from the part of politicians, and Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid from the part of Muslim scholars do not qualify as Muslims in their view), claiming a monopoly on truth.[7] Westerners and all those who would continue to espouse either Western ideas or diverse views of Islam are relegated to the margins. For some groups, no Muslim is a "true Muslim" who does not seek to fight against "false" Muslims. This tyranny of fight is no more acceptable than the tyranny of reason. What is the origin of this belief?

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It is in the contemporary quest for the "Islamic State" that we find the demise of the humanitarian spirit of Islam. Islam is an integrative worldview: that is to say, it integrates all aspects of reality by providing a moral perspective on every aspect of human endeavor. Islam does not provide ready-made answers to all human problems; it provides a moral perspective within which Muslims must endeavor to find answers to all human problems. However, Islamist movements have made the fundamental error of perceiving Islam as a "totalistic ideology"; and the pursuit of this ideology in the form of an Islamic State is supposed to provide solutions to all the problems Muslim societies are faced with. Indeed, in the pursuit of Islam the Islamic State has itself become an ideology. The Iranian State is clearly based on this assumption.[8] The reduction of the worldview of Islam to an ideology is, of course, a form of secularization. Once Islam, as an ideology, became the program of action of a vested group, it lost its humanity and became a battlefield where reason and justice were readily sacrificed on the altar of emotions and communalisms.

This ideology is the antithesis of Islam. It is an enterprise of suppression and not a force for liberation. Ideology ensures that mistakes and errors are perpetuated; Islam requires an open attitude where mistakes are freely admitted and efforts are made to correct them. Islam is not, and cannot be, molded into ideological boundaries.[9] The transformation of Islam into an ideology has had dire consequences for Muslims. The totalitarian version of Islam-as-a-state has transformed into metaphysics; in such an enterprise, every action can be justified as "Islamic" by the dictates of political expediency. It is not just Westerners who distrust and are alarmed by such a vision; it also disturbs enlightened Muslims.

The theological distrust of Muslims by Westerners or Christians concerns not so much the fundamental sources of Islam, the Quran, and the Sunna, but the judicial interpretation of the sources—*fiqh*, or classical jurisprudence. The legalistic ruling

of the classical *imams*, and their associated schools of thought, were space and time bound. However most islamist movements relegate this obvious reality.

The term *fiqh*, in its technical sense of jurisprudence, was not popular before the Abbasid period. The early formulation of *fiqh* was focused more on the practice of faith than on questions of jurisprudence. This can be proved by an examination of such works as *al-fiqh al-akbar* attributed to Imam Abu Hanifah (d. 150 AH), which deals exclusively with the basic tenets of Islam rather than with legal questions. There is nothing wrong with this aspect of *fiqh*, which focuses on matters of belief, prayer, and ritual. However, when *fiqh* assumed its systematic legal form during the era of the Abbasids, it incorporated three vital aspects of Muslim society of that period. At that time, Muslim history was in its expansionist phase, and *fiqh* incorporated that era's logic of imperialism. The *fiqh* rulings on apostasy, for example, derive not from the Quran but from this logic. Moreover, the world was simple and could easily be divided into black and white: hence the division of the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*.

What this means in reality is that when *fiqh* is applied in contemporary society, it throws up the contradictions which were inherent in its formulation and evolution. And the application of *fiqh* legislation out of the context of its time and out of step with ours, gives Muslim societies a "medieval" feel.

It is the post-Abbasid formulation of *fiqh* that has given rise to Christian and Western-in-general distrust of Muslims. It is here that the prejudices and biases of the expansionist age of Islam make their mark. Ibn Taimiyya, for example, recognizes that non-Muslims living in a Muslim country enjoy the protection of their rights as enshrined in the Quran and Sunna. But he adds his own view to the *shari'a* injunctions and advises Muslims to "humiliate them (the Christians), but to do no injustice to them". Given Ibn Taimiyya's stature, such a view can easily become part of the Islamic tradition, which is now vehemently

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defended by pious Muslims. But humiliating non-Muslims is not the only violation of their rights that has become part of post-Abbasid *fiqh*.[10]

The solution for such anomalies lies in distinguishing between *shari'a*, Islamic Law and *fiqh* as three distinct entities. *Shari'a* is a set of regulations, a set of principles, a set of values, which provides the Muslim community with eternal guidance. Basically, these principles and values can be grasped and appreciated intellectually by all human beings regardless of their nation, religion, race, and ethnicity. Islamic Law is what the Muslim community derives from the *shari'a*. In this particular sphere, one nation can be different from the other in conceptualizing, explicating, and executing its own specific law. *Fiqh* is what the classical Muslim jurists derived from the *shari'a* as appropriate laws for the time in which they lived.

A Muslim community, especially its scholars, needs to explore other possible alternatives, to evolve a new contemporary Islamic tradition, a *fiqh* of our time, that treats the fundamental sources of Islam, the Quran, and the Hadith, as an integrated whole.[11] Only the evolution of a body of Islamic Law that reflects the demands and the needs of our time would put Western and Christian distrust of Muslims permanently to rest.

Toward a Solution? Peace Journalism in the Era of Globalization

These hurdles add to the obstacles that both Westerners and Muslims have to overcome if they are to survive as dignified human beings and to cooperate in any meaningful joint venture. Both sets of cultures have to work hard to overcome the impasse of their respective histories and traditions, and both have to recognize that mutual respect means that each group inside the country has the right to be described, and understood, in terms of its own cultural concepts and categories. Both groups have to fight the imperialism of their own traditions and

move from servile conformity and apathetic non-commitment to a position where their worldviews are adoptative rather than ossified in a particular historic location. Western Christianity must end its marriage with secularism, and Islam needs to recover its lost humanity.

Nevertheless, what comes to mind in confronting the challenge of globalization is the role of the media, whether electronic or otherwise, in constructing and formulating the image and the public opinion about the West and Islam as separated cultural entities.

In Asia and in Arab countries, Western values and lifestyles—communicated via mass media—prove to be increasingly popular, so much so that there is a strong indication that their own cultural identity is in danger. According to their perception the Islamic world is about to lose its identity through a transformation heading to Western concepts of life and values through media. In that context, the September 11 attacks on the US and the military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq today have given many people in the world some reasons to redefine their position—often based on religious beliefs.

The re-embedding of cultural identities within local contexts has led—as we can see in Indonesia and many other areas—to the instrumental use of religion, in particular as a political instrument to mobilize voters, communicated through the media. Especially in times of crisis, many local media put their stakes on mobilizing the masses instead of seeking inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue and mutual understanding and cooperation. Serious complaints have also been addressed to the Western media by the Muslim world and vice versa. Since the media serves society, with self-observation, they can easily be used as propaganda tools to mobilize the masses for political purposes. On the other hand, the media could also contribute to the de-escalation of ethnical, cultural, and religious conflict. Within the global context, new approaches on media and conflict resolution—such as peace journalism—should be widely

and intensively discussed as an integral part of the comprehensive solutions in the new world civilization to come.

NOTES

[1] Marilyn R. Waldman, "Primitive Mind/Modern Mind: New Approaches to an Old Problem Applied to Islam" in Richard C. Martin (ed.), *Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies,* Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1985, pp. 94-5.

[2] Jim Torczyner, "Globalization, Inequality and Peace Building", *Social Work and Globalization,* special issue, July 2000, p. 127-31.

[3] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1988, chapter one. Robert D. Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity,* Colorado: Western Press, 1977, p. 192; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* New York: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 141-2.

[4] Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 27-8.

[5] Ali A. Mazrui, Ibid, p. 7.

[6] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* translated by Carol Volk, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999, p. 3.

[7] For Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid's case, see his work *Al-Tafkir fi Zamani al-Takfir: Didda al-Jahl wa al-Zaif wa al-Khurafa,* al-Qahira: Sina li al-Nashr, 1995. Also Al-Qahira, February 1996, pp. 538-42 and 581-96.

[8] Abdul Karim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential writings of Abdul Karim Aoroush,* Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri (ed.), Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000, especially part 9.

[9] Ziauddin Sardar, *Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come,* London: Mansel, 1985, p. 147.

[10] For a detailed elaboration on this particular issue, see Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim, "Shari'a and Basic Human Rights concerns", Charles Kurzman (ed.), *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 222-38.

[11] See e.g. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,* London: The University of Chicago, 1982. Muhammad Shahrur, *Al-Kitab wa al-Quran: Qira'a Mu'asira,* Damascus: al-Ahali li at-thiba'ah li an-nasyr wa at-tauzi', 1992.

Dialogue among Civilizations: In Search of a Just and Pluralistic World Order

Bassam Tibi

To conclude our common effort for bridging civilizations I propose to use Jürgen Habermas' "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" as a compass. As a Muslim I learned from him to call terms and concepts first into question before adhering to them. Other co-panelists talk about obstacles and solutions and see themselves committed to the search for a new "world civilization". The question at hand is, does such a thing as "world civilization" exist? And if so, what does it consist of? Is it global? Or is it only a vision as a cause of wishful thinking?

At this point I shall follow my co-panelist Mahmoud who said we should "start with the facts". He is a student of religion. I am a student of social science, but in this point we fully agree with each other. I am a secular Muslim who distinguishes between faith and knowledge, whereas Mahmoud is a scriptural Muslim. He is nevertheless reasonable and therefore we are in a position to reach an agreement in first looking at the facts. Now, what are the facts? Is a world civilization a fact?

Historically speaking the first world civilization in mankind's history is the civilization of Islam. When studying

Roman civilization we find that it was a Mediterranean civilization. If one deals with Chinese civilization it is clear that it was restricted to a geographical area. Only a civilization that claims to be valid for the entire world can be considered a "world civilization". In this understanding Islam is the very first world civilization that has existed. In fact, the first globalization that took place in history was the one launched by Islam in the seventh century. Some people consider globalization as a Western ideology and falsely restrict it to American hegemonial politics. Based on the assumption that any model implemented on the entire globe is an indication of globalization, the successful spread of Islam from the seventh until the sixteenth century was the first project of globalization in world history.

In terms of history then the first world civilization was the civilization of Islam. As a religion Christianity is older than Islam. It is a fact that Christianity has a universal face but the spread of the religion itself did not fit into the pattern of globalization. Some argue that Christians involved themselves in the crusades but the crusades were just battles to conquest Jerusalem, not the entire world. When Muslims from Damascus went to the Caliph of Baghdad asking for help against the crusaders, the Caliph was busy with other problems, because there were other invaders underway to Baghdad coming from Asia. He knew that the crusaders were not planning to invade Baghdad, so they posed no threat to him. Although we cannot call the globalization Christian, we surely can name it "Western". This global project began to emerge during the sixteenth century.

Therefore, the rise of the West challenged the globalization of the Islamic civilization. The historian Geoffrey Parker from the History Department at Cambridge University has thoroughly researched the rise of the West that began approximately 500 years ago. There has been competition between Islam and the West ever since. Both civilizations also share an intellectual history affecting one another. This was, of course, long before the United States became a hegemonial power.

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For five years, I was the director of the Dialogue Forum of the European Academy of Sciences. At that time, our patron was the Prince of Jordan. In his opening speech he said that Western civilization and the civilization of Islam have something to share. If both are willing to understand one another they will be on good terms. If they are unable to understand each other, but enforce their universalization against the universalization of the other instead, they are likely to be at war soon, be it *jihad* or crusade.

Islamic rationalism gave Hellenism an Islamic character. Hellenism was not only Greek any longer; it was not simply based on translation of the literature of Aristotle and Plato into Arabic either. Rather Plato and Aristotle became Islamic sources. And then again, Islam had an impact on the West, on the European Renaissance. In return, the rise of Islamic liberalism of Tahtawi and others in the nineteenth century was related to the impact of the West. I will come back to this mutual fertilization, but for now I would like to express that in my opinion that there is no "world civilization". We now live in the twenty-first century. Some fear that it will be the century of the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. To overcome this clash, however, we have to give up the idea of a world civilization in order to stop the competition for universal prevalence.

The notion of a world civilization is now being used by President George W. Bush. In the *Wall Street Journal* he was quoted to have said: "We are determined to fight for a world civilization", using the term in singular. Yet we should be talking about civilizations in plural. There is an Islamic civilization and a Western civilization and they are different from each other. But under the pressure to live with one another in peace, how can we establish bridges between both of them? The bridge is not to be found in the formula of a single world civilization. In terms of International Relations the bridge can only be a "world order". During the second half of the twentieth century there were two conflicting camps in world politics: the Communist and the

Capitalist. Nowadays we have one super power aiming at uni-lateral order designed by the United States. As much as I disfavor this kind of order on the one hand, I equally recognize the fact on the other that we face terrorism as an existing threat. I view terrorism as a scary reality and we have to fight it. But this fight should not be carried out by the United States unilaterally. There has to be a pluralistic approach to it. Europeans, Americans, and Muslims have to fight jointly against terrorism in order to ensure world peace. Therefore, we need a new world order. Terrorism is a kind of pattern I call irregular war, which is something we cannot cope with by using short-term strategies. There are structural causes of terrorism: some of them are related to injustice, others to the ideology of "jihadism". What we need in a globalized world is a just and pluralisitc world order. This has to be a just one, not only in terms of access to and distribution of resources, but also of power. We also need to enlighten the world about tolerant Islam, which does not approve of the violence of "jihadism".

Let me conclude by making four points.

First, there is no world civilization. It is not even possible to achieve it. What is possible is a civilizational world order. In history we find the Islamic world civilization from the seventh to the sixteenth century driven back by the rise of the West from the sixteenth century on to the present. Today, we need a pluralist world and to give up the idea of one world civilization.

Second, some panelists talk about constructivism. I am not a post-modernist, particularly for one reason: I follow Kant as much as I follow the Islamic rationalism of Al Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. I believe that there is something that you can describe as "objective reality". There is an objectivity that we can understand and have knowledge about. Post-modernists, however, argue that everything is constructed and based on a narrative. I refuse to believe this and therefore argue that civilizations are real, not constructed. When I come to Indonesia I feel at home being back to the Islamic civilization. I live in Europe.

When I visited Denmark I felt somehow alienated, even though I am a European citizen. For me, this is evidence for something that can be called the "world of Islam" as a civilization. This is not constructed. It is reality. The West is not a construct either. It is reality.

Third, in asking how Muslims and non-Muslims can establish a bridge between each other we find an idea in Islamic philosophy, which has been adopted by the Europeans and thus became very important for the European Renaissance. This idea finds its roots in Ibn Rushd and his *al-haqiqa al-muzdawaja* (dual reality). He separated knowledge based on revelation from knowledge based on reason. Indeed, philosophy is rational and based on reason; whereas religion is a belief for which reason it is "for the heart". There is a divine knowledge in the Quran, but the Quran is not an encyclopedia of sciences. In 1989, in an interview with Shaikh Al-Azhar I asked him about the fundamentalist claim that all original sciences are to be found in the Quran. He regarded this as dangerous for the Quran itself because scientific knowledge is based on the concept that you can either verify or falsify. But the Quran is to be believed in and not to be verified or falsified. Thus, we obviously have to separate knowledge from belief. This concept is not solely Western. You find this idea of secular knowledge in Islam. Hence, Islam and the West would be supposed to find a way to live in peace together.

Fourth, related to the second point I made, I would like to stress that there is a "threat perception", and there are realities. Both terrorism and the war on terrorism are real and perceivable. As a social scientist I believe that threat perceptions are being established. In my discipline, International Relations, we call this the "Perception and Misperception in International Politics" (Robert Jervis, 1976). So there are things that are real, but the way the observer perceives it can surely differ. Misperceptions can be the cause. In the objective world there is terrorism, which constitutes a threat to all of us. If you consider

the fact that fundamentalists killed more Muslims than Westerners (in Algeria 157 European were killed between 1992 and 2000 in contrast to 160.000 Muslims) you have to concede that there is a threat perception. We have to go beyond threat perceptions and establish bridges between one another.

I believe, for future peace we need mutual understanding, mutual respect, mutual tolerance, and pluralism. The point of departure is cultural and religious pluralism on the grounds of equality. This is my reason for admiring Indonesia and Pancasila. Here we find world religions on the grounds of equality. Democratic peace is the crucial thing we can look for. Let us forget about a new world civilization. Let us rather talk about a new world order based on justice and democratic peace in which cultural and civilizational pluralism and mutual respect determine how people of different religions live in peace with one another.

The Selling of Souls and the Shortness of Democracy: Reversing the Course of September 11 Discourses through the Universal Virtues of Politics

Mochtar Pabottingi

The attack on New York's World Trade Center was heinous and terribly cruel. All sane people would readily concur here and condemn the attack. And it is in the interest of present and future humanity that we have to exert lofty in our mental capacity to the utmost, first and foremost by scrutinizing and balancing our judgmental facilities from the outset. Only then could we not only prevent the repetition of such a tragedy but to overcome its root(s), namely the least eye-catching and yet world-systemic tragedies in many parts of the globe that must be counted as even much more massive over time. Also only then could we face the emerging signs of a turning point in world-wide opinion concerning the American response to that tragedy.

Rather than simply joining the rising chorus of questioning the real motives behind the acerbic rhetoric and hawkish actions of the White House since September 11, it is always wise to start first with our own position and behavior. The primitive

practice of black-and-white imposition and of judging ourselves solely on ideal terms while judging others solely on historical terms must be discontinued. Nobody, and no civilization, is wholly good under the cold eyes of history. Empathy, or better love, is equally a must in seeing others as it is in seeing ourselves. And it is always wise to remind ourselves that evil resides and incessantly works within each of us and it is the duty of all humankind to be constantly alert to keep it under control at all times.

Questioning the Antagonization

It is high time to terminate the antagonization of Islam and the West for two principal reasons. We know that each religion contains tenets concerning both worldly and transcendental matters. Across great religions there are substantial overlappings in tenets in worldly matters, which, I think comprise at least two thirds of the contents of all religious injunctions. But even in terms of other-worldly salvation, there is a significant variation of tenet-sharing between, for instance, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—a sharing which will certainly include Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism as soon as we delve deeper into the kernels of those great religions. Secondly, the bulk of contestations between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam or between Islam and Hinduism have much to do with their close historical proximity and concurrence—having claims upon the same lands, venerable sites, and worldly resources at about the same time.

The call to end our antagonizing habits holds true with respect to Islam *vis-à-vis* democracy, which blatantly ignores the important fact that the two belong to different categories. Islam is a system of belief whereas democracy is a system of government. We have sufficient evidence that democracy is culture-neutral, another fact that must be attributed to a parallel phenomenon in great religions: here too we find a substantial

overlap of values. We have ample arguments of the potentiality for Islam-democracy agreement in politics that are easily countered (though not necessarily invalidated) by counter arguments pointing to the poverty of democracy in Islamic countries.

But then, given such a myriad of determining factors in the making of our total history, a particular historical or political path does have to emerge from a system of belief, irrespective of its innate potentiality. We have come a long way in understanding that a Weberian explanation, or a Marxist one, is also tainted by serious ideological bias. This is not to mention the fact which was only recently re-emphasized by David Held, that strong democracies in the West tend to preclude the emergence of new democracies, particularly in developing countries through market offensives, which somehow echoes the thesis of dependency of the 1970s from Andre-Gunder-Frank and/or Samir Amin.

The Selling of the Souls

Antagonizing Islam and the West signals an extremely dangerous future. It is as totally inappropriate as it is both futile and potentially fatal worldwide. Rather than increasing the bitterness of antagonization (reminiscent of the remarks by figures like Ayatollah Khomeini, Oriana Fallaci, Sayyid Qutb, and Silvio Berlusconi), therefore, I am much more concerned with what I call "the selling of the souls" in the Faustian manner. Soul selling undermines both religious and democratic ideals.

Selling of the souls occurs when the deepest virtues of religions are captured and/or supplanted by evil motives and practices and/or when the enlightening rationality of democracy surrenders to the latency of the system's darkest predilections. As to the former, I sadly see the seeds of it planted in Indonesia by what I call "the emergency political format" of Soeharto's regime as from the mid-1960s, which began to reap its destructive consequences in the early 1990s. During the last six years this late stage of the political format has threatened to disinte-

grate the country.

Indonesia's soul selling is two-fold. One, as Indonesians are confronted with the original ideals of their nation. The other as, being mostly Muslims, they are confronted with the ideals of Islam. Indonesia the world is witnessing today is by no means the one envisioned by Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Soetan Sahrir — three of its greatest founders — that is stamped into and sheltered in the minds and psyche of millions of Indonesians for at least eight decades beginning in the 1920s. Only very few nations were blessed with enlightened nationalism — one that is only slightly tainted by chauvinism and xenophobia — which proclaimed theirs to be open lands where people can breathe and live freely and respectably, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or color; one that is as supportive to universal justice and humanity as it is to the imperative of its unity. The Indonesian conception of nationhood is among the closest that approximates one with the greatest potentiality for a positive symbiosis with democracy as explained by Rupert Emerson in 1960.

Now it would be extremely difficult for outsiders to perceive the signs of such a conception of nation(hood) or nation(alism). Horrific cases of ethnic and religious strive; widespread and unbridled corruption (among the top brass in the tree branches of the government); lawlessness virtually throughout the land; the trampling of human rights; a serious lack of national solidarity, as well as the ease and callousness with which Indonesians hurt and kill each other; and above all the stark absence of a sense of utter urgency as regards the abysmal multiplication of crises the country has been facing during the last six years certainly eclipses any evidence of the prevalence of such a national conception and entity.

All these simultaneously indicate bankruptcy in religious virtues and morality, that of Islam in particular. No exaggeration is meant to observe that many Indonesians, perhaps inadvertently and — over decades under the New Order — certainly stealthily, have sold their political, and even more, their reli-

gious ideals. Indonesians' soul selling in politics is intertwined with their soul selling in religious life. The perpetrators of atrocities, the plotters of gargantuan corruptions therefore stole public rights from the poor, those who slighted the virtues of religiosity; and the schemers of discords and hatred in the land were, by and large, Muslims. It is true that provocateurs have been so much at large in the country since Soeharto's starkly irresponsible "step-aside". But even the very fact of being vulnerable to negative provocations also constitutes an indication of religious bankruptcy.

This selling of political and/or religious ideals is not at all confined to Indonesians. As already stated, it is difficult to find a suitable example in the entire Muslim world of congruity not only in matters political, but in terms of the kernel of their own faith as well. Neither is this confined to that of the Muslims. There are equally worrisome cases in the African and Indian continents, Muslim or not, as well as in both sides of Europe. We see a similar phenomenon in Israel where the exceptional light brought in succession by the Judaic prophets has been sold and incarcerated by those in power who are determined to establish a shining polity without shining principles.

But we are most concerned with developments in the United States. Here the darkness of terrorism, which succeeded in attacking the heart of its global business center, is now progressively equaled and potentially surpassed by the year-long reaction and response from the White House. Many of us who have spent some significant time in America feel a great consternation over the wildness of the policy and the pronouncements coming from the present leaders of the great country.

Months ago it was still inconceivable that America would ever fall merely through the collapse of its WTC buildings, or even other alleged targets that reached their goal on the "the day of infamy". Now, however, from without and I am sure also from within American people begin to see the real possibility of the unraveling of the American ideals[1] upon which that great-

est polity in over the last two centuries was founded, from within. It has turned out that America is not shattered by the September 11 attack, but by its hasty and inconsiderate reaction to it. During the last month the shining light of the United States began to dim and continuously so. In deep irony, were have to say that for the first time in its exemplary history America has not been invulnerable to the very pitfall its political system has so ingeniously avoided for centuries: "that absolute power corrupts absolutely".

What I have in mind here is not only the way America conducted its war against terrorism in Afghanistan, its evilizing virtually all but itself, and hence its unruly desire to crush Saddam Hussein, which blindly thrashed its own political principle of respecting any modicum of doubt before taking serious actions, but also in the way it revives a monstrous kind of "Pax-obsession" perhaps to continue the western superiority complex enshrined in Pax-Romana and Pax-Britannica. In a fortnight, the Bush administration has changed America from a polity most respectable for its polyarchy and/or the heterogeneity not only of voices within its own borders but way beyond.

We say the words "great consternation" not so much because we fear as because we love America, not because its tomahawks and precision nuclear missiles could easily reach and in an instant reduce our bodies and houses to ashes, but because of the throwing into the ashes of American ideals that have enlightened the civilized world for so long. The feeling of great consternation has to do also with the fact that while most of us in smaller and much less fortunate nations are struggling in endless pains to follow the American example, the example bearer is flatly denying itself, strangely shedding its own pilgrims' and/or founding fathers' *raison d'être*. Again, we must say this not because we fear American deadly arsenals so much. For the majority of humankind even at this moment of modernity, including us here in Indonesia during the last six years, death and destruction have always been close anyway. We must

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say this because America, the exemplary, has trampled upon its true self for the sake of its own obsolete and monstrous glory, the very thing we from without have always quietly admired and wanted to emulate.

Notes

[1] The world has become all too familiar with the American ideals of freedom and equality, of liberty and non-discrimination, of freedom from fear and persecution, and of the right to pursue happiness that is not very easy to see the United States apart from them.

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Contributors and Editors

Abdurahman Wahid is Chairman of the Dewan Syuro Dewan Pimpinan Pusat of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa and the Musytasyar (Advisor) Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU).

Alex Soesilo Wijoyo S.J. is Member of the Lembaga Sensor Film Indonesia (LSFI) and Executive Secretary of the Komisi Komunikasi Sosial at KWI (Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia).

Azyumardi Azra is Professor of History at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta. He is at present Rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta.

Bassam Tibi is Professor of International Relations University of Göttingen, Germany.

Chaider S. Bamualim is Lecturer at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University and Research Fellow at Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya. He got his MA degree in Islamic Studies from Leiden University and graduated from 2003 Fulbright American Studies Institute "Religion in the United States: Pluralism and Public Presence".

Dick van der Meij is Visiting Professor at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta and staff member of INIS (Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies), Universiteit Leiden.

Elizabeth Fuller Collins is Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Ohio University; Visiting Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Division of Comparative Studies in the Humanities, Ohio State University (Winter-Spring quarters); and Lecturer, San Jose State University.

Farish A. Noor is presently an Affiliated Fellow with the Institute for Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), National University of Malaysia (UKM); Associate Fellow with the Bureau of Nation-Building and National Security at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; and Fellow at the Center for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin.

Iik Arifin Mansurnoor is Lecturer at the University of Brunei Darussalam.

Johan Hendrik Meuleman is Senior Lecturer, Universiteit Leiden in the framework of INIS (Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies), Universiteit Leiden; Research Fellow, International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden; President of the Board of the Foundation and Volunteer Lecturer, Islamic University of Europe, the Netherlands; and by special appointment Professor in the History of Islam, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta.

Juwono Sudarsono is Ambassador of Indonesia to the United Kingdom and Professor at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.

Karlina Helmanita is Lecturer at the Syarif Hidayatullah State

Islamic University and Research Fellow at Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya. At the Pusat Bahasa she is responsible for promoting program and research on Inter-cultural and Religious dialogue.

Komaruddin Hidayat is a Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Lecturer at the Faculty of Ushuluddin, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta. Activist at Paramadina Foundation; and Director of Madania Foundation.

M. Amin Abdullah is Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, and Rector of Sunan Kalijaga State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. He also teaches at the Faculty of Ushuluddin & Post Graduate Studies of the State Institute for Islamic Studies.

Mark R. Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies, University of Illinois.

Mochtar Pabottingi is Director of the Center for Political and Regional Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.

Murni Djamal is Director of Pusat bahasa dan Budaya (the Center for Languages and Cultures), Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta.

Norbert Eschborn is Representative of the Konrad -Adenauer-Stiftung to Indonesia.

Osama Ghazali Al-Harb is Chief Editor of "Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya" (The International Politics) Magazine, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo; Advisor of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo; and Political Analyst in the Al-Ahram Newspaper.

Parni Hadi is Journalist with ANTARA News Agency, Founder/ Chairman of The Earth Wire, global environmental news network (co-sponsored by UNESCO), and Columnist, radio and television talk show master.

Taufik Abdullah is Research Professor of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, and Professor of History, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.